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From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States 
and Human Rights Treaty Bodies∗ 
tara j. melish∗∗ 
In the battle for democracy and human rights, words matter, but what we do matters 
1much more. 
It is frequently said that the United States has a paradoxical human rights 
policy.2 On the one hand, the United States embraces human rights princi-
ples as a founding national ideology3 and has supported the enhancement of 
human rights and democracy as a core premise of its foreign policy since 
the end of World War II, when it played a leading role in birthing the 
international human rights regime.4 Indeed, the promotion of human rights 
and democracy abroad is a central motivating tenet of U.S. foreign policy, 
∗ The original version of this chapter was published in the Yale Journal of International Law 
(YJIL), volume 34, pp. 389–462 (2009). It has been adapted and substantively modified for 
inclusion in this book by permission of YJIL. 
∗∗ Visiting Professor, University of Notre Dame School of Law, Spring 2009. Associate Professor of 
Law, University at Buffalo School of Law, SUNY. JD, Yale Law School; BA, Brown University. 
I extend my gratitude to Robert K. Harris, Steven R. Hill, and Mark P. Lagon of the U.S. 
Department of State for their helpful conversations on issues discussed in this chapter, as 
well as to Sean Murphy, Susan Benesch, Rick Wilson, and Cesare Romano for their valuable 
comments on an earlier draft. All views expressed herein are those of the author alone. 
1 Warren Christopher, “Democracy and Human Rights: Where America Stands,” transcript of 
U.S. Secretary of State’s address to 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, June 21, 1993, 
in U.S. State Dep’t Dispatch No. 25, June 23, 1993 [hereinafter Christopher]. 
2 See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” in Michael Ignatieff, 
ed., American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 
147–97. 
3 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Policy (1988), 24 (“The cause 
of human rights forms the core of American foreign policy [as] it is central to America’s 
conception of itself.”); Christopher, op. cit. (“America’s identity as a nation derives from our 
dedication to the proposition ‘that all Men are created equal and endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable rights.’”). 
4 See Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001). 
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manifested in the nation’s extensive foreign assistance commitments, political 
and financial support of international human rights bodies, linking of bilateral 
aid to human rights improvements, and annual reporting on the human rights 
situation of 194 nations of the world.5 National public opinion polls, moreover, 
suggest that roughly eighty percent of Americans believe that human rights 
inhere in every human being, whether the government formally recognizes 
those rights or not.6 Equal numbers express not only their support for U.S. 
ratification of human rights treaties but also their belief that international 
supervision over those treaty commitments, by a court or other independent 
body, is necessary.7 
Yet despite strong external and internal human rights commitments, the 
United States has appeared to flinch, even recoil, when it comes to direct 
domestic application of human rights treaty norms, especially as those norms 
are interpreted by international supervisory bodies. Whether through the exec-
utive, the legislature, or the courts, the nation has insisted that human rights 
treaties are non-self-executing domestically and has remained ambivalent 
toward international adjudicatory fora that may judge it on its own human 
rights treaty commitments. The United States has renounced international 
bodies that have issued judgments against it on human rights matters, declined 
to affirmatively accept the contentious jurisdiction of human rights bodies, 
and even fought the creation of new international bodies with adjudicatory 
5 The U.S. Department of State, under congressional mandate, has been reporting annually on 
human rights conditions in countries around the world since 1976. Since  2002, these  Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices have been supplemented by an annual report to Congress 
on the specific actions taken by the U.S. government to encourage respect for human rights 
around the world, in compliance with section 665 of the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No.  107-228, 116 Stat. 1350 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 2151n, 2304 (2000 & Supp. VII 2007)). See, e.g., U.S. State Department, Supporting Human 
Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2006 (2006). Of course, U.S. foreign policy has also 
served over the years to consolidate the power of many dictators and repressive governments 
responsible for systematic human rights abuse. 
6 See The Opportunity Agenda, “Human Rights in the United States: Findings from a National 
Survey,” Public Opinion Research on Human Rights in the U.S. (by Belden Russonello & 
Stewart), Aug. 2007, at  12 (finding that 80 percent of Americans support this proposition, 
whereas only 18 percent endorse view that “rights are given to an individual by his or her 
government”). 
7 See, e.g., Steven Kull et al., “Americans on International Courts and Their Jurisdiction over 
the US,” The WorldPublicOpinion.org/Knowledge Networks Poll, May 11, 2006, at  3. The  
poll finds that 79 percent of Americans believe that there should be an independent interna-
tional body, such as a court, to judge whether the United States and other states parties are 
abiding by the international human rights treaties they ratify. Indeed, of all subject matters 
commonly governed by treaty (i.e., border disputes, fishing rights, environment, human rights, 
trade, labor, investments, and protection of aliens), human rights treaties received the highest 
percentage of support for the proposition that independent international tribunal supervision 
over compliance was necessary. Id. 
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competence over its citizens. It is this apparent paradox of U.S. human rights 
policy – outwardly prodigious, inwardly niggardly – and its underlying set of 
“antinomies”8 that a growing literature has sought to document and explain, 
often through the lens of U.S. exceptionalism.9 
This chapter offers a new narrative based in interest-group management. It 
does so by taking a closer look at the U.S. human rights paradox from the per-
spective of U.S. engagement with the international human rights treaty bodies 
that exercise formal supervisory jurisdiction over it.10 This engagement, once 
negligible, has expanded quite significantly over the last decade, a byproduct of 
the United States’ careful navigation through a diverse set of political pressures. 
It is thus useful to view the distinct ways and degrees in which this engagement 
manifests itself, especially with respect to the varied competences that treaty 
bodies exercise along the supervisory spectrum. Doing so allows us to take a 
closer look at the actual reasons why the United States may shrink from full 
engagement with certain international processes, while accepting others fully. 
Such a frame can, in turn, reveal important insights for predicting what the 
United States can and will do in the future, why, and under what preconditions 
or constraining guidelines. Importantly, it also allows us to begin to imagine a 
set of institutional arrangements and coordinating mechanisms that can help 
to address the underlying concerns, particularly as they relate to recurrently 
raised federalism, separation of powers, and countermajoritarian objections. 
My central claim is that a closer, more searching look at the nature and 
scope of U.S. treaty-body engagement policy – especially at the plurality of 
disaggregated policy interests that determine its evolving and often asymmetric 
contours – reveals that the U.S. human rights paradox may not in fact be so 
paradoxical. To the contrary, given U.S. engagement policy’s modern doctri-
nal anchoring in one of international human rights law’s most foundational 
principles – the principle of subsidiarity11 – it may be precisely the foundation 
8 Sean D. Murphy, “The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with Anti-
nomies,” Chapter 4 in this volume (defining antinomies as “equally rational but conflicting 
principles” and discussing three that underlie U.S. foreign policy: realism vs. institutional-
ism, exceptionalism vs. sovereign equality, and autonomous national law vs. internationally 
embedded domestic law). 
9 See, in particular, contributions in Michael Ignatieff, ed. American Exceptionalism and Human 
Rights, op. cit.; Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” op. cit. (presented as 
conference paper in proceedings giving rise to this book project). 
10 Human rights treaty bodies refer to the committees or commissions of independent experts set 
up under key human rights treaties to supervise, through quasi-adjudicatory and promotional 
powers, state-party compliance with treaty undertakings. 
11 The principle of subsidiarity, discussed further in this chapter, governs the appropriate relation-
ship among international, national, and subnational levels of supervision in the shared project 
of ensuring human rights protection for all individuals. Foundational to international human 
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necessary to build a strong and sustainable domestic human rights policy over 
the long term. Achieving this, however, will require a fundamental shift in 
thinking and strategy among many domestic advocates. That shift is one that 
draws from the insights of an interest mediation perspective to transform the 
current U.S. engagement emphasis on the negative dimension of the subsidiar-
ity principle from a shield into a sword. That is, the tools of the subsidiarity 
principle must not be permitted to be used only defensively by U.S. actors to 
shield domestic legislative and judicial processes from international interven-
tion. They must also be used offensively to routinize, within the bounds of 
U.S. federalism, an internal process of domestic self-reflection and localized 
democratic deliberation on how we, in our own local communities, wish to 
protect internationally recognized human rights to best ensure the dignity of 
the human person. 
The challenge for domestic human rights advocates, I argue, is not to reject 
the negative dimensions of subsidiarity (as is the tendency today), dimen-
sions that are core to U.S. interest-management techniques, but rather to 
firmly embrace them, while likewise finding new ways of working flexibly 
and effectively within the subsidiarity paradigm to institutionalize a frame-
work for respecting the positive half. In this way, advocates may ensure that 
U.S. engagement policy is directed not only outward, toward an international 
audience, but, just as critically, inward to our own domestic constituencies at 
home. It is this vital shift in U.S. human rights policy – from partial subsidiarity 
(paradox) to genuine subsidiarity – that is the focus of this chapter. 
Yet a doctrinally anchored, interest-mediation perspective on U.S. human 
rights policy does not only help to chart a path toward the future. It also helps to 
explain the present and past. It offers, in this regard, a fuller, more empirically 
plausible and realistic account of U.S. human rights policy than can parallel 
accounts sounding in “U.S. exceptionalism,” whether of a “rights cultural” 
or “structural” variety.12 Indeed, a closer look at the actual ways in which the 
United States engages with human rights treaty bodies – and, specifically, at the 
varying mediating techniques13 it employs to ensure its engagement comports 
rights law, it has been broadly defined as “the principle that each social and political group 
should help smaller or more local ones accomplish their respective ends without, however, 
arrogating those tasks to itself.” Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of 
International Human Rights Law, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 38, 38 n.1 (2003) (providing a “simplified 
working definition”). 
12 See Moravcsik, op. cit. (discussing “rights cultural” and “structural” narratives of U.S. excep-
tionalism, and defending the latter). 
13 The term “mediating techniques” is used here in relation to the tactics, methods, and postures 
employed by the U.S. government in modulating its human rights engagement policy to take 
into account the countervailing pressures faced from a diversity of interest groups, at both 
domestic and foreign policy levels, each urging greater or lesser levels of U.S. engagement. 
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with evolving U.S. domestic and foreign policy interests – suggests that aca-
demic prognostications that the United States will resist further engagement 
with human rights bodies may be short-sighted. Whereas prominent observers 
of the “U.S. human rights paradox” have suggested that we should not be 
optimistic about further U.S. engagement in the international human rights 
regime, given certain structural conditions that set the United States apart 
from other nations,14 I argue that this view may be overly static in its portrayal 
of the predicted behavior of relevant social actors, even under unreservedly 
correct, “thicker” explanations of U.S. ambivalence to human rights law.15 
Specifically, while correctly focusing on domestic special interest politics and 
the unique ability of veto players in the United States’ highly decentralized 
and fragmented political structure to block treaty ratification notwithstanding 
supportive domestic majorities (especially under Republican Senate majori-
ties), such a view fails to take account of the diverse and dynamic ways that 
civil society advocates – of both liberal and conservative persuasions – take 
advantage of changing positions and new strategic openings for advancing 
their substantive policy preferences. 
In particular, by focusing too narrowly on conservative politics, veto play-
ers, and formal treaty ratification procedures, the view fails to take account 
This usage differs slightly from the term’s primary use in the scholarly literature to describe 
the justiciability doctrines and other judicial restraint techniques used by courts and tribunals, 
at both national and international levels, to accommodate separation of powers, federalism, 
subsidiarity, and sovereignty concerns. See, e.g., Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 
112 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962) (discussing domestic judiciary’s “passive virtues” and quoting Justice 
Brandeis’s assertion that the “mediating techniques of not doing” were the most important 
thing the U.S. Supreme Court did); Murphy, op. cit. (discussing and citing other scholarly 
discussions of “mediating techniques” used by international tribunals to promote engagement 
by States). 
14 See Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” op. cit. Professor Moravcsik 
identifies four such structural conditions (external power, democratic stability, conservative 
minorities, and fragmented political institutions), concluding that “[t]he United States is excep-
tional primarily because it occupies an extreme position in [these] four structural dimensions 
of human rights politics, from which we would expect extreme behavior on the part of any 
government.” Id. at 150–51. 
15 See id. Professor Moravcsik argues convincingly that a “thicker,” “pluralist” explanation that 
focuses on the instrumentality of partisan politics and conservative policy agendas in explaining 
U.S. human rights behavior is more plausible empirically than “thinner” accounts that attribute 
U.S. ambivalence to a unique American “rights culture,” one predisposing Americans to oppose 
human rights treaty commitments. He nonetheless reads his analysis as suggesting a “sobering 
conclusion”: “U.S. ambivalence toward international human rights commitments is not a short-
term contingent aspect of specific American policies, but it is woven into the deep structural 
reality of American political life.” Id. at 197. Consequently, “The institutional odds against any 
fundamental change in Madison’s republic are high. To reverse current trends would require 
an epochal constitutional rupture – an Ackermanian ‘constitutional moment’. . . . Short of that, 
this particular brand of American ambivalence toward the domestic application of international 
human rights norms is unlikely to change anytime soon.” Id. 
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of the equally relevant strategies and campaigns of liberal politics, including 
their regular employ of the many “deblocking” opportunities presented by the 
fragmented U.S. political structure. Likewise, it insufficiently addresses the 
ways the U.S. government acts in a mediating role between these countervail-
ing persuasions, including those operating at the foreign policy level: bowing 
more or less to one or the other, yet always within the bounds of a principled, 
rule-bound policy position. Under this light, any prediction that the United 
States will not further engage with human rights treaty bodies may be missing 
critical domestic movements and changing visions of political agency that 
suggest the contrary. 
This is particularly true as advocates and interest groups adapt their strategies 
to the hard reality of U.S. ratification of an increasing number of human rights 
treaties and persistent engagement with international supervisory procedures. 
The fundamental domestic debate has in many ways thus changed. It is no 
longer whether the United States will ratify, but rather how domestic advocates 
will use U.S. ratification and international engagement to achieve their distinct 
domestic policy agendas at home and what measures or methodologies the 
U.S. government will adopt to mediate these countervailing pressures. 
To address these important issues, this chapter proceeds in six parts. Fol-
lowing this introduction and a brief explanation of the subsidiarity principle, 
Part A provides an overview of the legal framework that structures current U.S. 
human rights treaty body engagements at the national and international lev-
els. Part B supplements this review by examining the specific ways the United 
States16 in fact engages with the three principal competences exercised by the 
UN, OAS, and ILO supervisory treaty body systems: periodic reporting, quasi-
adjudication, and promotional activities. It concludes that U.S. engagement 
with these competences is in fact far more robust than popular notions of the 
“U.S. human rights paradox” would suggest. 
Part C seeks then to explain this discrepancy. It suggests that U.S. engage-
ment policy is best viewed not as a static or structural given, but rather as a 
complex mediation among a variety of pressures exerted on policy makers by 
powerful actors at both the foreign and domestic policy levels. Disaggregat-
ing those pressures, the analysis emphasizes the role of four distinct groups 
that contribute to the pragmatic calculus undertaken in shaping U.S. human 
rights policy. These include “realists” and “institutionalists” at the foreign 
policy level and groups I call “insulationists” and “incorporationists” at the 
16 Throughout this chapter, “United States” is used to refer to the state agents who express the 
policy position of the nation before international treaty bodies. Although frequently represented 
by the U.S. State Department, the position asserted represents that of the “State” and is informed 
by many complex processes. 
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domestic policy level, each seeking alternately greater or lesser substantive 
and procedural engagement with human rights bodies, in accordance with 
their group-specific policy interests. While scholars in the various camps of 
international relations theory tend to explain U.S. engagement policy with 
primary emphasis on one of these four groups,17 it is the complex interaction 
and competing interests of each of them, I argue, that determine the precise 
coordinates at which U.S. policy can most accurately be mapped. 
To explain how this complex management process is effectuated, Part D 
identifies the principal mediating techniques employed by the United States in 
its current treaty body engagements, each designed to accommodate distinct 
sets of competing interest-group pressures. While each of these mediating 
techniques is solidly anchored in foundational international law doctrines 
of sovereignty and subsidiarity, each nonetheless draws on only the negative 
dimensions of those doctrines. Corresponding to doctrines of non-interference 
and deference to domestic political processes, this selective posture allows the 
United States to effectively manage competing interest group pressures, pur-
suing an engagement policy that at once permits active U.S. engagement with 
international procedures, appeases the most vocal critiques of such engage-
ment (at both domestic and foreign-policy levels), and allows the United States 
to remain in formal compliance with the external procedural obligations it has 
assumed under international law through treaty ratification. 
What it does not do, as currently pursued, is facilitate internal domestic 
reflection on the nation’s treaty-based human rights commitments. Indeed, 
responsive to the dominant pressures exerted at present on U.S. policy makers 
from both within and without government, these mediating techniques draw 
on only half of subsidiarity’s blueprint. This partial and selective embrace of the 
tools envisioned by international human rights law’s subsidiarity principle has 
conduced to a signal, yet predictable, outcome: U.S. engagement policy has to 
date been pursued principally, if not wholly, as a foreign policy objective, not as 
a domestic policy one. That is, contrary to the primary purposes of international 
human rights law, the United States engages with international human rights 
bodies not with an eye toward better protecting human rights within its own 
jurisdictional boundaries but rather with a view toward influencing the policies 
of other sovereign states and the international community generally. Part E 
17 These camps include those dedicated to realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and construc-
tivism. For a general descriptive overview, see Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties 
Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002). Though neither liberalism nor constructivism 
refers in name to “insulationists” or “incorporationists,” the emphasis of liberalism on domes-
tic political structures and processes focuses it on the veto-player politics of the former, just 
as constructivism’s privileging of the role of non-state actors and their persuasive discourses 
focuses it on the tactics and strategies of the latter. 
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discusses this conflict, the structural opportunities for addressing it, and the 
importance of giving the principle of subsidiarity its full and intended meaning 
in international human rights law. The piece continues by looking at where 
U.S. policy can be expected to lead in coming years, as U.S. policy makers 
continue to chart a middle course through difficult and shifting pressures. 
This middle course is one that does not reject but rather solidly embraces 
supervisory human rights treaty body processes, albeit under a vision of their 
jurisdiction as strictly subsidiary to domestic decision-making processes. The 
challenge for domestic advocates, I argue, is to ensure that this subsidiarity 
principle is embraced in its full dimensionality, not only in its negative facets. 
An outline of how this might be institutionally pursued and structured in the 
United States is discussed in Part E. 
∗ ∗ ∗ 
Before turning to these important issues, a brief reflection on the subsidiarity 
principle in international human rights law is warranted.18 First off, this princi-
ple should not be confused with the narrower, more rigid rule of the same name 
that has developed since 1993 in the European Union to govern the constitu-
tional relationship between the Union and its member states.19 Often equated 
with U.S. federalism,20 which draws from but does not replicate subsidiarity’s 
18 For the fullest account of this principle, see Carozza, op. cit. 
19 This principle is reflected in Articles 1, 2, and  5 of the (Maastricht) Treaty on European 
Union, as updated by the Protocol of Amsterdam. Although the broad essence of subsidiarity 
is reflected in Article 1, which requires that “decisions [be] taken . . . as close as possible to the 
citizen,” it is the practical operationalization of the principle in article 5 that has been the 
focus of the EU subsidiarity “rule”: “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which 
do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the 
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.” 
20 The similarities between EU subsidiarity and U.S. constitutional federalism have spawned 
a vast comparative literature. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: 
Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 332 (1994); 
W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law – American Federalism 
Compared, 27 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L.  61 (1995); Gerald L. Neuman, Subsidiarity, Harmo-
nization, and Their Values: Convergence and Divergence in Europe and the United States, 2 
Colum J. Eur. L. 573 (1996); Cary Coglianese and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Securing Subsidiarity: 
The Institutional Design of Federalism in the United States and Europe,” in The Federal 
Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (K. 
Nicolaidis & R. Howse, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
Other literature has explored the nuances and complexities of the concept across subject 
matters and jurisdictions. See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, 
and Nation in the European Commonwealth 151–55 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
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premises, the rule is directed to dividing legislative competences21 between ver-
tically overlapping sovereignties, with the higher level preempting the lower 
in its carefully prescribed fields of authority.22 The principle of subsidiarity 
that structurally underlies international human rights law is both broader and 
less rigid than its modern European namesake.23 This is true even as it is fully 
consistent with, and complementary to, both the narrower EU subsidiarity 
rule and American constitutional federalism. 
The primary differentiating feature between the two lies in their respective 
objects of protection. Unlike its narrower rule-based instantiation, the safe-
guarded object of which is the sovereignty interests of formal political units 
within a given constitutional structure, the principle of subsidiarity begins and 
ends with the human person – specifically, with the inherent dignity of the 
socially situated human being. Society and government are thus viewed as inte-
grated into a protective layering of facilitative support, or subsidium, designed 
to ensure that such dignity finds genuine expression in meaningful, appro-
priate, context-specific ways. Such support does not aim to preempt “lower” 
competences but rather to assist and strengthen them such that they are capa-
ble of meeting needs directly where and when they arise, at the level closest 
(distinguishing “market subsidiarity,” “communal subsidiarity,” “rational legislative subsidiar-
ity,” and “comprehensive subsidiarity”); Giandomenico Majone, “Regulatory Legitimacy in 
the United States and the European Union,” in The Federal Vision, op. cit. at 252 (noting 
increased demand in the EU for local control in the nineties led to shift in subsidiarity’s 
interpretation from “total” harmonization to “optional” and “minimum” harmonization, just 
as similar demands in the United States in the seventies and eighties led to a shift from 
“preemptive” to “cooperative federalism”). 
21 For an argument that subsidiarity should likewise be incorporated into the judicial doctrine of 
the European Court of Justice, which has so far resisted Maastricht’s governing principle, see 
Edward T. Swaine, Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice, 
41 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1 (2000); Florian Sander, Subsidiarity Infringements before the European 
Court of Justice: Futile Interference with Politics or a Substantial Step Towards EU Federalism, 
12 Colum. J. Eur. L. 517 (2006). 
22 Lower political units, bound by the higher, are thus required to harmonize their laws to 
conform to the rules and directives of the higher authority, whenever higher action is expressly 
authorized or, given its scale or effects, sanctioned as “necessary” and proportional to achieve 
treaty objectives. See Maastricht Treaty, op. cit. art. 5. 
23 See Carozza, op. cit. at 52 (underscoring that “[i]t would truly impoverish our discourse and 
reduce our capacity for understanding to limit subsidiarity to a technical European rule that 
does not grow up out of that ground”). Carozza provides the long history to the concept, which 
dates back to classical Greece, tracing its intellectual history through medieval scholasticism; 
seventeenth-century securalist theory; the work of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century titans 
such as Montesquieu, Locke, Tocqueville, Lincoln, and Proudhon; and nineteenth-century 
Catholic social theory, until finally transposed from social philosophy into positive law by 
Germany in its post–World War II drive to undo the massive centralization of national socialism 
and to devolve power to the Länder. It was formally enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992 (and further proceduralized in the 1996 Protocol of Amsterdam), taking on a particularly 
European meaning that is nonetheless still quite contested. 
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to the affected individual. In this way, subsidiarity represents the constitutive 
scaffolding to what may usefully be visualized as a series of nested circles, with 
the individual human person sitting at the center, surrounded concentrically 
by progressively larger social groupings of family, civic solidarity associations, 
local government, nation-state, and, ultimately, intergovernmental bodies and 
transnational social networks. 
To best ensure the dignity interests of their constituent members, each of 
these connective layers holds concurrent duties of both non-interference and 
assistance to their interior or smaller units. On the one hand, larger, more 
comprehensive organizations have a “negative” duty not to interfere in the 
freedom of inner groupings to meet their own human dignity needs in ways 
that accord with their own realities. “It requires that problems be solved where 
they occur, by those who understand them best, and by those who are most 
affected by them.”24 It thus mandates that a respectful degree of latitude and 
discretion be given to smaller communities to interpret and implement human 
rights in ways that authentically accord with local understandings, mores, and 
particularized conditions. This follows not only from the fact that local needs 
are best appreciated by local actors but also from the fact that we live in a plural 
world in which the value of human dignity can be instantiated in a diversity of 
ways, each of which may fully accord with the broad purposes to which human 
rights aim. It is the formalized tools of this negative aspect of subsidiarity that the 
United States tends to invoke exclusively, often in conjunction with appeals to 
U.S. federalism, in defending its domestic human rights record and insulating 
it from outside pressures or influences. 
Yet just as the subsidiarity principle does not tolerate preemption of smaller 
social or political units, neither does it support wholesale devolution to them.25 
Accordingly, whenever interior bodies cannot accomplish the good to which 
human rights aim without assistance, exterior groupings have a “positive” 
responsibility to intervene – by, for example, “directing, watching, urging, 
restraining, as occasion requires and necessity demands”26 – to assist them  
24 J. E. Linnan, Subsidiarity, Collegiality, Catholic Diversity, and Their Relevance to Apostolic 
Visitations, 49 The Jurist 399, 403 (1989), cited in Dinah Shelton, “Subsidiarity, Democracy 
and Human Rights,” in Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of 
Asbjorn Eide 43 (Donna Gomien ed., Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1993). The passage 
continues: “Only when their efforts fail should the matter be placed before a higher authority.” 
Id. at 43–44. 
25 See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 
35 Ind. L. Rev. 103 (2001) (arguing that the “compassionate conservatism” platform of the 
Republican Party purports to enact the lessons of Catholic teachings on subsidiarity but in so 
doing advocates wholesale devolution to local authorities, neglecting subsidiarity’s core focus 
on assistance from higher authorities). 
26 Carozza, op. cit. at 41, quoting Pius XI’s 1931 papal encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical 
Letter on Reconstruction of Social Order. 
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in fulfilling the objectives of the common good. This requires that compre-
hensive monitoring mechanisms be set up – separately, at local, national, 
and international levels – that can track progress and setbacks at lower lev-
els, providing support, an external check, and facilitative assistance whenever 
locally unremedied abuses or systemic problems are perceived. International 
human rights law, accordingly, envisions a constitutive framework of moni-
toring, supervision, and facilitation that allows this subsidiary relationship to 
play itself out flexibly within a broad variety of institutional structures and 
mediating procedures.27 This is true not only at the international level but 
also, just as importantly, at the national and subnational levels. 
In short, the subsidiarity principle in human rights law is directed at ensur-
ing that the heavy lifting of human rights interpretation and implementation 
occurs at the domestic level, as close as possible to affected individuals. Inter-
national treaty bodies correspondingly see their role as inherently supplemen-
tal, designed not to usurp or preempt but to facilitate, assist, and strengthen 
indigenous and localized implementation efforts. The principle of subsidiarity 
thus provides an important middle way through the polarizing tensions and 
cross-talk that currently dominate U.S. discourse on domestic human rights 
incorporation, particularly in its unhelpful setting of sovereignty and feder-
alism in opposition to internationalism and human rights.28 These dueling 
27 Modern international human rights treaty bodies, for example, exercise this subsidiary respon-
sibility through each of their recognized competences. Thus, periodic reporting processes are 
designed precisely to stimulate and regularize domestic monitoring, enforcement, and self-
appraisal processes, with the broad participation of all members of society. See, e.g., Comm. 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 1, Reporting by States Parties 
(Third session, 1989), U.N. Doc. E/1989/22, annex III at 87 (1989) (identifying objectives of peri-
odic reporting). The issuance of general comments aims to offer advice and guidance, drawn 
from the comparative experience of other states, for state consideration in implementing, mod-
ifying, and enforcing their own policies. Special rapporteurs work to identify best practices 
and common pitfalls across jurisdictions, stimulating and promoting issue-specific dialogue 
among a multiplicity of actors working on a common problem. Further, individual complaint 
processes, activated only when domestic remedies have proved ineffective in addressing a 
concrete human rights abuse, aim at ensuring, through a variety of tools, that an appropriate 
remedial scheme is effected by local actors. In fact, to ensure that such interventions are 
proportional and offered only where necessary, a series of institutional restraint doctrines have 
been adopted to guide treaty body conduct, particularly where complaints procedures are 
at issue. These include, among others, the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule, the mar-
gin of appreciation doctrine, “reasonableness” and other appropriate interest-balancing and 
proportionality tests, the fourth instance formula, and friendly settlement and “good offices” 
conciliation, all of which are important tools of subsidiarity. They also include recognition of 
the permissibility of reservations, understandings, and declarations and, specifically, respect 
for the non-self-execution doctrine. 
28 This discourse, which extends over an enormous literature, is in many ways succinctly encapsu-
lated in the popular-media exchange between Peter Spiro, Jack Goldsmith, and Curtis Bradley 
in Foreign Affairs, in which “sovereignty” and “internationalism” are antagonized. See Peter J. 
Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, Foreign Affairs, 
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postures, through their tendency to minimize the important constitutional 
values and democratic insights offered by the opposing position, tend toward 
communicative deadlock and heel-digging.29 Subsidiarity, by contrast, merges 
the core democratic insights of both positions.30 It values the procedural facil-
itation of international bodies and national monitoring, while respecting the 
primacy of localized process in determining appropriate means toward com-
mon ends. That is, it sees as its objective the authentic instantiation of human 
rights values in locally relevant, contingent, and meaningful ways, by local 
actors – not as cookie-cutter transplants determined and imposed by interna-
tional experts, as is frequently claimed by those who resist human rights treaty 
incorporation on sovereignty, federalism, or majoritarian grounds.31 
Subsidiarity, in this way, rejects the notion that respect for universal human 
rights is synonymous with singular or absolutist outcomes or interpretations, 
which only an international body is competent to define.32 To the contrary, 
it understands that, given the plurality of human communities, the broad 
Nov./Dec. 2000, at  1 (describing sovereigntists as “insulationist” and “anti-international”); Cur-
tis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Letter to the Editor, Foreign Affairs, Mar./Apr. 2001, at  
188 (rejecting Spiro’s “unalloyed internationalism” as ignoring importance of state consent); 
Peter J. Spiro, “What Happened to the “New Sovereigntists?” Foreign Affairs, foreignaffairs.org, 
July 28, 2004 (predicting that the United States will finally be forced to “bend to international 
norms” after Iraq War debacle). See also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American 
Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390 (1998) (concluding that U.S. government must “make a 
choice”: human rights treaties or American federalism). 
29 See generally Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Con-
ditional Consent, 149 U.  Pa. L. Rev.  399, 468 (2000) (noting that “the exaggeration and 
impatience that characterize the opposition to RUDs [reservations, understandings, and dec-
larations] threaten to make U.S. officials less inclined, not more inclined, to continue their 
involvement with international institutions”). 
30 The constitutive relationship among democracy, subsidiarity, and human rights has been 
initially explored in Dinah Shelton, op. cit. 
31 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law? 
1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 327, 338–39 (2000). As Professor Carozza has underscored, “A subsidiarity-
oriented understanding of human rights and international law does not care to ask whether 
‘state sovereignty’ must either resist or give way to international harmonization and intervention 
but, instead, whether the good that human rights aim at realizing can be accomplished at the 
local level, and if not, what assistance is necessary from a more comprehensive association to 
enable a smaller unit to realize its role.” Carozza, op. cit. at 66. 
32 This is equally true for quasi-adjudicatory treaty bodies, such as the UN treaty body committees, 
and for supranational “courts,” such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. Although court rulings and remedial orders are binding 
on the parties to the litigation, they tend to be drafted in sufficiently broad terms to permit 
significant latitude to states in determining the contours of appropriate implementation at the 
domestic level. The remedial orders of the Inter-American Court, for example, increasingly 
require the participation of victims in the determination of the specific concrete measures 
that will give effect to the broad principles laid down by the Court. See Tara J. Melish, “Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity,” in Malcolm Langford, ed., Social 
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in Comparative and International Law (New York: 
Cambridge University Press 2008). 
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purposes of human dignity that human rights norms encapsulate must be given 
concrete form in locally relevant ways and that these instantiations will take 
a wide diversity of forms across the culturally rich tapestry of human society. 
As such, international processes are designed first and foremost to require that 
processes are established and routinized at the domestic level to resolve human 
rights complaints locally and to ensure that these are operating effectively and 
reliably. International bodies will intervene only when domestic institutions 
prove ineffective in resolving human rights issues, and then with the primary 
objective of strengthening local processes through constantly innovating forms 
of facilitative assistance, or subsidium. 
Whether human rights treaty law becomes a more permanent fixture in 
U.S. law and policy making in the coming years will depend in large measure 
on the extent to which this positive dimension of the subsidiarity principle 
is constructively embraced by U.S. policy makers and, most importantly, by 
domestic interest groups – actively employed to formalize and institutionalize 
domestic supervisory and monitoring processes, at local, state, and federal lev-
els, as a national project (rather than an international one). Such internally 
reflective processes – supported by a national institutional framework – must 
aim to continually assess and reassess national and local progress and setbacks 
in human rights achievement, debate the normative content of those rights, 
listen to citizen views on where deficiencies arise and how potential solutions 
might be crafted, and chart locally and nationally relevant paths toward fuller 
domestic human rights achievement. The promotion of such internal delib-
erative processes around the normative meaning of rights is in fact precisely 
the object to which international human rights law is directed.33 
It is important to underscore, in this respect, that the United States’ historic 
ambivalence to human rights treaty body engagements does not relate to 
either human rights or international supervisory regimes per se; both are 
fully consistent with and complementary to U.S. democracy, federalism, and 
rights culture. Rather, U.S. ambivalence is responsive to a particular static and 
absolutist way of conceiving human rights and international supervision that 
has been propagated and popularized over the past half-century by partisan 
U.S. interest groups. Although this rights absolutism is key to the rhetoric 
and group-mobilization strategies of many domestic advocates (of both liberal 
and conservative persuasion), it fails to acknowledge two of the principal 
underlying tenets of international human rights treaty law and supervision: 
First, its subsidiary nature vis-à-vis domestic protection efforts and, second, its 
33 It has been observed, for example, that “from a Liberal perspective, a –  if not the – primary 
function of public international law is . . . to influence and improve the functioning of domes-
tic institutions” and that, accordingly, “human rights law is the core of international law.” 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 ASIL Proc. 240, 246 (2000) 
(emphasis in original). 
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focus on domestic process and progressivity, not universalized or standardized, 
top-to-bottom policy prescriptions or outcomes. A renewed focus on these 
tenets would reveal that the U.S. human rights paradox, at least in its modern 
manifestation and as applied within the U.S. territorial jurisdiction, is not in 
fact so paradoxical. To the contrary, once given an institutional framework to 
express itself domestically, it may be precisely the foundation for ensuring a 
sustainable domestic U.S. human rights policy over the long term.34 
A. LEGAL CONTEXT: THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 
APPLICABLE TO THE UNITED STATES 
It is frequently contended that the United States ratifies few international 
human rights treaties. Although this may be true in relative terms, it does 
not accurately reflect the scope of commitments the United States has in 
fact undertaken under international human rights law, particularly over the 
past two decades. Under growing pressure from domestic and international 
constituents and with strong bipartisan support, the United States has ratified 
an increasingly broad spectrum of human rights treaties, under Republican 
and Democratic administrations alike. Thus, under the administrations of 
George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush, the United 
States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),35 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),36 the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),37 the 
Genocide Convention,38 a series of ILO treaties on labor rights,39 and the two 
Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the areas 
34 It may also provide important insights for a more sustainable U.S. policy toward other interna-
tional tribunal engagements, such as with the International Court of Justice. 
35 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The ICCPR was ratified by the United States 
on June 8, 1992. 
36 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
The CAT was ratified by the United States on October 21, 1994. 
37 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 
1965, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212 [hereinafter CERD]. The CERD 
was ratified by the United States on October 21, 1994. 
38 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The Convention was ratified 
by the United States on November 25, 1988. 
39 See, e.g., Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, S. Treaty 
Doc. 88-11, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (ratified by the United States on September 25, 1991); Convention 
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 (ratified by the United States on December 2, 
1999). As of 2008, the United States has ratified a total of fourteen ILO treaties. 
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of children in armed conflict and the sale of children, child prostitution, and 
child pornography.40 The United States has also ratified human rights treaties 
relating to slavery,41 refugees,42 and the political rights of women,43 among 
others,44 and has ratified the OAS Charter, which subjects it to the promotional 
and quasi-adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights with respect to the full scope of internationally recognized 
rights enshrined in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. 
Taken together, these treaties cover a vast spectrum of rights – of a civil, 
cultural, economic, political, and social nature – and extend horizontally 
under three distinct supranational supervisory systems, each with its own set 
of promotional and quasi-adjudicatory powers. In this sense, although critical 
attention is often focused on the U.S. failure to ratify certain internationally 
popular treaties, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), the American Convention on Human Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
it must be recognized that the scope of international commitments implicated 
by these treaties has already, in large measure, been undertaken by the United 
States pursuant to the treaties that it has ratified.45 This reality complicates 
40 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children 
in armed conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 (ratified by the United States on December 
23, 2002); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, at 6, 54 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000) (ratified by the United States on December 
23, 2002). 
41 See, e.g., Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Conven-
tion of 1926 (Slavery Convention of 1926), 60 L.N.T.S. 253; Protocol Amending the Slavery 
Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 182 U.N.T.S. 51; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 226 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
42 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
43 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, July 7, 1954, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Inter-American 
Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. T.S. No. 3 
(ratified by the United States on March 22, 1976). 
44 The United States has ratified all four Geneva Conventions. As it recognizes, it has also “entered 
into many bilateral treaties (including consular treaties and treaties of friendship, commerce, 
and navigation) that contain provisions guaranteeing various rights and protections to nationals 
of foreign countries on a reciprocal basis,” some of which may be invoked directly in U.S. 
courts. See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, “Core Document Forming 
Part of the Reports of States Parties: United States,” ¶ 151, U.N. Doc. HRI/CORE/USA/2005, 
Jan. 16, 2006. 
45 There is indeed wide overlap in the rights protected in distinct human rights treaties. This is 
apparent in the substantial substantive overlap (both direct and indirect) in the rights enshrined 
in the ICCPR and ICESCR, as well as by the express inclusion of varying numbers of both 
sets of rights in virtually all other human rights treaties, including the European Convention, 
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the utility to partisan actors of wholesale opposition to currently nonratified 
treaties.46 It also undermines claims that the United States fails to ratify human 
rights treaties out of a cultural commitment to “negative” or libertarian con-
ceptions of rights or, relatedly, a cultural aversion to economic, social, and cul-
tural rights, two frequently raised but factually uncompelling explanations.47 
American Convention, African Charter, CERD, CEDAW, and CRC. Although it is there-
fore undoubtedly correct that the oft-purported “cultural aversion to socioeconomic (‘positive’) 
rights in the strong sense of welfare entitlements or labor rights,” is not a credible reason for U.S. 
ambivalence to human rights (see Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” 
op. cit. at 163), the proffered reasons for reaching that conclusion are misdirected. Id. (conclud-
ing that because “the international human rights system strictly separates civil and political 
rights from socioeconomic ones,” the “United States could, therefore, at any time simply ignore 
socioeconomic documents, while ratifying and implementing civil and political ones”). 
46 Indeed, CEDAW, CRC, and ICESCR subject matters are regularly taken up through ICCPR, 
CERD, CAT, and ILO convention supervisory procedures. 
47 U.S. law, at local, state, and federal levels, provides significant and far-reaching protections for 
economic and social rights, including the rights to housing, health, education, work, social 
security, unionization, and other basic labor guarantees. National opinion polls, moreover, 
reflect that the majority of Americans identify many of these guarantees not as mere “privi-
leges” but as personally held, individual rights, secured as part of the American heritage and in 
fact constitutive of the rights enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need it More than Ever 
(Basic Books 2004) (noting that the majority of Americans would be surprised to learn that 
the rights to social security and education were not constitutionally protected), 62–63 (noting, 
too, a 1991 survey of U.S. citizens in which strong majorities identified adequate housing, 
a reasonable amount of leisure time, adequate provision for retirement years, an adequate 
standard of living, and adequate medical care as “a right to which he is entitled as a citizen” 
and not as “a privilege that a person should have to earn.”). 
A 2007 national survey similarly found that strong majorities of Americans not only believe 
but “strongly believe” that a core set of social rights are human rights. These include equal 
access to quality public education (82%), access to health care (72%), living in a clean environ-
ment (68%), fair pay for workers to meet the basic needs for food and housing (68%), freedom 
from extreme poverty (52%), and adequate housing (51%). Only slim minorities believe these 
are not human rights. The Opportunity Agenda, “Human Rights in the United States: Findings 
from a National Survey,” op. cit. at 3–4. 
Although currently lacking a direct federal constitutional basis, such rights are guaranteed 
in many state constitutions and came close to federal constitutional incorporation in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. See, e.g., Sunstein, op. cit. at 5; William E. Forbath, Constitutional 
Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1821, 1823 (2001); 
William E. Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 1969–Present, 
39 Tulsa L. Rev. 597, 612 (2004) (noting U.S. Supreme Court on verge of recognizing consti-
tutional basis for array of economic and social rights, in line with domestic social views, when 
the slim Nixon victory in 1968 ushered in judicial appointments that stopped process). 
At the same time, traditional distinctions between “negative” and “positive” rights, particu-
larly as reified in classic “sets” of rights, have never been tenable as a factual matter, all rights 
possessing both negative and positive dimensions in the sense of duties to act reasonably and 
duties not to act arbitrarily. See, e.g., Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of 
Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (W.W. Norton 1999); Tara J. Melish, Rethinking the 
“Less as More” Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 
the Americas, 39 NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. 171 (2006). 
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These are pretexts for other interests at play.48 Indeed, in its interactions with 
international treaty bodies the United States regularly addresses the “positive” 
dimensions of its human rights obligations as well as a wide spectrum of eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights,49 as it does in its own domestic legislation. 
In this regard, it is also useful to note that although the United States 
has been slow to ratify many treaties – primarily because of the blocking 
opportunities presented by the fragmentation of the U.S. political structure – 
virtually all core human rights treaties have, since the late 1970s, been signed 
by the U.S. executive, indicating at least a political commitment to the rights 
and obligations enshrined therein and a present, if revocable, intent to be 
bound in the future.50 President Carter signed the ICESCR, ICCPR, CERD, 
and the American Convention in 1977 and CEDAW in 1980. President Reagan 
signed the Genocide Convention in 1986, and President Clinton signed the 
CRC and its two Optional Protocols in 1995 and 2000, respectively. 
Likewise, the administration of George H. W. Bush presided over U.S. 
ratification of the ICCPR in 1992, having urged Senate consent in 1991, and 
President Clinton, who presided over U.S. ratification of the CERD and CAT 
in 1994 and ILO Convention 182 in 1999, strongly promoted U.S. ratification 
of the ICESCR, CEDAW, and CRC from the beginning of his administration 
in 1993. 51 The George W. Bush administration, moreover, not only presided 
48 This is not to say that those who perpetuate them as part of a cultural myth of America are 
using them as pretext but rather that their underlying motivations rest on political-ideological 
foundations of a more partisan nature. For discussion, see Part C.2 infra. 
49 This is particularly true in U.S. reporting under the ICCPR and CERD, in which the United 
States regularly addresses the positive measures it has taken to respect and ensure the rights 
to nondiscrimination, equal protection, due process, and judicial protection with respect to 
health, housing, education, and employment. See, e.g., U.S. State Department, “Periodic 
Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination Concerning the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, April 2007,” at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/race/cerd_report/ (visited 
Apr. 25, 2007) [hereinafter “U.S. CERD Report 2007”], ¶¶219–78 (addressing the right to work; 
the right to form and join trade unions; the right to housing; the right to public health, medical 
care, social security, and social services; the right to education and training; and the right to 
equal participation in cultural activities). The United States also addresses these dimensions 
of economic and social rights with respect to contentious cases lodged against it with the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which has jurisdiction over all of the rights 
in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, including the rights to health, 
education, unionization, housing, and social security. 
50 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (stating that signature obliges certain conduct until a State’s 
intention not to ratify is made clear). In 2002 the Bush administration “unsigned” a treaty 
to indicate its lack of both obligations thereunder and intent to ratify. See Edward Swaine, 
Unsigning, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061 (2003). 
51 See, e.g., Christopher, op. cit. at  1. There is wide recognition that Senate consent failed because 
of the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994. 
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over the ratification of the two Optional Protocols to the CRC in 2002 but, after 
an initial decision to step back from the negotiation process, reinitiated active 
engagement in the final stages of the substantive drafting of the newly adopted 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).52 It did 
so under active pressure from both domestic constituencies53 and members 
of the U.S. House of Representatives.54 CEDAW, for its part, has consistently 
garnered strong, even bipartisan, support in Congress, with Senate Demo-
cratic leaders committing in 2008 to bring it to a full Senate vote as soon as 
politically opportune. Although likely to face intense targeted opposition from 
antiabortion lobbies, which by continuing to politicize it in absolutist terms 
may succeed in blocking it still, CEDAW is expected to receive supermajority 
support. 
This treaty-related behavior, from Republican and Democratic administra-
tions alike, suggests two important conclusions. First, it suggests that, despite 
popular rhetoric to the contrary, the United States does not in principle 
perceive inherent contradictions between such regimes and U.S. domestic 
law, policy, or interests. If it did, such treaties would neither be signed by 
the President nor ratified by Senate supermajorities. Second, given the estab-
lished track-record of speedy human rights treaty ratification with Democratic 
control of the Senate and Executive, it can be concluded that the nation’s 
52 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, art.  5, U.N. Doc.  
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD]. The CRPD received eighty-four signatures 
on the opening day, more than any human rights treaty in history. Although the United States 
formally participated in all eight sessions of the UN Ad Hoc Committee charged with drafting 
the CRPD, it announced its intention not to ratify at the second session in June 2003. See State-
ment of Ralph F. Boyd, U.S. assistant attorney general for civil rights, to the UN General Assem-
bly Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, June 18, 2003, 
USUN Press Release #89 (03), at http:www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/03print_089.htm (vis-
ited Apr. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Boyd Statement]. The U.S. delegation thereafter ceased to 
make substantive proposals, reinitiating its active engagement in the drafting process only at 
the seventh session in January 2006. 
53 See discussion in Part C.2.III infra. 
54 See House Concurrent Resolution 134 (expressing the sense of Congress that the United States 
should support a UN convention on disability rights and thereby urging: “(1) the United States 
to play a leading role in the drafting of a United Nations convention and to work toward its 
adoption . . . and (2) urg[ing] the President to instruct the Secretary of State to send to the 
UN Ad Hoc Committee meetings a U.S. delegation that includes individuals with disabilities 
who are recognized leaders in the U.S. disability rights movement.”) (emphasis added). The 
resolution was unanimously adopted by the House International Relations Committee in 2004 
but failed to be scheduled for a vote on the House floor by majority leader Tom Delay (R-TX). 
Members of the House committee, together with the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, 
met directly with members of the U.S. State Department to express their sense of urgency that 
the United States reinitiate a leadership role in the CRPD drafting process, given the United 
States’ historic protagonism in advancing disability rights. 
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political branches reasonably anticipate being subject to human rights treaty 
regimes as an inevitable outcome of swings in the political process.55 Within 
this context, any view that says the United States institutionally or “culturally” 
resists human rights commitments appears incomplete. 
The better explanation, as advanced by Professor Moravcsik, rests in the 
distinct ways that conservative minority special interest groups exert their influ-
ence over veto players in the ratification process, particularly within the U.S. 
Senate.56 Through rhetorical resort to stereotypes and “rights absolutism”57 
that portray international procedures as undemocratic, authoritarian, com-
munistic, and hence “anti-American,” these interest groups have historically 
succeeded in turning the rhetorical debate into one related to American rights 
culture and states’ rights, rather than simply as a rough-and-tumble domestic 
wrestling match over the shape of distinct social policy outcomes, within the 
methodological framework of human rights commitments and supervisory mon-
itoring procedures. This “thicker” explanation should not, however, lead to 
dire predictions that the status quo will persist58 but rather to a more searching 
look at what special interest groups are doing and how their interests intersect 
or fail to intersect with the promotion of international human rights law. 
Special interest groups traditionally at the forefront of the fight against U.S. 
adherence to international human rights treaties over the past two decades 
appear in fact to have begun to reassess their positions and modify their 
strategies, finding ways that recurrence to such treaties may in fact advance 
their domestic and international agendas. They have increasingly demanded 
greater U.S. participation in drafting the terms of international human rights 
55 Strong Democratic control of the Senate has historically been an important facilitating con-
dition for the ratification of human rights treaties. Moravscik calls it a “necessary condition” 
based on a review of a set of core treaties ratified from 1945 to 2000. See Moravcsik, op. cit., 
at 184 (“[T]he Senate has never ratified an international human rights treaty (even with reserva-
tions) when Democrats held fewer than 55 seats.”). It is important to recall, however, that ILO 
Convention 182 as well as the two CRC optional protocols were ratified under Republican 
Senate majorities in 1999 and 2002, respectively. 
56 Id. at 186–87 (noting that “[a]ll other things being equal, the greater the number of ‘veto 
players,’ as political scientists refer to those who can impede or block a particular government 
action, the more difficult it is for a national government to accept international obligations” 
and highlighting three characteristics of the U.S. political system that engender veto players: 
“super-majoritarian voting rules and the committee structure of the Senate, federalism, and 
the salient role of the judiciary in adjudicating questions of human rights”). 
57 Rights absolutism can be defined as an unwillingness to recognize that human rights law 
permits reasonable restrictions on all individual rights and that states are granted a (variable, 
but generally quite wide) margin of discretion in determining their nature and scope in distinct 
contextual settings. 
58 Moravcsik, op. cit., at  197 (predicting no change absent some unexpected “epochal constitu-
tional rupture – an Ackermanian ‘constitutional moment’”). 
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agreements and even sought U.S. ratification of certain human rights treaties.59 
This activity, taken together with the renewed mobilization of groups tradi-
tionally in favor of human rights treaty compliance – particularly through the 
coordination of the U.S. Human Rights Network60 – is leading to a distinctly 
new situation for U.S. engagement with international human rights supervi-
sory bodies and will lead to growing opportunities and challenges for all parties 
involved. 
Increased civil society engagement (from both sides of the political spec-
trum) is being met, moreover, by growing institutionalization of human rights 
coordination within the U.S. government, particularly from the U.S. State 
Department, which is increasingly broadening its oversight from an exclusive 
focus on the human rights situation in other countries to domestic human rights 
achievement. In this regard, it is useful to recall that it was not in fact until 
1976 – the year the ICCPR and ICESCR entered into force – that the U.S. 
government began to systematically monitor human rights achievement at all, 
in any country. In that year, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act 
to require the Secretary of State to transmit to it “a full and complete report” 
every year concerning “respect for internationally recognized human rights in 
each country proposed as a recipient of U.S. assistance.”61 The next year, the 
first forebear to the current position of Assistant Secretary of State for Democ-
racy, Human Rights, and Labor was appointed,62 and an Interagency Working 
Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance was established.63 Yet these 
focal points were mandated exclusively to report on the human rights situation 
59 See discussion infra Part C.2. 
60 Founded in 2003, the U.S. Human Rights Network is a loosely coordinated community 
of more than 250 human rights organizations and 1,000 individuals committed to ensur-
ing that U.S. human rights treaty commitments have effect for domestic communities. See 
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/ (visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
61 This limited reporting requirement was authorized in the 1976 International Security Assis-
tance and Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729, which included an 
amendment to § 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No.  87-195, 75 Stat. 424 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). The requirement was expanded in 
1978’s International Development and Food Assistance Act, Pub. L. 95-424, 92 Stat. 937, to  
include each member of the United Nations. The report was to be based on the internationally 
recognized human rights ideals detailed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). In 1998, the mandate was 
extended to religious freedom. See International Religious Freedom Act, § 102(b)(1), 22 U.S.C. 
§ 6412 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
62 It was at the time called coordinator (and then assistant secretary) for human rights and 
humanitarian affairs. The latter named bureau was renamed the Bureau for Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor under the Clinton administration. 
63 See Hauke Hartmann, U.S. Human Rights Policy under Carter and Reagan, 1977-1981, 23 Hum. 
Rts. Q. 402, 417 (2001). 
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of other countries, particularly those receiving U.S. foreign assistance.64 They 
had no mandate to report on the human rights situation within the United 
States itself. It was not until two decades later – on the fiftieth anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – that an interagency group was 
specifically mandated to coordinate executive agency response to domestic 
human rights concerns.65 
Although that body, the Interagency Working Group on Human Rights 
Treaties (IAWG), functioned in that form for only two brief years, it repre-
sented a fundamental turning point for the orientation of U.S. human rights 
policy. Created by Executive Order 13107, issued by President Clinton on 
December 10, 1998, it was mandated to promote coordination among U.S. 
executive agencies in ensuring compliance with the human rights treaties the 
United States has ratified and supporting the work of international human 
rights mechanisms, including the UN, ILO, and OAS.66 The order states 
that “[i]t shall be the policy and practice of the Government of the United 
States, being committed to the protection and promotion of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, fully to respect and implement its obligations under 
the international human rights treaties to which it is a party, including the 
ICCPR, the CAT, and the CERD.”67 Critically, it further charges all exec-
utive departments and agencies to “maintain a current awareness of United 
States international human rights obligations” relevant to their functions and 
to ensure that such functions are performed “so as to respect and implement 
those obligations fully.”68 This duty includes “responding to inquiries, requests 
for information and complaints about violations of human rights obligations 
that fall within [each agency’s] areas of responsibility.”69 
The IAWG, for its part, was given a series of concrete coordination and over-
sight functions. These included coordinating the preparation of both treaty 
compliance reports to the UN, OAS, and other international organizations and 
responses to contentious complaints lodged therewith, as well as overseeing a 
review of all proposed legislation to ensure its conformity with international 
human rights obligations. It was also mandated to ensure that plans for public 
outreach and education on human rights provisions in treaty-based and domes-
tic law were broadly undertaken and to ensure that an annual review of U.S. 
64 See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) § 502(B); see also Hartmann, op. cit., at  417 (describing limited 
economic focus of Human Rights Bureau’s Interagency Group). 
65 Exec. Order No. 13107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (1998), 38 ILM 493 (1999). 
66 Id. §1. 
67 Id. §1(a) (emphasis added). 
68 Id. §2. 
69 Id. §§2–3. 
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reservations, declarations, and understandings to human rights treaties takes 
place. Finally, and notably, the Working Group was charged with ensuring 
that all nontrivial complaints or allegations of inconsistency with or breach of 
international human rights obligations be reviewed to determine whether any 
modifications to U.S. practice or laws are in order.70 
The change of administrations in January 2001 meant that the work of the 
IAWG was never fully institutionalized. On February 13, 2001, it was super-
seded – in form, if not function – by President George W. Bush’s National 
Security Presidential Directive, which reorganized the National Security 
Council system.71 Specifically, the Bush Directive transferred the duties of 
the Human Rights Treaties IAWG established under Executive Order 13107 
to a newly established Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on Democracy, 
Human Rights, and International Operations, to be directed by the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs.72 With the national security struc-
ture thrown into disarray by the September 11 attacks later that year, the PCC 
was not, however, formally constituted. It was not until 2003 that the staffs 
of the State Department and National Security Council, aware of a growing 
number of overdue periodic reports, began to work again on an ad hoc basis 
in preparing the relevant reports.73 
Since then, U.S. responses to international human rights treaty bodies have 
been coordinated by the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Depart-
ment, with the assistance, when necessary, of legal consultants with expertise 
in the area and of other executive agencies and departments, particularly the 
National Security Council and the Departments of Justice, Homeland Secu-
rity, the Interior, Defense, Health and Human Services, and Labor. This is true 
both for the preparation of U.S. periodic reports on domestic compliance with 
human rights treaties and of U.S. responses to individual complaints and pre-
cautionary measures.74 Although this work is done on an ad hoc basis, without 
dedicated staff and resources, the framework for a more structured response 
is at least technically in place. This framework requires formal reconstitution 
and the infusion of resources and staff that ideally, at least with respect to 
periodic reporting functions, are functionally independent of the Office of 
70 Id. §4. 
71 National Security Presidential Directive, Feb. 13, 2001, at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/ 
nspd-1.htm (abolishing the system of Interagency Working Groups established under the 
Clinton administration). 
72 See id. 
73 Interview with Mark P. Lagon, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of State, Bureau of Int’l Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, & Robert K. Harris, Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 1, 2007) 
[hereinafter Lagon-Harris Interview]. 
74 For their part, responses to ILO complaints and periodic reports are prepared principally by 
the U.S. Department of Labor. 
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the Legal Adviser – more like the current structure for preparing the State 
Department’s country reports on the human rights situation in other nations.75 
It is important to note that whereas this latter mandate remains limited to non-
U.S. jurisdictions, the 2006 report recognized for the first time that the U.S. 
government, too, has fallen short of international standards in some areas.76 
This movement within the executive branch77 is being matched by move-
ments within the legislative and judicial branches. The judicial branch is 
increasingly, if slowly and cautiously – and in the face of certain powerful 
resistance78 – referring to comparative human rights jurisprudence in resolving 
domestic disputes and interpreting domestic statutory and constitutional law.79 
75 The State Department has a sizable staff of attorneys working exclusively on preparing Annual 
Country Human Rights Reports, a permanent staff that is assisted by the staffs of U.S. embassies 
and consulates around the world. A similar mechanism could be set up through which a 
permanent staff of attorneys within the State Department or other federal agency or entity, 
preferably with an autonomous monitoring mandate, is assisted by the staffs of federal offices 
in the fifty states, together with the voluntary inputs of state officials. 
76 U.S. State Department, “2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” at http://www 
.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/ (visited Apr. 20, 2007). See also Brian Knowlton, “U.S. Releases 
Report on Human Rights in 2006,” Int’l Herald Tribune, Mar.  6, 2007. 
77 Although President Obama has taken no action yet on a proposed Executive Order to revitalize 
and strengthen the Clinton-era IAWG, he issued an Executive Order on March 11, 2009 
establishing a more limited-mandate White House Council on Women and Girls that would 
function under a similar interagency structure. See Executive Order No. 13506, 74 Fed. Reg. 
11,271 (Mar. 16, 2009). 
78 Justice Antonin Scalia has been the most vocal judicial opponent of referring to foreign law 
in domestic jurisprudence. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). A minority of representatives within the U.S. House of Representatives has 
likewise resisted this trend, introducing two House resolutions in 2004 and 2005, respectively, 
that sought to legislatively preclude domestic courts from referring to “judgments, laws, or pro-
nouncements of foreign institutions” in determining the meaning of U.S. laws. See H.R. Res. 
568, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005). Although voted out of committee, 
the two proposals, which garnered seventy-four and eighty-four House cosponsors, respectively, 
were never brought to a vote in the full House. A similar bill was introduced to the U.S. Senate 
in 2005 but did not make it out of committee. It is important to note that Supreme Court 
justices, including Justice Scalia, have indicated constitutional objections to such legislative 
initiatives on separation of powers grounds. See Tony Mauro, “Scalia Tells Congress to Stay 
Out of High Court Business,” Legal Times, May  19, 2006. 
79 For recent Supreme Court examples, see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Laurence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 344 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002). Of course, the Court has long referred to international law in general, either 
as federal common law or in interpreting domestic statutes to not conflict with international 
treaty commitments. See, e.g., Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64 (1804); The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 
(1964). For reviews and discussion of this jurisprudence, both as a contemporary and historical 
matter, see, for example, Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 109 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi and Stephani Dotson Zimdahl, 
The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 743 (2005); Sarah H. Cleveland, 
Our International Constitution, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (2006). 
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The Senate Judiciary Committee, for its part, created a new Sub-Committee 
on Human Rights and the Law in 2007, reauthorizing it in 2009. 80 Such Sen-
ate bodies, together with the bipartisan Congressional Human Rights Caucus, 
could play a critical role in coordinating with a new National Human Rights 
Commission, National Human Rights Office, and reconstituted IAWG or 
PCC,81 particularly if the latter entities were given a specific legislative report-
ing mandate,82 to ensure that all branches of government are adhering to 
their treaty-based human rights obligations. At a minimum, the playing field 
for domestic advocates in pushing their respective policy agendas has been 
materially altered in recent years, changing the opportunity structure for using 
human rights language to achieve distinct policy ends. Opponents and propo-
nents have taken note, adjusting their strategies accordingly. 
B. SUPERVISORY TREATY BODY SYSTEM AND THE SCOPE 
OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT 
Although scarcely covered by the U.S. media establishment and hence not 
well known outside narrow advocacy circles,83 the United States has remained 
actively engaged in the work of supranational human rights treaty bodies, 
consistent with its international treaty commitments. “Human rights treaty 
bodies” refer to the committees or commissions of independent experts84 set 
up under key human rights treaties to supervise, through quasi-adjudicatory 
and promotional powers, state party compliance with treaty undertakings. 
There are currently eight United Nations (UN) human rights treaty bodies 
operating under the auspices of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on 
Human Rights, four of which exercise direct supervisory jurisdiction over the 
United States.85 These include the Human Rights Committee, the Committee 
80 See David Johnston, “New Judiciary Subcommittee Is to Focus on Civil Liberties,” New York 
Times, Dec. 14, 2006, A33. 
81 See Part E infra (proposing these new entities). 
82 Such a reporting mandate might be similar to the one given to the State Department under 
the Foreign Assistance Act. The benefit of a legislative mandate is that it cannot be abolished 
through executive order with periodic changes in the White House. 
83 For a discussion of the phenomenological biases of the media as a participant in the interna-
tional legal process, see Monica Hakimi, The Media as Participant in the International Legal 
Process, 16 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 24 (2006). 
84 Such experts are nominated and elected by the States parties to the treaty but serve in their 
personal capacities, generally for renewable four-year terms. Most treaties require them to 
be persons of high moral authority and recognized competence in the field of international 
human rights law; in practice, they have various skill sets and backgrounds. 
85 The United States is not subject to the jurisdiction of the other four: the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the UN Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, and the UN Committee on Migrant Workers and their Families. 
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Against Torture, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.86 The United 
States is also subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, one of the two principal human rights organs of the 
Organization of American States (OAS),87 as well as the International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO) Committee of Experts and Committee on Freedom of 
Association.88 
Although not courts in the sense of having competence to issue legally 
binding rulings on the matters and parties before them, these treaty bod-
ies often exercise quasi-adjudicatory functions that closely approximate that 
role.89 Most are empowered to receive petitions of alleged human rights viola-
tions from either individual or collective complainants,90 review evidentiary or 
informational submissions, find facts, interpret legal rules, and issue nonbind-
ing decisions or recommendations. Such recommendations are increasingly 
accompanied by follow-up and compliance reporting requirements, designed 
to ensure that appropriate measures are taken by states to give domestic legal 
effect to treaty body pronouncements. These quasi-judicial functions, exer-
cised under jurisdictional rules and procedures highly similar to those of inter-
national judicial bodies,91 are supplemented by functions of a more overtly 
86 Although the United States has not yet ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
it has ratified the two optional protocols thereto, each of which entails a periodic reporting 
obligation to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
87 The other is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the contentious jurisdiction of 
which the United States has not recognized. For more on the Court, see Elizabeth A. H. 
Abi-Mershed, “The United States and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,” Chapter 7 
in this volume; see also Melish, “Inter-American Court of Human Rights,” op. cit. 
88 The former has mandatory supervisory jurisdiction over the ILO’s core labor standards, two 
of which the United States has ratified: No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor and No. 
182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor. The latter exercises contentious 
jurisdiction over collective complaints involving freedom of association regardless of whether 
the member state has ratified ILO treaties; as of 2008, it has considered forty-nine complaints 
against the United States. See Steve Charnovitz, The ILO Convention on Freedom of Association 
and Its Future in the United States, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 90, 92 (2008). 
89 See UN Human Rights Comm., General Comment 33, The Obligations of States Parties under 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 11, U.N.  
Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (Nov. 5, 2008) (“While the function of the Human Rights Committee 
in considering individual communications is not, as such, that of a judicial body, the views 
issued by the Committee under the Optional Protocol exhibit some important characteristics 
of a judicial decision. They are arrived at in a judicial spirit, including the impartiality and 
independence of Committee members, the considered interpretation of the language of the 
Covenant, and the determinative character of the decisions.”). 
90 The UN and OAS mechanisms have individual standing rules, whereas the ILO has jurisdic-
tion over collective complaints lodged by, and on behalf of, workers’ or employers’ organi-
zations. 
91 Compare, for example, the jurisdictional rules for receiving contentious complaints of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (a quasi-judicial body) and the Inter-American 
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promotional nature, such as periodic reporting procedures and their accompa-
nying committee conclusions and recommendations, the issuance of general 
comments or observations, onsite visits, and general reports on distinct human 
rights matters or issues. 
U.S. engagement with these bodies extends over the full range of treaty body 
activities, including each of the three principal types of supervisory mecha-
nisms: periodic reporting processes, individual and collective complaints pro-
cedures, and special mandate or promotional mechanisms. Because the scope 
of engagement with each of these mechanisms speaks so powerfully to the 
parameters of U.S. human rights policy, each merits slightly closer attention 
here. 
1. Periodic Reporting Process 
The quintessential function of human rights treaty bodies is a periodic report-
ing process.92 Periodic reporting reflects the subsidiary nature of human rights 
law vis-à-vis domestic law and is designed to assist states in their central obli-
gation under human rights treaty law: to ensure that protected rights have 
domestic legal effect through the adoption of “appropriate” or “necessary” 
measures, determined in context. States parties are thus required to submit 
reports on the appropriate measures they have adopted to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the treaty and on the progress and setbacks made in the 
enjoyment of those rights.93 
Court of Human Rights (a judicial body). Both bodies – like the UN committees and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights – require the exhaustion of domestic remedies, proof of concrete 
personal harm to identified individuals, imputation of conduct-based causal responsibility to 
the state for that harm, and similar ratione temporis and ratione loci requirements. The principal 
difference between the two is that the case-based conclusions of judicial bodies, like the Court, 
are formally binding on the parties to the dispute, whereas those of quasi-adjudicatory bodies, 
like the Commission and UN treaty bodies, are recommendary in nature. An expectation exists 
nonetheless that such recommendations will be given effect in the domestic jurisdiction, with 
treaty bodies increasingly requesting follow-up reports on the measures taken toward this end. 
92 An exception is the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which, despite an explicit 
competence to supervise a periodic reporting process (see American Convention on Human 
Rights art. 42, Nov.  22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at  1 (1969)), has declined 
to formally pursue it over the years. A periodic reporting function has been set up under the 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and guidelines have recently been drawn up by the Inter-American Commission for 
the preparation of reports by States parties. See, e.g., OAS General Assembly Resolution 2074 
(XXXV-O/05). 
93 To do so, they are expected to undertake a thorough and comprehensive review of national 
legislation, administrative rules and procedures, and practices to assess conformity with treaty 
commitments, to determine whether new policy making is required by identifying areas of 
strength and weakness, and to continually monitor the actual situation with respect to each 
treaty-recognized right for progress and setbacks in levels of enjoyment and protection. 
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Each of the core UN human rights treaties envisions a mandatory periodic 
reporting process under the supervision of the relevant treaty body committee. 
An initial report must generally be provided within one year, followed by 
a periodic report every two to five years or as the Committee so requests.94 
The United States has undertaken periodic reporting requirements under the 
CERD, the CAT, the ICCPR, the two Optional Protocols to the CRC, and 
certain ILO conventions it has ratified. Although the United States – not unlike 
most other nations – has frequently been late in submitting its reports,95 it has 
actively engaged with the supervisory treaty bodies in the periodic reporting 
process, particularly as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become 
increasingly savvy in using international procedures and pressure points to 
ensure timely, substantive, and participatory reporting. 
In this regard, the United States submitted its first report under the ICCPR 
to the Human Rights Committee in Geneva in 1994, defending it in 1995. This  
was followed by its first CAT report in 1999 and its first CERD report in 2000. 96 
These reports were defended before the UN Committee on Torture and the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, respectively, 
in 2000 and 2001. In  2005, the United States submitted its combined second 
and third CAT reports and its combined second and third ICCPR reports,97 
defending each in Geneva in 2005 and 2006, respectively. It presented its 
combined fourth, fifth, and sixth report to the CERD Committee in 2007, 
which it defended in 2008. It has regularly submitted reports as well – on a 
two-year periodic basis – to the ILO Committee of Experts.98 
The supervisory procedures associated with periodic reporting tend for-
mally to be characterized as a process of “constructive dialogue” between 
treaty bodies and states parties.99 After a state party submits its written report, 
94 Most human rights treaties require periodic reports to be submitted every four to five years. 
CERD, by contrast, requires reports to be submitted every two years. This has led to serious 
backlogs in the Committee’s ability to review states’ periodic reports and the Committee’s 
increasing request for states to prepare and submit combined reports on a four-year schedule. 
95 This delay owes to several mostly institutional factors. First, until early 1999 the United States 
lacked any dedicated body with explicit competence to prepare and supervise such reports, 
causing many deadlines to be missed. While a coordinating mechanism exists today, it con-
tinues to lack dedicated staff and resources, thus constraining its capacity to produce reports 
on time, especially given the significant institutional coordination and commitment needed 
for their production. It is for this reason that the institutional mechanisms proposed in Part E, 
infra, are so crucial. 
96 The United States missed its CERD report due dates in 1995, 1997, and  1999 and thus submitted 
its combined first, second, and third reports as a single document in 2000. 
97 These were submitted one and seven years late, respectively. 
98 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Int’l Labor Affairs, International Labor Organization (ILO), 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/oir/ILO.htm (recognizing requirement of regular submis-
sion of U.S. reports to ILO supervisory bodies). 
99 See, e.g., Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 Am. J. Int’l L.  365, 370 (1990) (noting 
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the treaty body prepares a list of priority issues that the state party should 
be prepared to discuss at a scheduled hearing in Geneva.100 On the basis 
of the state party’s written report, its oral presentations, and any additional 
information made available to the committee, the supervising committee pre-
pares a public report in which it identifies areas of progress and areas of 
concern with respect to the state’s human rights achievement. It then draws 
conclusions and sets forth recommendations for how the state party might take 
further measures in areas where deficiencies or weaknesses were identified. 
Although technically a friendly process, treaty-based reporting has become 
increasingly adversarial over the years as treaty bodies have gained promi-
nence and international authority.101 As a result, their recommendations are 
often interpreted, at least by domestic and international advocacy groups and 
some international media sources, as a binding “legal decision” requiring 
immediate domestic execution by national authorities. This view is often rein-
forced by committee requests that the state party submit additional information 
if committee questions were not answered fully in oral proceedings, a request 
sometimes construed by advocates as a requirement to report on follow-up 
measures. 
U.S. participation in this process is marked by five major characteristics, 
each determinative in appreciating the mediated nature of U.S. engagement 
policy. First, the United States prepares extensive and detailed reports to the 
committee. In contrast to many states, which often submit incomplete or 
insufficiently inclusive reports,102 the United States closely hews to the 
committee-issued guidelines in preparing its consistently lengthy and com-
prehensive submissions.103 These reports address each substantive rights-based 
that periodic reporting function is “based on the assumption that a constructive dialogue 
between the Committee and the state party, in a non-adversarial, cooperative spirit, is the most 
productive means of prompting the government concerned to take the requisite action.”). 
100 These questions are often based on the information provided to treaty bodies in civil-society-
prepared “shadow reports,” prepared to highlight and correct misstatements or generalizations 
in official state reports; fill in overlooked areas with accurate facts, details, and statistics; and 
generally present an alternative view for the expert UN committee to consider in assessing 
state progress and setbacks and in making recommendations for domestic improvements. 
101 This growing prominence and global authority have in many ways emboldened treaty bodies 
to be more confrontational with U.S. delegations. Cf. Murphy, op. cit. (“For the [ICJ], the 
lesson [of increasing global authority unbeholden to major powers] may be not to tread lightly 
with respect to the United States but, rather, to tread heavily unless doing so would be viewed 
generally as bias.”). 
102 The UN Human Rights Committee, for example, has regularly lamented the lack of com-
prehensiveness in state party reports. See, e.g., General Comment No. 2, op. cit., ¶1. As a  
result, it has issued guidelines to assist states in preparing reports under the respective treaties. 
“Consolidated guidelines for States reports under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: 26/02/2001,” CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2 (2001). 
103 The U.S. third periodic report to the UN Human Rights Committee, for example, was 120 
single-spaced pages, covering U.S. achievements with respect to each of the twenty-seven 
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provision in the relevant treaty, how U.S. law protects the right, the types of 
claims that are regularly brought to U.S. courts to protect it, and the outcomes 
of major court decisions, particularly those of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 
this respect, the United States tends to be very good at reporting on formal 
legal protections emanating from the three branches of government, focus-
ing on the outcomes of high-profile judicial decisions and the legislation or 
policy positions enacted to give formal effect to rights. It is less good at criti-
cally describing gaps in coverage and at documenting progress or setbacks in 
the statistical enjoyment of rights over the population and distinct subgroups 
within it, particularly at the state level.104 It is here that the treaty bodies gener-
ally focus their questions and direct their recommendations, relying on NGO 
submissions to fill in the missing pieces and to ask further probing questions. 
In response, the United States, keen on improving its performance, is increas-
ingly opening the reporting process to a greater degree of transparency among 
nongovernmental actors and greater substantive comprehension, explicitly 
seeking input and data for its reports from U.S. NGOs105 and state attorney 
generals. 
Second, the United States participates in Geneva-based meetings – and 
increasingly in contentious OAS proceedings106 – with large, high-level 
interagency delegations. According to State Department officials, it does so to 
demonstrate the seriousness with which the United States takes the human 
rights supervisory process. It thereby seeks to set an example for other states, 
encouraging them to engage the process with a similar degree of seriousness 
and material commitment. It is important, in this regard, to highlight that 
the United States sends not only a high-level official spokesperson to present 
and defend its report but also a full delegation of high-level officials from 
each of the major executive agencies and departments to present and answer 
substantive rights guaranteed in the ICCPR. See CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005). The United 
States’ 2007 CERD Report is more than 170 pages and includes coverage with respect to each 
provision of the CERD, as well as separate annexes on examples of state-level civil rights 
programs, the U.S. legal position on the Western Shoshone case, and new domestic laws 
adopted since 2000, when the United States submitted its first CERD report. See U.S. CERD 
Report 2007, op. cit. 
104 In response to Committee requests for the United States to discuss state-level progress 
and setbacks, the U.S. has included an annex to its 2007 CERD Report in which it 
provides examples of civil rights programs in Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, and South 
Carolina. 
105 The State Department and other executive departments and agencies have increasingly been 
meeting with civil society representatives, at the latter’s request, before and after treaty body 
hearings in Geneva to take their views into account. 
106 Although this has not historically been the case, a change has occurred over the last five or 
six years in which larger interagency delegations are appearing at hearings before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. 
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committee questions in their respective areas of competence.107 This level 
of engagement reflects the high standard requested of governments by the 
Geneva-based committees to ensure the effectiveness of the process.108 
Third, the United States consistently affirms, particularly in its oral presen-
tations to treaty bodies, that it recognizes that it is not perfect and has definite 
gaps to fill.109 The central message of the treaty-mandated reports is thus that 
the United States “is trying in good faith to bring its domestic practices into 
compliance with international standards.”110 Within this context, it formally 
welcomes the views of the treaty body as part of a constructive dialogue aimed 
at assisting it in identifying areas of weakness in its own internal process, affirm-
ing that committee suggestions are appropriately taken into consideration.111 
According to U.S. representatives, what grates U.S. officials is not the process 
107 At its most recent appearances before the UN Human Rights Committee and Committee 
Against Torture, for example, the U.S. delegation comprised more than thirty government 
officials from at least six executive agencies or departments. 
108 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment 2, “Reporting guidelines” (Thirteenth 
session, 1981), U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 3 (1994), ¶4: “The Committee wishes to state 
that, if it is to be able to perform its functions under article 40 as effectively as possible and 
if the reporting State is to obtain the maximum benefit from the dialogue, it is desirable that 
the States representatives should have such status and experience (and preferably be in such 
number) as to respond to questions put, and the comments made, in the Committee over the 
whole range of matters covered by the Covenant.” 
Although the UN treaty bodies tended to acknowledge this effort in its initial reports, they 
have declined to do so in later reports as the relationship with the United States has grown 
more contentious on matters relating to the Iraq War and counterterrorism measures. Com-
pare “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, 
03/10/95,” CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995), ¶¶267–68 (expressing appreciation of high quality of 
report, “participation of high-level delegation which included a substantial number of experts 
in various fields relating to the protection of human rights in the country,” and well-structured 
replies) with “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of 
America,” CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006) (no mention of high-level delegation or 
quality of process). 
109 See, e.g., Remarks to the U.N. Committee Against Torture by Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Geneva, Switzerland, May 
10, 2000 (“Although we are proud of our record in eliminating torture, we acknowledge contin-
uing areas of concern within the United States. Although our commitment is unambiguous, 
our record is not perfect.”); Remarks to the UN Human Rights Committee by Robert Harris, 
Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Geneva, Switzerland, July 17, 2006 (noting that the 
United States recognizes that it has gaps to fill in its human rights record under ICCPR); see 
also Briefing on the State Department’s 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices by 
Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Mar. 6, 2007 (“We do not issue 
these reports because we think ourselves perfect, but rather because we know ourselves to be 
deeply imperfect, like all human beings and the endeavors that they make. Our democratic 
system of governance is accountable, but it is not infallible.”). 
110 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 
St. Louis U. L.J. 293, 308 (2002). 
111 See, e.g., Harris Remarks, op. cit. (noting that the United States welcomes committee’s views 
and that such views are appropriately taken into consideration by agencies of U.S. government). 
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itself – which, they affirm, is genuinely appreciated, particularly for the oppor-
tunity to orally defend U.S. policy positions on human rights internationally – 
but when committee members appear unopen to dialogue on debatable issues 
and insensitive to areas of simple disagreement, particularly as they relate to 
U.S. jurisdictional concerns on the substantive limits of treaty body compe-
tence.112 
Fourth, and relatedly, members of official delegations and those who pre-
pare reports tend to recognize the genuine utility of the reporting process 
for gaining a better understanding of the precise ways in which the United 
States is and is not in compliance with international standards.113 That is, 
despite prominent unilateralist or realist strains within many departments and 
agencies of government, the process of engagement has revealed for many 
the real utility of periodic reporting for gaining a better understanding of the 
national reality and where the country stands vis-à-vis international human 
rights law. This realization militates in favor of greater U.S. engagement – 
both for purposes of pushing other states to engage to a similar degree and for 
promoting the involvement of an increasing number of federal, state, local, 
and nongovernmental actors in the reporting process. The U.S. government, 
for example, is increasingly meeting with civil society organizations to follow 
up on concerns articulated at treaty body sessions and to discuss the estab-
lishment of mechanisms for coordinating information on state and national 
human rights monitoring and achievement.114 
Finally, although the United States manifests a high degree of openness and 
willingness to answer treaty body questions in virtually all areas of domestic 
human rights policy, there are certain policy issues that it declines to address 
other than “as a matter of courtesy.” These predominate in two areas: one, the 
territorial scope of treaty body competence and, two, the intersection of human 
rights and humanitarian law.115 The United States insists that UN and OAS 
112 Lagon-Harris Interview, op. cit. 
113 This appreciation, often acknowledged to be unexpected, has been consistently expressed in 
multiple fora by government officials responsible for preparing treaty reports. This is equally 
true in public meetings between U.S. departments and agencies, treaty bodies, and domestic 
advocacy groups and in private interviews or conversations in which this author has taken part. 
See, e.g., Interviews with Steven Hill, Robert Harris, and Mark Lagon, U.S. Department of 
State, Feb. 2007. 
114 U.S. State Department officials, as well as those from Justice, affirm that they are always open 
to meeting and working with domestic groups on human rights issues. Interagency meetings 
involving representatives of the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense 
have been held on multiple occasions with the U.S. Human Rights Network and other civil 
society organizations to discuss the periodic reporting process and follow-up measures thereto. 
115 Statement of Mark P. Lagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization 
Affairs, Media Roundtable with Senior Government Officials at presentation of U.S. periodic 
report under the ICCPR to UN Human Rights Committee, Geneva, July 17, 2006 (“There are 
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treaty bodies lack jurisdiction to consider U.S. human rights policy as it affects 
persons outside its territorial boundaries and as it intersects with the law of 
armed conflict, which, it asserts, prevails as lex specialis at points of intersection 
and hence falls outside treaty body jurisdiction.116 The United States has, in 
this sense, adopted a highly technical and legalized posture with respect to 
the scope of treaty body competence, asserting its prerogative to decline to 
answer questions that exceed that competence as the United States defines it. 
Although this is an explicit mediating posture adopted by the United States 
to shield its foreign policy and national security interests within the context 
of active engagement with human rights treaty bodies,117 it has nonetheless 
put the United States in an increasingly adversarial position vis-à-vis the treaty 
bodies. 
2. Individual and Collective Complaint Procedures 
and Precautionary Measures 
Just as the United States actively engages in mandatory periodic reporting 
processes under all relevant treaty regimes, it likewise engages in individual 
and collective communication procedures wherever they are mandatory. The 
United States has not, however, optionally acceded to any such procedure. 
Thus, it has not recognized the right of individuals to initiate individual com-
munications or claims procedures under the ICCPR, CAT, or CERD, nor 
has it recognized the contentious competence of the Inter-American Court of 
some issues that will come up in this defense that have to do with the war on terrorism and 
the United States conduct of it. It is our firm belief that those issues in large part lie beyond 
the scope of the treaty, those things that have to do with conduct outside of the territory of the 
United States or those that belong to the questions of law of war rather than human rights law. 
Nonetheless, the United States will answer those controversial questions as a courtesy to the 
committee, and importantly, as a matter of openness in the international community.”). 
116 On the former point, see “Third Periodic Reports of States Parties due in 2003: United States 
of America,” CCPR/C/USA/3 (2005), Annex 1 (“Territorial Application of the [ICCPR]”), 
109–11. This posture predates but supports the U.S. “war on terror” policy of holding suspected 
terrorists and “enemy combatants” outside of U.S. territory, such as in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
or on offshore vessels. Significantly, the extraterritoriality point is pressed as a matter of human 
rights treaty law, even while accepting the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466 (2004), that the U.S. judiciary may exercise jurisdiction over extraterritorial abuses 
taking place in loci over which the U.S. exercises effective (“exclusive”) authority and control. 
This constitutional exception to the extraterritoriality principle is effectively identical to that 
recognized in international human rights law generally. See, e.g., Coard et al. v. United States, 
Case 10.951, Report N◦ 109/99, Sept.  29, 1999, Inter-Am.Comm.H.R, para. 37 (“In principle, 
the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim’s nationality or presence within a particular 
geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances, the State observed the 
rights of a person subject to its authority and control.”) (emphasis added). 
117 See discussion infra Part D.1. 
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Human Rights, the properly judicial (as opposed to quasi-judicial) organ of the 
regional human rights system.118 These adjudicatory and quasi-adjudicatory 
procedures provide legal standing for individuals within a state party’s jurisdic-
tion to bring contentious claims alleging that the state is responsible, through 
its conduct, for violating the individual’s treaty-protected rights. Although most 
human rights treaty bodies can issue only findings and recommendations, not 
legally binding rulings,119 they nonetheless act in an adjudicatory capacity in 
considering the claims that come before them – finding facts, issuing legal 
conclusions and remedial recommendations, and initiating follow-up mecha-
nisms to supervise compliance with their case-based recommendations. 
There are, however, two mandatory mechanisms in international human 
rights law that allow individuals to bring human rights complaints against the 
United States, as well as one mechanism for collective complaints. The first 
is the case-based contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (Commission). The second is the precautionary measure or 
early warning/urgent action procedure recognized respectively by the Com-
mission and the UN human rights treaty bodies.120 Finally, the United States 
is subject to a collective complaints procedure regarding compliance with 
ILO labor rights treaties, through which labor and employer organizations 
may bring complaints against the United States before the ILO Committee 
on Freedom of Association.121 The United States recognizes and engages with 
each of these three sets of procedures, appearing and presenting arguments at 
all procedural stages of litigation. 
With regard to individual complaints procedures, the most significant and 
extensively used of the two applicable to the United States is the quasi-
adjudicatory petitions process of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
118 Each of these nonmandatory procedures requires the deposit of an independent instrument 
of jurisdictional recognition for operativity. 
119 The exception, of course, is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the findings of which 
are “final” and “binding” on all OAS Member States that have accepted its jurisdiction. See 
American Convention on Human Rights, op. cit., arts. 67–68. 
120 The formal competence of treaty bodies to issue these measures is generally established in their 
respective rules of procedure. See, e.g., Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, art. 25, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev. 12 (2007) at  171 (“In serious and urgent cases, 
and whenever necessary according to the information available, the Commission may, on its 
own initiative or at the request of a party, request that the State concerned adopt precautionary 
measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons.”). For information on the CERD’s urgent 
action or early-warning procedure, see Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, 
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Monitoring Racial Equality and Non-
Discrimination, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). 
121 These will not be substantively addressed here. For an assessment, see Charnovitz, op. cit. 
The full range of cases and complaints against the United States can be accessed at Interna-
tional Labour Organization, International Labour Standards, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/ 
caseframeE.htm (follow “United States” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). 
243 From Paradox to Subsidiarity 
Rights. Formally established in 1959, the Commission is mandated under the 
OAS Charter to “promote the observance and protection of human rights and 
to serve as a consultative organ of the [OAS] in these matters.”122 In this regard, 
the Commission has both quasi-adjudicative and promotional functions. 
Persons within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States at the 
time of an alleged violation can therefore bring human rights complaints 
through this supranational mechanism for violation, to their detriment, of 
any of the rights recognized in the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man, including the rights to health, education, property, life, due 
process, judicial protection, and nondiscrimination.123 To date, the majority 
of cases lodged against the United States have involved persons on death row 
claiming due process denials with respect to the rights to life and to judicial 
protection,124 including through failure to provide consular notification to 
nonnationals. This U.S. case pattern owes primarily to limited public aware-
ness in the United States about the regional human rights system and its 
adjudicatory competence over concrete instances of domestic human rights 
abuse. 
Nevertheless, the Commission has considered a growing number of U.S. 
cases beyond the death penalty context, increasingly so in recent years. These 
have involved the rights of indigenous persons to ancestral territory,125 voting 
122 Charter of the Organization of American States art. 106, Apr.  30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951); see also id. arts. 3, 16, 51, 112, 150. The Commis-
sion has affirmed that, consistent with its Statute and Rules of Procedure, it has jurisdiction to 
consider individual petitions lodged against the United States, as with all thirty-five OAS mem-
ber states, by virtue of the United States’s 1951 ratification of the OAS Charter. See, e.g., Sánchez 
v. United States, Petition 65/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 104/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc.  
5 ¶ 50 (2006) (“United States of America deposited its instrument of ratification of the OAS 
Charter on June 19, 1951 and has been subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction since 1959, 
the year in which the Commission was created.”); see also Roach v. United States, Case 9647, 
Report No. 3/87, OEA/Ser. L./V/II.71. doc.  9 rev. 1 (1987). 
123 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, International Con-
ference of American States, 9th Conf., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. L./V/II.23, doc.  21 rev. 6 (1948). 
Article 1 of the Commission’s Statute defines the human rights the Commission is competent 
to apply as “[t]he rights set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation 
to the States Parties thereto” and “[t]he rights set forth in the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, in relation to the other member states.” OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev. 12 at 
163 (2007). 
124 See, e.g., Medina v. United States, Case 12.421, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 91/05, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc  5 (2005); Workman v. United States, Case 12. 261, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Report No. 33/06, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc.  4 rev. 1 (2007) (admissible). A great number of these 
cases have dealt with failures to provide consular notification under the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations. 
125 Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser. L./V/II.117. 
doc. 7 rev. 1 (2002); Cherokee Nation v. United States, Case 11.071, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 6/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.a5, doc.  7 (1997). 
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rights in the nation’s capital,126 summary deportations,127 abortion,128 abuses 
committed during U.S. military action abroad where effective authority or 
control was maintained over the alleged victims,129 capital punishment of 
minors,130 and the rights of interdicted refugees and detainees held in Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service detention facilities and at Guantanamo 
Bay.131 They have likewise involved freedom from extraordinary rendition, the 
right not to be deported where HIV treatment is not available in the return 
country,132 border controls,133 the right to reparation for civil rights abuses,134 
welfare reform,135 and the right to police enforcement of domestic violence 
restraining orders,136 among others. 
Although U.S. responsibility for rights violations is frequently found, the 
majority of cases lodged against the United States with the Commission are 
found inadmissible, either in pre-admissibility vetting procedures137 or after 
admissibility hearings. This is principally because of jurisdictional defects 
in petitioners’ arguments, including failure to properly exhaust domestic 
126 Statehood Solidarity Committee v. United States, Case 11.204, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 
98/03, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.114, doc.  70 rev. 2 (2003). 
127 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, Case 8-03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 56/06, OEA/Ser.L/ 
VII.127, doc.  4 rev. 1 (2007); Armendariz v. United States, Case 526-03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Report No. 57/06, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc.  4 rev. 1 (2007). 
128 “Baby Boy” v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, 
doc. 9 rev. 4 (1981). 
129 Coard v. United States, Case 10.451, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, 
doc 6 rev. (1999) (U.S. attacks on Grenada); Disabled Peoples’ International v. United States, 
Case 9213, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 198, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, doc.  9 rev. 1 (1987) (U.S. attacks on 
Grenada); Hill v. United States, Case 9213, Inter-Am., Report No. 3/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, 
doc. 7, at  201 (1996) (closing case after full reparation provided to alleged victims of U.S. attack 
on civilian hospital in Grenada); Salas v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 31/93, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.85, doc.  9 rev. (1993) (U.S. invasion of Panama). 
130 See, e.g., Patterson v. United States, Case 12.439, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 25/05, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 doc. 5 (2005) (17 years old when committed crime); Thomas v. United 
States, Case 12.240, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 100/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118 (2003) (17 years 
old when committed crime); Roach v. United States, Res. No.  3/87, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71 doc. 9 
rev. 1, ¶¶ 46–49 (1987). 
131 Haitian Ctr. for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 
51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 doc. 7 rev. at 550 (1997); Ferrer-Mazorra v. United States, Case 9903, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/01, OEA/L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 1188 (2000). 
132 These two cases do not yet have formal admissibility reports. 
133 Sánchez v. United States, Petition 65/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 104/05, OEA/Ser.L/ 
V/II.124 doc. 5 (2005) (found inadmissible). 
134 Shibayama v. United States, Petition 434-03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 26/06, OEA/Ser.L/ 
V/II.127 doc. 4 rev. 1 (2007). 
135 Poor People’s Economic Human Rights Campaign v. United States (1999, dismissed without 
prejudice for failure to identify individual victims). 
136 Gonzales v. United States, Petition 1490-05, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/07 (2007). 
137 In this case, no public record of the filing is maintained. 
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remedies, lack of victim standing, failure to state a prima facie claim, or 
lack of ratione temporis, ratione personae, or  ratione loci jurisdiction. These 
defects most frequently stem from petitioners’ conflation of the case-based and 
promotional competences of the Commission and an effort to extract strong, 
absolutist human rights statements from it without framing the controversy as 
a concrete justiciable case.138 In this respect, the U.S. position often rests on 
reminding the Commission of the limited nature of its jurisdiction and the 
importance of not exceeding it or acting as a court of fourth instance in any 
particular case. 
Within this context, the United States participates reliably in individual 
petitions processes before the Commission, as it has since at least 1977, the  
year President Carter signed the American Convention on Human Rights.139 
As the cases have become more varied and complex, U.S. participation in 
hearings has likewise become more active, extensive, and substantive, with 
strong positive effects for the system as a whole. Although the United States 
has frequently argued that the Declaration, as a nontreaty, creates no binding 
obligations for it, its submissions nonetheless consistently address both the 
admissibility and merits of the underlying claim. The United States today 
substantively briefs and argues all questions posed by alleged victims and their 
representatives in each stage of case-based proceedings140 at the Commission’s 
Washington, D.C., headquarters, at times arriving with full interagency dele-
gations of experts in the distinct fields under consideration.141 It increasingly 
also invites local or state authorities in whose jurisdiction the alleged violation 
took place. 
At the same time, while the United States hastens to emphasize that the 
final recommendations of the Commission are in fact just that – nonbinding 
138 See Melish, “Rethinking the ‘Less as More’ Thesis,” op. cit., 207–74 (discussing common 
jurisdictional errors in framing contentious claims); Tara J. Melish, “The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights: Defending Social Rights through Case-Based Petitions,” in 
Malcolm Langford, ed., Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in Comparative and 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
139 Although earlier cases had been lodged against the United States, it was in 1977 that the 
first case to proceed to a merits decision was submitted. See “Baby Boy” v. United States, 
Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc.  9 rev. 1 ¶ 1 (1981). The 
United States extensively briefed this abortion-related case, using the regional instruments’ 
travaux préparatoires to support its argument that regional norms protecting the right to life 
did not proscribe abortion absolutely, but rather allowed it to proceed under reasonable state 
regulation. 
140 This includes pre-admissibility, admissibility, merits, and follow-up/compliance stages. With 
respect to the latter, the United States attended its first follow-up meeting in March 2007 to 
discuss compliance with the IACHR’s recommendations. See Dann v. United States, Case 
II.140, Report No. 75/02, Inter-Am. C.H.P. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc.  1 rev. (2002). 
141 This is particularly true in cases dealing with national security issues. 
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recommendations – it likewise takes measures to consider the propriety of 
those recommendations and, to the extent that state agency behavior is impli-
cated, to give state agents the opportunity to independently consider and give 
effect to the Commission’s conclusions and recommendations. Similar to the 
practice of other federal nations, decisions of the regional body are proce-
durally transmitted to the responsible federal department or agency and/or 
state attorney generals for follow-up, within the bounds of their responsibili-
ties, competence, and discretion.142 In this sense, the U.S. State Department 
treats the Commission’s recommendations in much the same way it treats ICJ 
decisions that affect state and local agents: it transmits the recommendations 
or decision to the competent authority, leaving it to them – in function of 
federalism considerations – to determine the appropriate response under the 
circumstances.143 Speaking on the issue most recently in Medellı́n, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has appeared to endorse this approach.144 
The United States responds in a similar way to requests for precautionary 
measures, whether by the Inter-American Commission or UN treaty bodies, 
such as the CERD.145 Precautionary measures are urgent interim measures 
of protection designed to prevent the occurrence or continuance of alleged 
human rights abuses that threaten irreparable harm, particularly until the 
merits of the underlying claim is considered. They are issued based on a 
prima facie assessment, without prejudgment on the underlying merits, of 
written communications that suggest abuse may be occurring.146 Although 
the United States regularly contests the competence of treaty bodies to issue 
142 Interview with Steven R. Hill, Att’y Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Hill Interview]. 
143 For a discussion of the U.S. response to ICJ provisional measures and merits decisions in the 
Breard, LaGrand, and  Avena cases, see Murphy, op. cit. (“The initial fallout from the decisions 
on the merits in LaGrand and Avena is a story of the federal government encouraging the 
several states to take into account the decisions of the ICJ, without actually telling the states 
that they must do so as a matter of federal law.”) (noting that “the United States sought to 
implement [provisional] measures . . . principally by encouraging the commutation of death 
sentences of the relevant convicts by governors or par ole boards” and by “embark[ing] on 
an aggressive campaign to educate and train state law enforcement officers regarding U.S. 
obligations arising under the Vienna Convention, to the point of printing cards that officers 
were to carry with them and read out when arresting an alien”). 
144 Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
145 The CERD Committee issued an “urgent action” request under its early-warning procedure to 
the United States in March 2006 with respect to the Western Shoshone Peoples of the Western 
Shoshone Nation, giving the United States four months to respond on the measures it has 
taken in response. The United States has responded both in writing directly to the Committee 
and in Annex II of its 2007 CERD Report, op. cit., in which it provides background information 
on the case and U.S. responses to the underlying claim over the years. 
146 See, e.g., Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 25, 
op. cit. (“The granting of such measures and their adoption by the State shall not constitute a 
prejudgment on the merits of a case.”). 
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such measures, the State Department nonetheless follows a policy of formally 
transmitting requests for precautionary measures as an informational notice 
to the appropriate attorney general or responsible federal agency.147 It also 
engages in associated hearings on the propriety of interim measures and on 
follow-up thereto, reporting on the measures it has taken to ensure that pre-
cautionary measure requests are brought to the attention of the relevant body 
or bodies and, where compliance follows, on the steps taken by that body in 
response to the measures. Although far from the norm, federal and state agents 
have on occasion complied with precautionary measure requests issued by the 
Inter-American Commission.148 
In sum, although the United States asserts that these contentious complaints 
procedures generate nothing more than recommendations for the United 
States to take under advisement – and participates in associated proceedings 
expressly on that basis – it nonetheless treats the process as a formal, adjudica-
tory one.149 It actively engages in all stages of proceedings, employing the full 
set of procedural rights available to it to defend U.S. policy interests within the 
jurisdictional constraints of the Commission’s competence. Where defects are 
identified, processes are at times initiated to consider whether further mea-
sures are necessary to address the underlying concern.150 This is true of both 
individual complaints procedures under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American 
147 Hill Interview, op. cit. Such transmittals do not propose or encourage any particular action, 
but are sent to the relevant authority for that authority to respond to in its discretion. 
148 See, e.g., Ramos v. United States, Case 12.430, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 1/05, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc.  7 ¶ 89 (2005) (noting U.S. indication that federal district court 
judge in Texas had postponed setting an execution date in light of the petition before the 
Commission and request for precautionary measures) (“The Commission observes that this 
arrangement has given practical effect to the Commission’s precautionary measures by preserv-
ing Mr. Moreno Ramos’ life and physical integrity pending the Commission’s consideration 
of his complaint, and the Commission commends the efforts taken within the Texas judicial 
system to preserve Mr. Moreno Ramos’ right of effective access to the inter-American human 
rights system.”). 
149 Notably, following submission of the Baby Boy case to the IACHR in 1977, four members of the 
U.S. House of Representatives sent a letter to the IACHR in 1979, “in a spirit of cooperation 
and with the intent of furthering the work of the Commission,” requesting an opinion on 
“whether, if the United States loses, it would be subject to trade and diplomatic sanctions 
similar to those imposed upon Cuba by the O.A.S. following, and partially on account of, 
the human rights violations of the Castro regime?” It also requested suggestions on “how 
legislation might be shaped in order to eliminate any doubts as to U.S. compliance with 
IACHR standards in this regard.” “Baby Boy” v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Res. No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc.  9 rev. 1 (1981), ¶19. 
150 In other instances, the United States will indicate that it is taking measures to address the 
issue even while asserting that the Commission lacks competence to consider it. See, e.g., 
Medina v. United States, Case 12.421, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 31/05, ¶ 43 (2005) (assert-
ing Commission’s lack of competence over Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, but 
submitting nevertheless that the United States takes its obligations thereunder “very seriously 
and has since 1998 undertaken an intensive, on-going and now permanently institutionalized 
effort to improve compliance by federal, state and local government officials . . . includ[ing] 
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Commission and the collective complaints mechanism of the ILO, in which 
U.S. participation is equally extensive.151 
3. Other Promotional Mechanisms 
The United States also actively engages with UN, OAS, and ILO treaty bodies 
in other noncontentious ways aimed at facilitating more robust human rights 
promotion at the domestic level. This may include coordinating with civil 
society on treaty-based requirements to prepare national programs of action 
to give treaty commitments domestic effect152 or issuing invitations to UN 
and OAS special rapporteurs and independent experts to come to the United 
States to undertake onsite visits or otherwise discuss issues under their special 
mandates. The United States has, for example, authorized and cooperated with 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as it has undertaken onsite 
visits to Florida, Puerto Rico, New York, California, Kansas, Pennsylvania, 
Louisiana, and Texas to look into alleged abuses in the areas of state and 
federal detention facilities and with respect to migrant laborers and their 
families.153 U.S. cooperation is also expected should the Commission take 
up pending proposals to investigate other alleged abuses in the United States, 
such as housing discrimination and inappropriate use of electroshock weapons 
by local police forces. 
Similarly, the United States regularly accepts and facilitates country visits 
by UN special rapporteurs and independent experts who request invitations 
to visit the United States to engage in constructive dialogue with federal and 
state officials, NGOs, and civil society more broadly – most recently by the UN 
Special Rapporteurs on the subjects of protecting human rights while counter-
ing terrorism,154 human rights of migrants,155 and racial discrimination. Such 
the publication of a 72-page brochure on Vienna Convention requirements as well as pocket 
reference cards for arresting officials and a training video”). 
151 As of January 2008, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association had decided forty-nine 
cases involving the United States, cases in which it frequently recognized the nation’s reliable 
and engaged participation. 
152 ILO Convention 182, for example, requires ratifying states to develop a National Program 
of Action on ensuring child labor rights. The U.S. government initiated a process of review 
with civil society organizations but ultimately concluded that no additional measures were 
necessary. 
153 For a list of all IACHR on-site visits, see http://www.iachr.org/visitas.eng.htm. 
154 Press Release, OHCHR, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants to Visit United States, 
UN Doc. HR/07/04 (Apr. 27, 2007) (announcing a U.S. invitation for country visit in May 
2007). 
155 See Eliane Engeler, “U.N. rights expert to probe U.S. treatment of illegal immigrants [sic],” 
Associated Press, Apr.  27, 2007 (reporting on U.S.-facilitated visit in May 2007, with scheduled 
stops in California, Arizona, Texas, Florida, Georgia, New York, and Washington, D.C.). The 
UN expert was, however, denied access to certain facilities in Texas by local authorities. 
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UN experts are mandated to develop a regular dialogue with relevant govern-
mental and nongovernmental actors, exchange information, make recom-
mendations, and identify and promote best practices on measures to respect 
and ensure fundamental human rights. Consistent with the U.S. approach 
to periodic reporting processes, U.S. officials have at times noted that special 
rapporteurs, through the noncontentious dialogue they engender with an array 
of domestic governmental and nongovernmental actors, represent one of the 
most promising ways of promoting change within the United States.156 
C. INTEREST MANAGEMENT: THE PUSH-PULL OF DOMESTIC 
AND FOREIGN POLICY AGENDAS 
As the preceding section’s examination reveals, U.S. engagement with inter-
national human rights treaty bodies is quite robust. The question of interest, 
then, is how this level of engagement can be reconciled with popular notions 
that the United States actively resists the domestic application of human rights 
norms and thumbs its nose at human rights treaty body regimes? The answer, 
I argue, lies in interest management. Specifically, it resides at the intersec-
tion of domestic and foreign policy pressures, and the mediating postures the 
United States employs to steer a middle course through them. As with all inter-
national tribunals, engagement with human rights bodies involves important 
push-pull dynamics among a plurality of interest groups, with some urging 
greater engagement (the “push toward” factor) and others resisting engage-
ment (the “pull away” factor). These push-pull vectors operate simultaneously 
at the foreign policy level and at the domestic policy level. The U.S. position 
has modulated within these countervailing tendencies, resting at momentary 
middle grounds within the four corners of the dynamic157 as interest politics 
change and distinct strategic opportunities evolve. 
What appears clear, however, is that the United States is moving decisively 
toward greater engagement with international human rights treaty bodies. 
This shift is due both to growing pressures to engage at the foreign policy level 
and to a gradual diffusion of interests in domestic constituencies opposed to 
engagement. The net effect of the two dynamics, both accelerating since the 
1990s, is an ever more robust engagement policy, albeit one that operates 
within clearly parametered constraints that represent the continuing power of 
“pull back” interests. 
156 Hill Interview, op. cit. 
157 Viewed diagramatically, this dynamic may be seen as operating over a plane with domestic 
and foreign policy interests along one axis and push-pull tendencies along another. The U.S. 
policy position locates itself within this four-cornered plane at convergence points along the 
various and shifting vectors. 
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Although the motivations for each shift are independent of each other, their 
effects are mutually reinforcing and equally constitutive of the parameters of 
U.S. human rights policy. To demonstrate the various levers in this interest-
management process, the following two sections look, respectively, at the 
push-pull dynamic as it plays out, first, at the foreign policy level between 
“realist” and “institutionalist” persuasions in the foreign policy establishment 
and, second, at the domestic policy level between groups I call “insulationists” 
and “incorporationists.” 
Because these labels are so important to the analysis, it should be empha-
sized that the four corresponding groups are neither ideologically based nor 
exclusive in their membership. Rather, each bundles adherents to one of four 
distinct instrumental approaches to interest achievement, each directed to fos-
tering a political environment most conducive to a given foreign or domestic 
policy agenda. Their memberships are thus variable and politically contin-
gent, with adherents straddling or moving into or out of groupings depending 
on the precise issue at stake and shifting appreciations of policy opportunities. 
1. Foreign Policy Interests: Net Push Toward Greater Treaty 
Body Engagement 
A body of scholarship has arisen of late, looking more closely at the foreign 
policy dimension of U.S. human rights engagement and domestic policy mak-
ing. In particular, whereas accounts of the U.S. human rights paradox often 
focus narrowly on domestic politics and the partisan cleavages that historically 
linked human rights with “anti-Americanism” and thus assured for forty years, 
through veto-player politics, that the United States would neither ratify newly 
adopted human rights treaties nor adopt broad-based “human rights” cam-
paigns at home, this new literature turns attention back to the countervailing 
influence of diplomatic and foreign policy pressures on changing formal U.S. 
behavior on human rights questions within its own jurisdiction.158 
This influence cannot be ignored. Just as it was determinative in influencing 
the federal response to the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, 
when the international human rights regime was first emerging,159 so, too, 
is it determinative today, fifty years later, as that regime has matured into a 
set of legitimacy-bestowing international instruments and institutions. Two 
intellectual camps have been most determinative in this regard, both heavily 
158 See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy 
(Princeton University Press, 2000); Carol Anderson, Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations 
and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955 (Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
159 See Dudziak, op. cit., chaps. 3–5. 
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represented in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. They include groups 
broadly referred to as “realists” and “institutionalists.”160 
Realists include those who, following either classical or neo-structural ver-
sions of international relations’ realism theory, understand State behavior as 
influenced by one of two realpolitik determinants: the raw power of a more 
powerful State or an objective expectation of material benefit, such as trade 
benefits, economic assistance, or debt reduction.161 Realists in the U.S. foreign 
policy establishment thus tend to reject the usefulness of international insti-
tutions or norms, seeing them as mere window-dressing for real power and 
interest. They seek instead to preserve the unconstrained prerogative of the 
United States, as a world superpower, to protect national interests and respond 
to foreign threats by all available means, including unilateral power whenever 
necessary. 
Institutionalists, on the other hand, see greater instrumental utility in engag-
ing actively with both international institutions and global norms – includ-
ing human rights norms. While they, too, believe that States act exclusively 
in accordance with their instrumental interest,162 they see these interests as 
being increasingly interwoven with participation in international cooperative, 
peace-building, and dispute-resolution institutions.163 U.S. engagement with 
international institutions thus constitutes for institutionalists an important and 
instrumental foreign policy tool for promoting and defending U.S. interests 
abroad, while conferring key reputational benefits, ever more salient in global 
politics particularly in the international human rights field.164 
While realists dominated U.S. human rights policy during the Cold War,165 
and remain highly influential in the foreign policy establishment today, insti-
tutionalists have gained increasing prominence over the last two decades with 
the dramatic proliferation of international institutions and rapid expansion of 
the international human rights architecture. Within this context, the push-pull 
dynamic over U.S. human rights policy as a foreign policy objective has shifted 
160 For a brief overview of “realist” and “institutionalist” positions, see Murphy, op. cit. 
161 For influential classical accounts of realism, see, for example, Hans Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); and 
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill 1979). More recent “neo realist” 
scholarship has sought to refine these classical understandings by drawing upon concepts in 
game theory and law and economics. See Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, The Limits of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
162 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 Yale L.J. 2599, 2649 (1997) 
(referring to both as “instrumental interest theories”). 
163 See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984). 
164 Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823 
(2002) (suggesting a reputation-based model of state compliance with international law). 
165 See generally Hartmann, op. cit. 
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determinatively toward institutionalists, those favoring active U.S. engagement 
with supranational human rights treaty regimes. For this group, human rights 
engagement serves two primary strategic foreign policy goals: first, renewal 
of U.S. moral leadership in multilateral settings and, second, promotion of 
human rights and democratic reforms in other countries. Both are directed to 
furthering national security and global public order objectives, independent 
of any domestic policy implication. 
First, institutionalists appreciate that the international standing of U.S. 
diplomats and their ability to lead in international processes of global dis-
pute resolution are compromised by the nation’s failure to ratify core human 
rights instruments and engage in their supervisory procedures. This failure, 
which has left the nation increasingly in the formal company of rogue or 
failed states,166 renders it out of step with its democratic partners and subjects 
it to charges of hypocrisy by less democratic nations where the United States 
seeks human rights improvements or security safeguards.167 On a real and 
practical level, this impairs the United States’ ability to get its national security 
and other global security priorities accomplished within multilateral settings, 
at times making disagreement with the United States a “principled” human 
rights stand in itself for nations.168 In this sense, ratification and engagement 
166 The United States stands alongside Somalia, a nation lacking a functional government, as the 
only two nations among 194 UN Member States that have not ratified the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. The United States likewise stands among only eight nation-states not to 
have ratified the CEDAW. 
167 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, “Why America Should Ratify the Women’s Rights Treaty 
(CEDAW),” 34 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 263, 269 (2002) [hereinafter Koh, CEDAW] (“[F]rom 
my direct experience as America’s chief human rights official, I can testify that our continuing 
failure to ratify CEDAW has reduced our global standing, damaged our diplomatic relations, 
and hindered our ability to lead in the international human rights community. . . . In particular, 
our European and Latin American allies regularly question and criticize our isolation from 
this treaty framework both in public diplomatic settings and private diplomatic meetings.”) 
(reflecting testimony to Congress); Statement of Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary, Bureau 
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, in U.S. Congress, Nov. 
1979 (affirming to Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “failure . . . to ratify [ICCPR, 
ICESCR, CERD, and CAT] has a significant negative impact on the conduct of [U.S.] human 
rights policy,” undermining its “credibility and effectiveness”) (cited in Moravcsik, op. cit., 
at 194). 
168 The United States has found that it is increasingly on the losing side of votes at the UN. U.S. 
representatives have, accordingly, recognized that the mere fact that the United States takes a 
strong stand on an issue may cause a number of states to vote against it, even if they have no 
independent interest in doing so. A recent illustration occurred in a 2006 vote in a UN treaty 
drafting committee regarding the inclusion of a politicized reference to “foreign occupation” 
in the treaty’s preamble. Little support had been expressed in the drafting committee for the 
phrase outside of one regional block. Nonetheless, upon U.S. insistence on a state-by-state roll-
call vote on the issue (in a treaty otherwise agreed to by consensus), the United States could 
garner the support of only four other nations. An overwhelming 102 states voted affirmatively to 
253 From Paradox to Subsidiarity 
serve as a tool through which the United States can reseat itself within the 
“international community,” reassert its moral leadership role, and hence better 
promote its national security agenda in multilateral settings, where most inter-
national work gets done. For institutionalists, this has been a particular priority 
following the widely internationally condemned unilateral actions taken by 
the United States following the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
The second factor, most commonly articulated by the U.S. State Depart-
ment, involves recognition that full compliance by the United States with 
international human rights treaty body procedures increases the visibility and 
legitimacy of the procedures themselves, ratcheting up expectation levels for 
their regular and concerted use, and thereby prodding other states to take the 
procedures more seriously. Indeed, U.S. executive agencies recognize that 
human rights treaty bodies – by providing an international spotlight for gross 
abuses, giving voice to individuals and civil society groups seeking greater 
human rights protections and transparency at home, and providing legitimacy 
to domestic human rights and democracy movements – have initiated impor-
tant conversations and processes in countries around the world, particularly 
in transitional states.169 They also recognize that while the U.S. failure to rat-
ify specific treaties has not likely caused other states to forego ratification, it 
may embolden some to turn ratification into an empty political act, used as 
a rhetorical device to claim greater commitment to human rights than the 
United States without making corresponding changes in their policies and 
practices at home.170 
In this sense, although the foreign policy establishment may remain skep-
tical, or at best agnostic, about the usefulness of engagement for the United 
States’ domestic human rights record, it nonetheless fully recognizes and val-
ues the importance of treaty body engagement for promoting human rights 
retain the text, with 8 states abstaining. The dearth of support the United States could muster 
in an official UN vote of this nature sent an unmistakable message. A similar message was 
conveyed in the November 2006 General Assembly elections of members of the International 
Law Commission, the first such election in which the U.S. nominee failed to be elected 
to the international body. See ILC, 2006 election of the International Law Commission, at  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/2006election.htm (visited Apr. 25, 2007). 
169 See White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Mar. 16, 
2006 (supporting human rights treaty bodies as an explicit part of the U.S. National Security 
Strategy), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf (visited Apr. 20, 2007). In 
December 2006, the U.S. State Department issued “Guiding Principles on Non-Governmental 
Organizations,” a set of ten principles to guide U.S. human rights policy around the world, 
in recognition that NGOs “are essential to the development and success of free soci-
eties and that they play a vital role in ensuring accountable, democratic government.” See 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/77771.htm (visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
170 With respect to the frequency of treaty ratification as an empty political act, see generally Oona 
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L. J. 1935 (2002). 
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and democracy in less democratically stable states. 171 By actively and con-
structively engaging with these procedures – through high-level government 
participation, comprehensive reporting, well-prepared and legally argued oral 
and written interventions, civil society participation, and a high degree of 
transparency – the United States thus seeks, through its example, to encour-
age other states to do the same. It is, in this sense, constitutive of the United 
States’ already heavy human rights investments in its broader national security 
agenda,172 a key strategy for promoting good practices in other states and hence 
contributing to global security as a whole.173 
These two general “push” factors appear to be the dominant influences 
motivating U.S. engagement policy with international treaty bodies. They are, 
however, blunted at the margins by certain “pull away” or “realist” tendencies. 
These, led by foreign-policy-focused national security entities, such as the 
National Security Council and Department of Defense – with the legal buttress 
of the U.S. Justice Department174 – tend to be little concerned by most of what 
human rights tribunals do and hence have less interest in determining U.S. 
engagements with them. They are more concerned with the implications of 
U.S. engagement with other international courts and tribunals discussed in this 
volume, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ),175 that more directly touch on state-to-state national 
security and international defense prerogatives. This follows from the fact 
that human rights tribunals do not tend to deal directly with interstate or 
transjurisdictional disputes that may involve threats to national security or 
other interests emanating from abroad176 – for which realists seek to maintain 
171 It serves, in this sense, to help restore a balance between ratifying nations whose formal treaty 
commitments find analogues in domestic policy and practice and those that do not. 
172 The United States invests heavily and plays an active role in promoting human rights abroad. 
This takes shape through its annual country reports on the human rights situation of 194 
countries around the world, its substantial bilateral and multilateral aid, support of international 
human rights treaty bodies, and substantial diplomatic efforts. 
173 In this respect, although some note that U.S. ratification has little effect on other states’ decision 
to ratify or not, see Moravcsik, op. cit. (finding little empirical evidence to support common 
claim), the level and scope of U.S. participation in treaty body processes or lack thereof can be 
expected to have a notable effect on the scope of other states’ participation, given the ratchet-up 
effect it has on community expectations. 
174 The U.S. Department of Justice under the George W. Bush administration has played a central 
role in crafting legal arguments to resist international engagement and provide justification 
for “war on terror” policies that often put the United States at loggerheads with the rest of the 
world. In so doing, it has increasingly been at policy odds with the U.S. Department of State. 
Cf. Neil Lewis, “Justice Dept. under Obama Is Preparing for Doctrinal Shift in Policies of 
Bush Years,” New York Times, Feb. 2, 2009, at A14. 
175 See chapters 6 and 4, respectively. 
176 Optional interstate complaint mechanisms, though rarely used, are in fact established under 
most human rights treaties. Notably, the United States has recognized the competence of the 
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a supple and unconstrained response capability. Rather, they deal exclusively 
with U.S. conduct vis-à-vis persons subject to its own jurisdiction. As such, 
the geopolitical calculations of engagement tend to be distinct from, and less 
sensitive than, those related to most other international tribunals. 
Realist tendencies nonetheless recognize that too full an engagement with 
human rights treaty bodies might function in practice to constrain U.S. war-
making or defense functions, especially as exercised abroad. Foreign policy 
realists thus pull back in areas where this might occur. That is, whereas insti-
tutionalists, for the reasons noted earlier, tend to prevail on the question of 
engagement once treaty ratification has been effected, their realist counterparts 
play an important role in policing the boundaries of human rights supervision, 
“pulling back” against the institutionalists’ “push forward” wherever human 
rights supervision may conceivably circumscribe U.S. national security discre-
tion and war-related undertakings. 
The United States has mediated these push-pull concerns by adopting an 
engagement policy that participates fully in human rights treaty body mecha-
nisms, except to the extent they purport to address extraterritorial concerns or 
matters that overlap with international humanitarian law or the law of armed 
conflict. That is, the United States has adopted a foreign policy position that 
supports active U.S. engagement with human rights treaty bodies in all but 
these two sensitive areas defined as beyond the jurisdictional competence 
of international human rights supervision. Although these positions put the 
United States in an increasingly adversarial posture vis-à-vis human rights 
treaty bodies, given extraterritorial abuses committed in response to the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and the U.S. war against Iraq and Afghanistan,177 they may be 
seen as a core mediating technique between U.S. institutionalist and realist 
positions with respect to achieving its varied foreign policy objectives. 
UN Human Rights Committee to examine interstate complaints against it under the ICCPR. 
See 138 Cong. Rec. S4781–01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992). 
177 The U.S. “pull-back” posture has the express effect of opening a space to which contested prac-
tices may be removed without the threat of supervisory censure by human rights treaty bodies. 
This has created growing international alarm as the United States has increasingly moved “war 
on terror” abuses off-shore, including the holding of “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo Bay, 
third-party states, and off-shore vessels, and engaged in the practice of extraordinary rendition. 
See, e.g., Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the 
Rule of Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1333 (2007). 
Prior to the U.S. presentation of its second and third periodic report to the UN Human 
Rights Committee in July 2006, a member of the UN Committee lamented privately to this 
author the fact that the United States had not submitted its report on time, the report being 
due before the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Had the report been submitted on time, the Committee 
would not have had to focus so narrowly on the high-profile abuses in Guantanamo, Abu 
Graib, and other extraterritorial loci, and could have addressed itself more fully to the more 
general human rights issues affecting the U.S. population as a whole. 
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2. Domestic Policy Interests: From Pull to Push – The Evolution 
of Domestic Social Struggles 
The foreign policy considerations just described have dominated in determin-
ing current U.S. engagement modalities with human rights treaty bodies over 
the last decade. The prior question of whether the United States will in fact 
ratify a given treaty, and thus open itself to treaty body engagement, remains 
a decision in which domestic politics are distinctly paramount. The push-
pull dynamic on U.S. decision makers at this level functions not between 
foreign policy institutionalists and realists but between domestic groups we 
may term “insulationists” and “incorporationists.” The former seek to insulate 
domestic law from the influence of international human rights constructions, 
finding a domestic environment free from human rights methodologies and 
migrations more amenable to achieving their substantive political policy pref-
erences. They oppose U.S. ratification of human rights treaties and vigorously 
object to the use of human rights norms by domestic courts. Incorporationists, 
by contrast, find the mediating influence of international human rights law 
on domestic politics helpful to their domestic policy agenda, which gener-
ally favors broader individual rights interpretations, with fewer permissible 
restrictions. They thus seek to incorporate international human rights norms 
and human rights methodologies into domestic law and decision-making pro-
cesses, through treaty ratification, local monitoring and interpretation initia-
tives, treaty body engagement, grassroots mobilization, judicial oversight, and 
direct implementing legislation at local, state, and federal levels. 
This push-pull dynamic has played out in virtually every domestic social 
struggle since the international human rights regime first emerged sixty years 
ago. Thus, the civil rights era demands of incorporationists in the fifties and 
sixties for the federal government to ensure respect for internationally pro-
tected human rights guarantees of racial equality were quickly countered by 
insulationists’ initiatives to launch “states’ rights” movements,178 red-baiting 
campaigns against rights advocates (and internationalism generally), and the 
fateful Bricker Amendment, a concerted attempt to constitutionally insulate 
domestic law from all treaty-related modifications.179 These insulation initia-
tives, intersecting with Cold War politics, led to a series of actions and political 
178 These movements, which included the founding of a “states’ rights” political party, sought to 
insulate local segregationist and abusive policies from the illumination of federal constitutional, 
statutory, and treaty law. 
179 For an animating description of the process through which the proposed constitutional amend-
ment (and a watered-down version of it) failed, see Anderson, op. cit. Had it passed it still of 
course would have required approval in three-quarters of U.S. states to take effect. U.S. Const., 
art. V. 
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compromises that ensured that human rights remained off the domestic policy-
making agenda for the next quarter century. Since the 1970s, this dynamic 
has played out with similar intensity over “family values,” abortion, parental 
rights, and personal lifestyle-choice debates, with incorporationists seeking 
broad human rights statements from international treaty bodies to incorpo-
rate into domestic advocacy and litigation strategies and insulationists seeking 
to foreclose all reference by domestic legislatures and courts to international 
decisions or comparative rights jurisprudence.180 
In this politicized struggle over the control of legal rights meaning, domestic 
policy insulationists – fewer in number but better in organization, funding, 
and insider/beltway political contacts – have historically been dominant.181 
The reasons for this, at least from the perspective of treaty ratification, are 
reviewed by Professor Moravcsik in his discussion of the “U.S. human rights 
paradox.”182 They center on two factors: first, the extreme decentralization 
and fragmentation of U.S. political institutions, which make them uniquely 
amenable to veto-group politics, and, second, a strong conservative minority 
that has consistently utilized veto players, most notably in the U.S. Senate, 
to achieve its insulationist agenda. Indeed, employing a culturally resonant 
rhetoric sounding in constitutional democracy, this minority has historically 
been successful in rallying partisan affiliates and mobilizing veto players to 
block ratification of human rights treaties, either by bottlenecking them in the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee or by foreclosing the ability to achieve 
super-majority advice and consent in the full Senate. 
The powerful political and financial lobby of these interest groups and 
their unique control over veto players in the political process – particularly 
over Republican majorities in the Senate – explain the U.S. historic failure 
to ratify human rights treaties apace with similarly minded nations, those 
equally committed to domestic human rights guarantees.183 It nonetheless 
fails as a reliable explanatory framework for predicting U.S. human rights 
engagements in the twenty-first century. Such an explanation would have to 
180 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005) (seeking to 
preclude domestic courts from referring to “judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign 
institutions” in determining the meaning of U.S. laws). 
181 Liberal advocacy and community-based groups readily recognize that they have been insuffi-
ciently successful in organizationally linking their grassroots campaigns and local support with 
beltway politics, and hence have had a much less effective influence in Washington than their 
numbers should indicate. 
182 See Moravcsik, op. cit. 
183 It also helps to explain why the United States, after ratifying the ICCPR, CERD, and CAT 
in 1992 and 1994, did not ratify the CRC and CEDAW from 1994 to 2006, when Republicans 
held majorities in the Senate and “family values” groups were actively lobbying beltway veto 
players against ratification. 
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account for three closely related facts: one, U.S. ratification of an increasingly 
broad spectrum of human rights treaties in the 1990s that failed, over time, 
to generate or sustain strong issue-specific oppositional lobbies (including the 
ICCPR, CERD, CAT, and child-protective labor rights treaties); two, active 
U.S. engagement in the international supervisory regimes corresponding to 
these treaties, including in areas of substantive overlap with nonratified treaties, 
such as the CRC, CEDAW, and ICESCR; and, three, the altered opportunity 
structure both of the above factors create for domestic advocates – that is, 
those pushing for greater engagement, and those pulling away from it – as 
they perpetually recreate and evolve their strategies to better achieve distinct 
substantive policy preferences in changing political environments. 
That is, a fully explanatory description of U.S. human rights politics must 
account not only for the structural potential for mobilized political lobbies to 
block treaty ratification.184 It must account as well for the shifting incentive 
structure for them to do so over time and the relative receptivity of the popula-
tion (and hence potential veto players) to traditional insulationist arguments. 
As these environmental factors change, so too does the importance of “extreme 
decentralization” as a structural condition favoring – rather than disfavoring – 
insulation. At the same time, insulationism, like incorporationism, has always 
been an instrumental strategy for its proponents, supported to create a domes-
tic political environment most conducive to particular policy agendas. As soon 
as it ceases to bring comparative advantage, it will be discarded and replaced 
by a new set of strategies and supporting ideologies. This is precisely what we 
are beginning to see today. 
The United States is thus faced in the twenty-first century with a new 
set of domestic pressures in its human rights engagement policy. It is no 
longer exclusively a push-pull dynamic between “liberal” and “conservative” 
interest groups, with the latter consistently prevailing – as they did from the 
1950s to  1980s – through their unique ability to block ratification of human 
rights treaties, and hence, together with a particular brand of politically-
resonant rights absolutism, preempt human rights conversations from deepen-
ing domestically. Rather, with U.S. ratification of core human rights treaties in 
the 1990s, it is increasingly becoming a push-push dynamic in the twenty-first 
century. That is, liberal interest groups, true to their incorporationist heritage, 
continue to push for greater U.S. engagement with human rights treaties and 
treaty bodies as a means of bringing domestic law, policies, and practice more 
fully into line with internationally recognized human rights norms, norms 
184 The mere existence of a vocal conservative minority and institutional amenability to veto 
politics as a treaty-blocking option does not, in itself, speak to the utility of insulationist 
strategies to the conservative political agenda. 
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they have spent decades constructing.185 Conservative interest groups, for their 
part, faced with a growing incorporationist reality, have increasingly realized 
that insulationism alone may not be helpful to their agendas, particularly 
as they relate to lifestyle, personal choice, and “family values” issues. Many 
such groups are thus urging the United States not to disengage with inter-
national human rights bodies but rather to engage more fully – albeit with a 
distinct agenda. That is, they do not seek the domestication of presently recog-
nized international norms, as do liberals, but rather – in a strategic reversal of 
process – the internationalization of socially conservative rights constructions 
more amenable to their domestic policy agenda, which may then be subject to 
incorporation at some later date. Where opportunities emerge, traditional insu-
lationists are increasingly using partisan political connections to press the U.S. 
diplomatic (and legislative) corps to undertake this agenda on their behalf.186 
Because this transition is so important for understanding current U.S. 
human rights politics, it is useful to highlight the constitutive processes that 
led to it. The techniques the United States adopts to mediate between these 
dueling push-push pressures will be taken up more fully in Part D. 
I. Diminishing U.S. Receptivity to Insulationism 
Historically, insulationism has been employed by socially and politically con-
servative interest groups as a way to bypass the mobilizing influence of human 
rights law on those wishing to effect equality or dignity-based change in the 
U.S. social structure. Because such change is rhetorically consistent with 
the promise of the U.S. Constitution – indeed, with the country’s national 
narrative187 – it has been necessary to create an ideational structure that pits 
international human rights law against U.S. constitutional democracy, framing 
the former as undemocratic and even anti-American. This is possible through 
a rhetorical manipulation of international human rights law that equates it 
with absolutist, externally defined policy outcomes, intrinsically and automat-
ically superior to domestic determinations. In fact, both sides of the political 
spectrum have tended to rely on rights-absolutist constructions to appeal to 
their respective constituencies, one side affirming that international treaty law 
185 Notably, they have often helped construct these norms in the mold of strong U.S. constitutional 
rights protections. 
186 See, for example, discussion in Part C.2.III infra. 
187 See Jack M. Balkin, “Brown as Icon,” in Balkin ed., What “Brown v. Board of Education” Should 
Have Said 5 (NYU Press, 2001) (describing as the “Great Progressive Narrative” that “widely 
held and often repeated story of deep resonance in American culture, which sees America’s 
basic ideals of liberty and equality as promises for the future to be achieved eventually through 
historical struggle”). 
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requires the immediate modification of domestic law to conform strictly to 
international treaty body views and policy preferences, the other that interna-
tional law constructions conflict with deliberative democracy at home. 
It is in fact precisely this rights absolutism that is responsible for the 
contentiousness of human rights treaty law engagements in U.S. domestic 
politics and, specifically, the historic ability of veto politics to successfully 
block human rights treaty ratifications. That is, opponents have mobilized 
influential veto players by representing human rights law as a doctrine of 
foreign-determined meaning imposed on nonconsenting domestic popula-
tions. Nationalistic urgency is then tied to ratification-blocking campaigns by 
asserting that ratification will force the United States to adopt a set of externally 
defined policies that are morally or socially objectionable to a large segment 
of the population. Although this once took the form of imagining UN bodies 
as communist-inspired institutions that would force communities to desegre-
gate their schools, eateries, pools, and public accommodations and lead to 
widespread miscegenation188 – issues that could mobilize powerful domestic 
constituencies against ratification – it now asserts that adhesion to currently 
unratified human rights treaties, such as the CRC and CEDAW, will require 
immediate mandatory legalization of same-sex marriage, provision of abortion 
and contraception on demand, decriminalization of prostitution, the turning 
over of child rearing to the state, and other measures that could not currently 
be achieved through national-level democratic processes alone.189 
It is this caricatured vision of human rights treaty law – one permitting of no 
national discretion in the crafting of “appropriate” policies – that gives rise and 
animating force to “national sovereignty,” “states’ rights,” and other “rights-
cultural” objections.190 These objections, although plainly instrumental given 
188 See, for example, William Fleming, Danger to America: The Draft Covenant on Human Rights, 
37 A.B.A. Journal 739, 794-99 (1951) (claiming that the Draft Covenant on Human Rights is the 
“perfect embodiment of . . . unmitigated socialism”); Frank E. Holman, International Proposals 
Affecting So-Called Human Rights, 14 Law & Contemp. Probs. 479, 483 (1949 (claiming that 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will force the United States to allow interracial 
marriages). 
189 The same strategy has been used with the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
with opponents arguing in the 1970s that it would lead to women being drafted by the military 
and to public unisex bathrooms. Today it is warned that its passage would compel courts 
to approve same-sex marriage and deny Social Security benefits for housewives and widows. 
See Juliet Eilperin, “New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment,” Washington Post, 
Mar. 28, 2007, A1, A4 (citing arguments of Eagle Forum President Phyllis Schlafly and other 
conservative opponents); see also Phyllis Schlafly, Time to Unsign CEDAW (Feb. 14, 2007) at  
http://www.eagleforum.org/column/2007/feb07/07–02-14.html (visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
190 It also gives rise to academic critiques of human rights advocacy. See, e.g., David W. Kennedy, 
The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J.  99 
(2001). 
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the subsidiary structure of human rights law, have high political traction 
in the U.S. popular mind-set and hence are effective mobilizing tools for 
capturing key veto players to block ratification when perceived as politically 
advantageous. 
This blocking process reliably works, however, only to the extent a politically 
influential minority can be convinced, or can convince core constituencies, of 
two critical factors with respect to any given human rights treaty: one, that rat-
ification will compel the immediate adoption of laws and policies determined 
by external (not domestic) decision makers; and, two, that such policies are 
socially or morally repugnant or otherwise contrary to group interests. Both 
propositions have become increasingly difficult to sustain over the past decade, 
as the U.S. ratification record reveals. 
First, the idea that human rights treaty ratification will compel the United 
States blindly to adopt externally defined policies is today unsupportable. As a 
legal matter, the United States has removed all basis for doubt over the issue 
by adopting the consistent practice of attaching non-self-execution clauses 
to human rights treaties upon ratification.191 Such clauses stipulate that any 
change to domestic law required by international treaty commitments must 
be implemented through the ordinary legislative process, in which federal, 
state, and local voices may all be heard, not through direct judicial construc-
tions unmediated by “deliberative democracy.”192 This policy, directly respon-
sive to rights-absolutist constructions that sustain “states’ rights” and “national 
sovereignty” rhetoric, effectively removes the key mobilizing rationale behind 
policy-driven opposition to ratification initiatives.193 At the same time, it has 
become increasingly clear, as a factual matter, that U.S. ratification of the 
ICCPR, CERD, CAT, ILO Convention 182, and the two CRC optional pro-
tocols – and submission to the jurisdiction of their supervisory treaty bodies – 
has not forced the United States to adopt extremist policies that were not fully 
vetted by domestic political processes. There is no reason to believe that this 
191 In providing its advice and consent to the ICCPR in 1992, for example, the Senate declared 
that “the provisions of Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.” 138 Cong. 
Rec. S4781, at S4784 (1992). The Senate stated that the declaration was meant “to clarify that 
the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. Courts.” S. Rep. No. 102-23, at  
15 (1992). 
192 In its decision in Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) the Supreme Court appeared to 
adopt a different, more expansive interpretation of non-self-execution that does not conform 
to the Senate’s stated intent in attaching such clauses to human rights treaties. Medellı́n, 128 
S. Ct. at n.2. 
193 This concern over direct judicial enforcement of human rights treaty law tends to be the 
principal objection of opponents of U.S. human rights incorporation. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, 
Should International Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law? 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 327 
(2000). 
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will not likewise be true with U.S. ratification of additional treaties, such as 
the CRC, CEDAW, CRPD, and the ICESCR. 
Second, given broad social, cultural, and attitudinal changes in the United 
States over the last two decades, domestic policy changes claimed to be 
required by human rights treaty ratification simply are not sufficiently unpalat-
able to U.S. interest groups in the twenty-first century to sustain veto politics 
for all but a small number of content-specific treaties. Such treaties are gen-
erally those associated with women and children’s role in the family and 
their access to contraception, abortion, and “integral health services.” These 
issues – like those on sexual orientation, marriage, prayer, and Israel – are 
those on which socially conservative minority groups continue to hold power-
ful domestic sway.194 This narrowing environment in which veto politics can 
effectively function follows from the changing interest politics and shifting 
political alliances that social struggle and norm internalization have brought 
with time. Indeed, as the principal social struggles turned in the past half-
century from race and Cold War divisions to “moral values” and “lifestyle 
choice” issues, old social alliances broke down and the treaty-opposition 
agenda narrowed, becoming more issue specific and less capable of mobilizing 
influential players across broad social sectors.195 At the same time, many polit-
ically and financially influential domestic groups – such as the U.S. business 
and legal communities – that once reliably opposed incorporation have today 
become, for a diversity of self-interested and non-self-interested motivations, 
active proponents of U.S. ratification of human rights treaties.196 The U.S. 
business community, for example, has taken energetic part in ILO treaty draft-
ing processes (particularly where child labor protections are at issue), actively 
lobbying the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for speedy ratification and 
attaining it even under strong Senate Republican majorities.197 
194 Significantly, this sway was magnified in the eight years of the George W. Bush presidency, 
given the special access such groups had to the White House and formal positions of power. 
195 Interestingly, it has necessitated that many conservative groups, long opposed to internation-
alism, have had to extend their strategic embrace to like-minded allies beyond domestic 
borders. 
196 The American Bar Association was a powerful and highly influential opponent of human 
rights treaties in the late forties and fifties, see, e.g., Fleming,  op. cit. (citing arguments of 
the ABA President); it today actively supports ratification of CEDAW, CRC, ICESCR, and 
the American Convention, albeit with a standard set of reservations, understandings and 
declarations (RUDs). 
197 This was true with both ILO Convention 182 and the two optional protocols to the CRC, each 
ratified under Republican Senate majorities with the support of the U.S. business community. 
See, e.g., “U.S. Business Community’s Letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 
ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor”, Sept. 23, 1999, at http://www.uscib.org/ 
index.asp?documentID=1352 (visited Apr. 20, 2007) (providing reasons U.S. business 
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Given the nature of the U.S. political structure, these shifting alliances 
have led to a predictable outcome. With broad national support for human 
rights treaty ratification generally, targeted pro-ratification lobbying by certain 
influential groups, and veto players mobilizable only with respect to lim-
ited “family value” subject matters, the United States proceeded to ratify the 
ICCPR, CERD, CAT, and a variety of labor and child rights treaties in the 
1990s and early 2000s. It will not be long before additional treaties are ratified, 
particularly where coordinated civil society ratification campaigns intersect 
with Democratic control of the U.S. Senate, as will be the case in at least 2009 
and 2010. 
II. Creeping Incorporation, Despite Insulationist Obstruction 
At the same time, it has become increasingly clear that strategies focused on 
insulation alone – most notably, ratification blocking and the inclusion of 
a standard package of reservations, understandings, declarations with treaty 
ratification198 – are no longer reliable in insulating the U.S. domestic system 
from human rights methodologies and migrations. This has resulted from 
the many innovative and constantly adapting strategies undertaken by incor-
porationists over the years, designed to circumvent the blocking potential of 
traditional insulationist tactics. Whereas these traditional tactics have focused 
on top-down insulation, mobilizing federal veto players through rhetorical 
appeals to states’ rights and federalism-based safeguards on localized experi-
mentation, the new incorporationist strategies seek in fact to operationalize 
these appeals: they start at the grassroots and incorporate upward. In this regard, 
it is important to underscore that while “extreme decentralization” or “political 
fragmentation” has been identified as a structural factor of the U.S. political 
system that favors top-down insulation, 199 it is – just as critically – a structural 
factor of the U.S. political system that favors filter-up incorporation. 200 The 
community, including U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable, supports U.S. 
ratification). The U.S. business community has also become a strong and influential supporter 
of universal health insurance in the United States. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, “What’s the One 
Thing Big Business and the Left Have in Common?” New York Times, April  1, 2007. 
198 For the package of Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations (RUDs) under the CERD, 
ICCPR, and CAT, see 140 Cong. Rec. S7634–02 (daily ed., June 24, 1994), 138 Cong. Rec. 
S4781–01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992), and Cong. Rec. S17486–01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). Of 
course, not all RUDs are aimed at insulation; many are required by constitutional constraints 
and are fully consistent, in both letter and spirit, with international law. 
199 See Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” op. cit., at  186–90, 197. 
200 In view of this in the judicial field, William Brennan famously called on state courts to continue 
to expand strong individual rights protections under state constitutions, given federal judicial 
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ability of the two in our Madisonian democracy to “resist and frustrate the 
measures of the other”201 has been one of the defining characteristics of U.S. 
human rights politics from the late twentieth to early twenty-first centuries. 
This can be seen in a wide variety of modern incorporationist tactics. 
First, with ratification of certain domestically popular human rights treaties 
impeded at the federal level by veto politics, incorporationists have gone 
straight to their local and state governments seeking direct localized incorpo-
ration, with growing success rates. With respect to CEDAW and the CRC, for 
example, governmental bodies in scores of U.S. states, territories, cities, and 
localities have adopted resolutions or instruments endorsing the conventions 
or adopting them on behalf of their jurisdictions.202 These initiatives have 
at times been accompanied by innovative community-based supervision and 
other follow-up procedures to monitor local-level progress in achieving treaty-
related commitments and to ensure implementation of locally relevant solu-
tions to the problems identified. Initiatives in San Francisco,203 Berkeley,204 
“backsliding” in the 1970s. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489–504 (1977). 
201 “Federalist 46” (James Madison) (discussing U.S. federal structure); cf. Moravcsik, op. cit., at  
197 (“The institutional odds against any fundamental change [in U.S. human rights policy] in 
Madison’s republic are high.”) 
202 See, e.g., Chicago City Council, Resolution (Feb. 11, 2009) (resolving to “advance policies and 
practices [that] are in harmony with the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in all city [sic] and organizations that address issues directly affecting the City’s chil-
dren.”); Koh, CEDAW, op. cit., at  274 and nn. 48–50 (“Far from CEDAW imposing unwanted 
obligations on local governments, local governments are in fact responding to the demands 
of their citizens, who have become impatient at the lack of federal action to implement these 
universal norms into American law.”). 
203 For a copy of the San Francisco city ordinance, see San Francisco, Cal., Administrative Code, 
ch. 12K (2001), at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/cosw/cedaw/pdf/appenda.pdf (visited 
Apr. 20, 2007). The San Francisco initiative represents an experiment in localized replication 
of UN periodic reporting, constructive dialogue, and expert recommendation processes. It 
specifically establishes a local CEDAW Task Force, composed of eleven elected representa-
tives from both government and civil society, to work with the Human Rights Commission 
and city departments to identify discrimination against women and girls and to implement 
human rights principles at the city level. For related documents, see http://www.sfgov.org/ 
site/dosw_page.asp?id=19725 (visited Apr. 20, 2007). See generally Stacy Laira Lozner, Diffu-
sion of Local Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco CEDAW Ordinance and the New 
York City Human Rights Initiative, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 768 (2004). 
204 On February 27, 2007, the Berkeley City Council adopted a resolution requiring the city 
manager to supervise a periodic reporting process on the city’s progress in eliminating racial 
discrimination, in accordance with the CERD. See Resolution No. 63,596-N.S. Eliminating 
Racial Discrimination. The Office of the City Manager thereupon created a template and 
sent it to every city agency in Berkeley seeking information on racial discrimination. The first 
Berkeley City report, submitted on June 26, 2007, was likewise to be sent to the UN CERD 
Committee in anticipation of its February 2008 review of the United States as a whole, as well 
as the attorney general of California. 
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New York City,205 Pennsylvania,206 and Massachusetts207 have been particu-
larly noteworthy, although forms of localized human rights incorporation are 
apparent at the grassroots throughout the country.208 City and state govern-
ments are, in response, increasingly taking a human-rights-based approach 
to community problem solving, including with respect to the few treaties 
that vocal conservative minorities continue to be able to block at the federal 
level.209 
Second, even where federal ratification is attained, non-self-execution 
clauses have posed a prima facie, if often overstated, dilemma for domestic 
human rights advocates. These jurisdictional clauses bar domestic courts from 
entertaining private causes of action arising directly under treaty law, requiring 
instead that independent causes of action be identified under U.S. statutory, 
205 In New York City, a bill was introduced to the city council in late 2004 to turn CEDAW 
and CERD into statewide principles of governance, to be interpreted and applied by state 
and city human rights commissions with competence over local disputes, reported on by city 
government, and periodically reviewed by a city task force. See Bill, Int. 512-A “New York City 
Human Rights Government Operations Audit Law.” The bill would require that city govern-
ment departments and programs review their policies and programs to determine their effects 
on women and racial minorities and report on those impacts for review by a city task force. For 
information on the New York City Human Rights Initiative, http://www.nychri.org/frame.html 
(visited Apr. 20, 2007). The bill is up for reintroduction in 2009. 
206 In 2002, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed a resolution establishing a House 
committee to “study and investigate the integration of human rights standards in Pennsylvania’s 
laws and policies.” See House Resolution 473 (2002). In 2003, House Resolution No. 144 
reestablished the select committee to continue its work. Public hearings were held throughout 
the state on the rights to health, housing, employment, transportation, and nutrition, and the 
House Select Committee’s conclusions and recommendations were issued on November 30, 
2004. 
207 In Massachusetts, House Bill No. 706 was proposed in 2005 to establish a special commission 
to review the integration of international human rights standards into the commonwealth’s 
laws and policies. It would authorize the state legislature to investigate human rights abuses 
through a series of public hearings, drawing conclusions and making recommendations for 
changes in state and local policy. 
208 In Chicago, for example, a local city council adopted a right-to-housing bill that brought in 
significant federal dollars. “National truth commissions” or “community hearings” to expose 
locally identified deficiencies in U.S. policies and practices vis-à-vis core human rights instru-
ments have also been undertaken locally around the country. See, e.g., Poor Peoples’ Eco-
nomic Human Rights Campaign, National Truth Commission: Shining a Light on Poverty in 
the USA, at http://www.economichumanrights.org/ntc_report1.shtml (visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
Efforts at local periodic reporting on human rights compliance are also being advanced in 
Portland, Oregon, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
209 This is particularly true with respect to CEDAW and the CRC. The United States has also 
not ratified the ICESCR and American Convention. The reasons, however, do not appear to 
be veto politics but simply the lack of any organized domestic constituency pushing strongly 
for ratification of either. That is, although there is no vocal minority actively obstructing 
ratification, neither is there yet any strong domestic advocacy movement pushing for ratifica-
tion. 
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constitutional, or common law. Incorporationists have responded by increas-
ingly pressing domestic courts to apply human rights treaty law not directly, but 
rather indirectly – used as a nonbinding interpretive aid or source of persuasive 
authority in discerning meaning under independent private causes of action.210 
U.S. courts, with their long historical pedigree of reference to international 
law, foreign practice, and foreign court judgments, have often been willing to 
adopt this approach, particularly with respect to state and federal constitutional 
provisions that are direct analogues to treaty-based norms, such as due process 
and cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.211 State courts, the principal 
protagonists in cooperative judicial federalism, may be especially amenable to 
such human rights migrations in interpreting state constitutional guarantees. 
This is particularly true where such guarantees have been directly influenced 
in their drafting by international human rights law212 or where they include 
normative protection for rights – such as those to health, education, welfare, or 
human dignity – that have no direct federal constitutional parallels and thus 
for which comparative foreign law and human rights sources are particularly 
useful.213 Although insulationist resistance to this judicial methodology 
remains sharp,214 the movement toward greater U.S. judicial reliance on trans-
jurisdictional human rights dialogues is unmistakable; it represents an area 
of growing U.S. human rights incorporation of ratified, and even unratified, 
treaty law.215 
210 In the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 term, all nine justices endorsed the view that treaty inter-
pretations by international tribunals were entitled to “respectful consideration” by U.S. courts. 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2683 (2006); id. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
211 See, e.g., Cleveland, op. cit.; Jackson, “Constitutional Comparisons,” op. cit. at 109 (“references 
to foreign and international sources occur episodically in constitutional decisions throughout 
the [Supreme] Court’s history”); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 
98 Am. J. Int’l  L.  43, 43–45 (2004); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 98 Am. J. Int’l  L.  82, 83–84) (2004). 
212 See, e.g., Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational 
Constitutional Discourse, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 15, 21–27 (2004) (describing influence of Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights on text of Montana Constitution). 
213 See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International 
Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 359 (2006). 
214 This resistance was perhaps most powerfully manifested in two resolutions introduced to the 
U.S. House of Representatives in 2004 and 2005, respectively, although neither came to a full 
vote. Each expressed the sense of their cosponsors that “judicial determinations regarding the 
meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based on judgments, laws, or pronounce-
ments of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform 
an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United States.” H.R. Res. 568, 
108th Cong. (2004), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c108:1:./temp/∼mdbsmtQvNi:: 
(visited Apr. 20, 2007); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/ 
D?c109:2:./temp/∼mdbsmtQvNi:: (visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
215 The methodology, given the noncontrolling nature of its inputs, allows domestic judges 
to draw not only on the growing set of international human rights treaty norms that the 
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Third, as with non-self-execution clauses, incorporationists have not been 
deterred by declarations or understandings attached to human rights treaties 
upon ratification that purport to affirm that U.S. laws are fully in compliance 
with treaty norms and hence require no modification. Rather, incorporationists 
have persistently used treaty body procedures – particularly periodic reporting 
and contentious complaints – to draw attention to perceived gaps and deficien-
cies in U.S. law, policies, and practices and to press government officials to 
respond to identified problems within a human rights framework. They have 
done so by working not only to attain strong issue-specific conclusions and 
recommendations from treaty bodies but, most important, to then ensure that 
those conclusions and recommendations are effectively addressed through 
increasingly institutionalized mechanisms and participatory processes at fed-
eral, state, and local levels. At the same time, “shadow report” procedures that 
accompany periodic reporting processes216 are now regularly used by incor-
porationists as a teaching and awareness-raising tactic, employed as a means 
to train local communities in how to use human rights methodologies and 
understandings to address problems of local concern and to frame dialogues 
with governmental entities. The grassroots analyses produced from shadow 
reporting exercises are then used not only for formal reporting purposes in 
Geneva217 but, most significantly, for pressing local, state, and federal officials 
for meaningful, socially relevant reforms in domestic communities. 
Finally, the continued success of federal veto politics in blocking certain 
treaties, such as the CEDAW and CRC, that raise sensitive issues for socially 
conservative minorities has not stopped domestic advocates from using inter-
national treaty body supervision to engage those very same issues, albeit under 
United States has ratified – including their case-specific interpretations by treaty bodies and 
foreign courts in factually-similar cases – but also norms that the United States has not ratified 
but that are widely seen as legitimate guiding principles for the conduct of nations, such as 
those in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) or CEDAW. See generally Jack-
son, “Constitutional Comparisons,” op. cit. at 111 (noting several U.S. Supreme Court opinions 
between 1949 and 1970 referring to UDHR). 
216 “Shadow reports” are parallel reports to the official treaty body reports prepared by the U.S. 
government. They aim to highlight and correct misstatements or generalizations in official 
U.S. reports; fill in overlooked areas with accurate facts, details, and statistics; and gener-
ally present an alternative view for the expert UN committee to consider in assessing U.S. 
progress and setbacks in human rights enjoyment under the supervised treaty and in making 
recommendations for improvements. 
217 The U.S. Human Rights Network has played an important role in coordinating the large 
numbers of domestic advocates who travel to Geneva to participate in the supervisory process, 
both by consolidating issue-specific and local shadow reports into a single accessible U.S. 
NGO report and in coordinating advocates in making timely, effective statements to the UN 
committees and in presenting appropriate information that is easily accessible to Committee 
experts as they question U.S. representatives. 
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other treaties. Pressed by civil society advocates, the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee, Torture Committee, and Racial Discrimination Committee thus reg-
ularly question U.S. representatives – who provide detailed responses – on the 
measures taken to give legal effect to rights related to women’s reproductive 
health and safety, gender violence, children’s rights abuses, discrimination in 
housing, education, health care, indigenous land rights, and employment, as 
well as to the disparate impacts of a wide range of U.S. policies on grounds of 
race, ethnicity, age, sex, religion, and sexual-orientation. 
There are in fact virtually no substantive issues arising under the CEDAW, 
CRPD, CRC, or ICESCR that cannot in some way be addressed under the 
ICCPR, CERD, and CAT supervisory procedures. The same is true of the con-
tentious individual complaints procedure supervised by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, which allows complaints to be lodged against 
the United States with respect to the full spectrum of internationally recog-
nized rights. Incorporationist strategies have thus altered in fundamental ways 
the incentive structure that has historically justified mobilizing veto players to 
block certain treaties. Today, that incentive structure has largely been reversed: 
given U.S. commitments under the ICCPR, CERD, CAT, ILO treaties, and 
the American Declaration, there is little functional reason to oppose – and 
growing functional reasons to support – U.S. ratification of the CEDAW, 
CRPD, CRC, ICESCR, and the American Convention.218 
III. Responding to Incorporation’s Advances: Reappropriating Rights 
This just-described reality has fundamentally changed the political environ-
ment in which traditional opponents of treaty ratification pursue their own 
domestic policy agenda, complicating their efforts to cordon off the domestic 
legal system from international interpretations that might differ from their 
preferred views. Many appear to be realizing that old strategies focused on 
ratification blocking alone are insufficient and that failure to reassess their 
strategies may mean missing out on critical agenda-advancing opportunities. 
Such interest groups have thus appeared increasingly to focus critical ener-
gies on ensuring that new international agreements reflect their interests and 
agendas at the drafting stage. 
218 This is particularly true with respect to the American Convention nonratification of which 
insulates the United States from no new obligations but rather serves only to prevent the 
United States from nominating and electing U.S. nationals to serve as judges on the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. This follows from the close substantive parallels between 
the American Declaration and American Convention and the fact that the Court’s jurisdiction 
is not mandatory upon ratification of the Convention; a separate opt-in instrument must be 
filed with the OAS. See American Convention, op. cit., art.  62. 
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The most notable of these shifts involves the increasingly active participa-
tion of traditionally insulationist NGOs in international human rights fora. 
Many such groups now have a regular and active lobby at UN meetings and 
conferences, especially those related to women, children, health, and family 
structure. A strong, but single, example has been the drafting negotiations 
behind the new UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), in which the U.S.-based “pro-life” movement maintained a highly 
visible presence and sustained political lobby over the four-and-a-half years of 
the treaty’s negotiation. It did so with a core aim of reshaping the international 
meaning of rights-based terms related to reproduction, family, child rearing, 
and “life,” using political affinities within the Bush administration to compel 
the U.S. government to pursue its policy agenda in the negotiation process. 
In fact, although the United States announced at the start of the treaty-
drafting process in 2003 that it did not intend to participate actively in the 
negotiating process,219 under sustained pressure from socially conservative 
activist groups it changed course at the penultimate session in early 2006. 
The United States announced the reason for its reentry as a manifestation 
of its strong interest in shaping the terms of the new human rights treaty – 
principally out of its long-term interest in ensuring the strength and consis-
tency of international law as a general matter, but also, specifically, to avoid 
the inclusion of any language that might be substantively objectionable to 
the United States.220 The actual textual amendments proposed by the U.S. 
delegation, however, spoke more forthrightly to its immediate motivations. 
These included: strengthened language on the role of the family in dependent 
caregiving; the deletion of references to “health services,” a term understood 
by antiabortion groups as an international code word for abortion services; and 
the insertion of “and worth” after each treaty reference to “inherent dignity,” 
a proposal associated with the embrace of the human fetus within the protec-
tive scope of human rights law. It also included the addition of a new draft 
219 The United States provided oral testimony essentially declaring no need for an international 
instrument given the availability of national laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
disability and declared its intention not to ratify the Convention. See Boyd Statement, op. cit. 
(“It is the position of the United States today that . . . the most constructive way to proceed is 
for each Member State, through action and leadership at home, to pursue within its borders 
the mission of ensuring that real change and real improvement is brought to their citizens 
with disabilities. Thus we hope to participate in order to share our experiences . . . but given 
our comprehensive domestic laws protecting those with disabilities, not with the expectation 
that we will become party to any resulting legal instrument.”). 
220 This official change of policy was declared and explained by the U.S. delegation in public-
information side meetings at the Seventh Session of the Ad Hoc Committee charged with 
negotiating the treaty text. This author served as UN representative of a U.S.-based disability 
organization in the treaty drafting process. 
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article – the first of its kind in international human rights law – guaranteeing 
a right not to be denied food or fluids when dependent on life support, a 
thinly disguised attempt to internationalize the Terri Schiavo case in human 
rights terms.221 While the United States failed to achieve sufficient support 
for removal of “health services,” it did succeed in getting substantial textual 
revisions to the health and family provisions, the addition of “and worth,” as 
well as inclusion of the essence of its food and hydration provision.222 
On the basis of these successes, the conservative NGO movement has 
intimated support for U.S. ratification of the CRPD. At a minimum, it has 
signaled that the time for wholesale rejection of international human rights 
law has passed. In speaking of the CRPD, a conservative commentator recently 
wrote in the Weekly Standard: 
Can anything good come out of the United Nations? Actually, yes . . . The 
positive impact [of conservative NGO participation in the CRPD drafting 
negotiations] teaches a valuable lesson. Many conservative organizations 
eschew obtaining NGO status with the United Nations because they loathe 
internationalism, disdain the U.N., and expect America not to be bound by 
these agreements. 
But such standoffishness is woefully shortsighted. Like it or not, many of the 
most important social and legal policies of the twenty-first century are going 
to be materially influenced by international protocols such as this one. These 
agreements are molded substantially behind the scenes by NGOs – most of 
which are currently leftist in their political outlooks and relativistic in their 
social orientation. This makes for a stacked deck. If conservatives hope to 
influence the moral values of the future, they are going to have to hold their 
collective noses and get into the game. 223 
We should increasingly expect to see this: a more active engagement by 
traditionally insulationist NGOs in the construction of normative mean-
ing at the international level – accompanied by more vigorous pressure on 
221 This author monitored all UN Member State proposals as they were made. Although the U.S. 
drafting proposals had partisan undertones and derivations, the United States played a positive 
role overall in mediating diverse international interests within the negotiations. Its renewed 
participation in the drafting process in 2006 was welcomed by all governments and civil society 
actors. 
222 The much longer draft provision was, in a final compromise deal, significantly condensed 
and consolidated into a subprovision of the right-to-health article, which reads: “States Parties 
shall: . . . (f) Prevent discriminatory denial of health care or health services or food and fluids 
on the basis of disability.” 
223 Wesley J. Smith, “A Worthwhile U.N. Initiative! A Welcome Defense of the Disabled from 
an Unlikely Organization,” Weekly Standard, Jan.  29, 2007, Vol.  12, Issue 19. 
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sympathetic U.S. officials to engage human rights organs in pursuit of this 
norm-reappropriation agenda.224 
Such a policy was in fact almost adopted twenty-five years ago by the 
U.S. antiabortion movement, which – given a legally and politically una-
menable domestic environment – came close to converting to incorpora-
tionism. Indeed, whereas states’ rights and other insulationist arguments pre-
vailed in the 1950s and 1960s, when race and poverty were the dominant social 
struggles and human rights law clearly favored desegregation and racial equal-
ity initiatives, the political climate shifted in the 1970s, as the cultural wars 
transitioned toward Vietnam, women’s rights, and lifestyle choices. Specifi-
cally, in the loosened political climate of the seventies, “rights cultural” or 
“states’ rights” arguments no longer served the substantive policy agenda of 
opponents of abortion, contraception, and alternative family structures. These 
groups increasingly found themselves on the losing side of both federal and 
state legislation and high court decisions. 
Consequently, in 1977, sensing a potential opportunity in the U.S. signature 
that year of the American Convention on Human Rights, the U.S. antiabortion 
movement turned to international human rights law. Catholics for Christian 
Political Action and Lawyers for Life filed a contentious complaint, Baby Boy 
v. United States, with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on 
behalf of an aborted fetus, alleging that domestic abortion law, at state and 
federal levels alike, violated international human rights law.225 Specifically, 
they saw strategic potential in the American Convention’s guarantee of the 
“right to life,” a legal protection that, according to Article 4 of the treaty’s text, 
begins “in general, from the moment of conception.” Drawing on this favorable 
provision (sans the introductory qualifier), the U.S. antiabortion petitioners 
asserted that an absolute prohibition on abortion, permitting of no restrictions, 
was mandated by the United States’ international law commitments and that 
224 As an example of U.S. officials carrying out conservative social movement agendas abroad, 
two conservative members of the U.S. House of Representatives went so far as to send a letter 
to the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights in early 2007, in anticipation of the Rapporteur’s scheduled trip to Nicaragua to 
meet with women’s groups and the government. In it, the Special Rapporteur was instructed 
not to discuss a legislative bill then before the Nicaraguan Congress that proposed adding life 
and health exceptions to the country’s comprehensive abortion ban, threatening cuts to U.S. 
financial support of the Inter-American Commission if he did. 
225 Specifically, petitioners alleged that the United States was in violation of “Baby Boy’s” right 
to life given its failure to respond appropriately to the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s 1977 
acquittal of a manslaughter conviction of the treating doctor and, by extension, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. See “Baby Boy” v. United 
States, Res. 23/81, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. (Mar. 6, 1981), 
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the United States was legally bound to follow this international construction 
of rights-based meaning. 
Had the U.S. antiabortion movement won this case, its activists would 
undoubtedly have demanded that U.S. law submit to the authoritative and 
final conclusions of international human rights treaty bodies. As it turns out, 
they lost. The Inter-American Commission, over two dissents, agreed with the 
U.S. government’s position that the right to life does not mandate an absolute 
prohibition on abortion but rather allows for reasonable restrictions in line 
with domestic political choices.226 By the time the 4–2 decision was issued 
in 1981, however, the political winds had again shifted in the United States 
and, with Ronald Reagan in the presidency, the domestic political climate 
had become distinctly amenable to the conservative “family values” policy 
agenda. Consequently, the mantle of “states’ rights” and “national sovereignty” 
was again taken up to insulate local decision-making structures – in which 
absolutist constructions of the right to life could still effectively be pursued – from  
the influence of evolving human rights law and international constructions, 
which have consistently rejected rights absolutism. 
These conservative advocates may today rue that they did not take a more 
dualist approach twenty-five years ago – pushing for conservative constructions 
at the international level, while insulating domestically until those construc-
tions were more fully consolidated. This is the process that appears to be being 
pursued today.227 
D. MEDIATING TECHNIQUES FOR PROMOTING U.S. 
GAGEMENT: ASSERTING CLEAR LINES AND RECURRING 
(SELECTIVELY) TO SUBSIDIARITY DOCTRINE 
EN
What do these instrumental realignments mean for the United States and 
its future engagement with human rights treaty bodies? The U.S. position is 
often presented, inaccurately and unhelpfully, as monolithically opposed to 
human rights treaty body engagement. In fact, it is most useful to view U.S. 
human rights policy in fluid and responsive terms: as a careful mediation 
between distinct political pressures – from realist and institutionalist tenden-
cies at the foreign policy level, liberal and conservative and/or incorporationist 
226 Alongside Brazil, the U.S. government had expressly opposed an absolutist meaning of the 
right to life in the drafting of the American Convention in 1969, as well as in the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. See id. 
227 It can be seen in multiple international fora – both in norm-creating conferences and meetings 
of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and regional organizations of States and in 
the increasing involvement of conservative U.S. organizations in policy debates on abortion 
in countries around the world. 
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and insulationist persuasions at the domestic policy level, and “political pro-
cess” versus “legal process” preferences more generally. The United States, in 
its policy positions, mediates these pressures, bowing more or less to one or 
the other at distinct political conjunctures and with shifting electoral politics. 
Yet, importantly, as its engagement practice reveals, it does so always within 
the parameters of a clearly articulated and jurisdictionally focused set of legal 
principles that frame and anchor the U.S. policy position. 
These principles, drawn from the lettered texts and doctrines of international 
law, serve as essential mediating tools in the articulation of U.S. human rights 
policy. Indeed, as presently invoked, they appear to be advanced with a distinct 
policy aim: to set bright-line rules with respect to the scope of treaty body 
competence in precisely those areas that make conservative critics, at both 
domestic and foreign policy levels, most politically exercised. The resulting 
U.S. posture at once accommodates those concerns, particularly as articulated 
through federalism, sovereignty, and national security objections – the priority 
concerns of domestic policy insulationists and foreign policy realists – while 
opening a viable political space in which active U.S. engagement with human 
rights treaty bodies may feasibly be pursued, both as an international project 
(as has been the case to present) and a national one (a challenge still pending). 
Significantly, the United States justifies this policy response not through 
resort to any exceptionalist notion of its power or political culture but rather 
through formal, repeated, and insistent resort to two of international law’s most 
foundational building blocks: the doctrine of sovereignty and the principle of 
subsidiarity. Both doctrines are not only applicable to and regularly recurred 
to by all nations of the world in their own engagement policies but are foun-
dational to the very rule of law and effective protection of human rights in the 
global public community. As such, formal U.S. reliance on them as the basis 
for its treaty body engagement policy lays a sturdy foundation for constructively 
advancing U.S. human rights policy toward the future, especially as advocates 
seek to strengthen and build the domestic dimension of the subsidiarity rela-
tionship. Their strategic use as a mediating device in U.S. engagement policy 
nonetheless comes clearly into focus upon considering that the United States 
currently invokes them before treaty bodies exclusively in their negative com-
ponents: as doctrines of non-interference and deference in domestic political 
processes. Largely absent from the discourse is a parallel focus on their more 
positive aspects of assistance and support in strengthening domestic processes 
of human rights enforcement. 
The current U.S. policy posture with respect to international treaty body 
engagement has three framework parts: (1) a bright-line, doctrinal statement 
of the substantive and spatial boundaries of treaty body jurisdiction, with a 
view to preserving the flexibility of foreign policy responsiveness in times of 
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war or threats to global public order; (2) a close attention to the technical-
jurisdictional boundaries of “contentious” dispute mechanisms versus “pro-
motional” ones, narrowing access to the former and preferring reliance on the 
latter; and (3) an aggressive insistence on the nonbinding nature of all inter-
national treaty body decisions and conclusions, aimed at underscoring the 
primacy of domestic political process.228 These three positions are advanced 
in virtually all international treaty body engagements, frequently as a direct 
preface to legal briefs and oral arguments. The first draws heavily on the nega-
tive dimensions of sovereignty doctrine, the latter two on those of subsidiarity. 
While domestic advocates often view these three positions as a manifesta-
tion of the United States’ stubborn refusal to accede to the binding rules of 
international law, they are, in many respects, just the opposite: a mediating 
posture that relies on the formal rules of international law to allow the United 
States to engage with supervisory human rights bodies on the widest diversity 
of subject matters feasible at a given political conjuncture. This rule-based, 
jurisdictional approach serves a number of ends. On the one hand, it creates a 
rhetorical or juridical comfort zone in which both conservative minorities can 
be politically appeased and foreign policy objectives pursued within the formal 
letter of U.S. human rights treaty commitments; this allows the United States 
to attend to oppositional concerns while simultaneously confuting charges of 
exceptionalism. On the other hand, and most consequentially from the domes-
tic standpoint, by changing the relevant vocabulary of resistance, it functions 
to diffuse and transcend the “rights cultural” rhetoric that has historically given 
rise to exceptionalist demands at home. Indeed, that rhetoric has served as the 
primary basis for mobilizing domestic resistance to human rights treaty ratifica-
tion and engagement, used to caricature human rights law in absolutist terms 
as contrary to and in direct conflict with U.S. constitutionalism, democracy, 
and sovereignty.229 
228 Although the three are frequently in tension, each plays a necessary role in defining the level 
of U.S. engagement with international treaty bodies at any given time. Advocates seeking a 
shift in levels or degrees of U.S. engagement would do well to pay close attention to how 
their strategies affect the equilibria achieved by these mediating techniques with respect to the 
underlying competing pressures. 
229 Although rarer to find in the U.S. State Department, which consistently takes a more multi-
lateralist and international law-based approach, this “rights cultural” rhetoric continues to be 
used by some attorneys in the U.S. Department of Justice as a rationale for why the United 
States should not ratify human rights treaties. For a recent published example, see Tracey R. 
Justesen and Troy R. Justesen, An Analysis of the Development and Adoption of the United 
Nations Convention Recognizing the Rights of Individuals with Disabilities: Why the United 
States Refuses to Sign this UN Convention, 14(2) Hum. Rts. Brief  36, 39–41 (2007). For a coun-
terperspective, see Tara J. Melish, The UN Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong 
Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, 14(2) Hum. Rts. Brief 37, 46 (2007). 
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The jurisdictional aggressiveness of the U.S. human rights policy may thus 
most profitably be interpreted as a mediating strategy in itself, designed to tran-
scend this rhetorical and absolutist view of human rights law, and to bring it 
back in line with the actual foundations of human rights law. Thus, U.S. prac-
tice is to insist before human rights treaty bodies that the United States will not 
accept human rights law on absolutist terms. Rather, the United States under-
scores, it will accept human rights law and treaty body engagements only under 
terms that allow it (1) to engage in legitimate self-defense if national security 
is threatened, (2) to be the primary and final interpreter of how international 
law commitments will be translated into domestic laws and policies, and (3) to  
ensure that those laws and policies are determined in the first instance by the 
political branches rather than the courts. These positions do not contradict but 
rather are fully consistent with international human rights law, which is based 
on the principle of subsidiarity and the sovereign decision-making authority 
of democratic states.230 What sets U.S. human rights policy apart from other 
states, then, is not its insistence on these legal principles – which other states 
equally expect to be respected in their relationship with treaty bodies – but 
rather its forthrightness and hyperlegalized defense of them in international 
contexts.231 This jurisdictional aggressiveness is often popularly misconstrued 
as a rejection of human rights law itself, rather than simply a rejection of 
absolutist constructions of that law. U.S. exceptionalism in this respect is often 
more a question of tone and political sensitivity than of content. 
It is here, however, that the mediating nature of the U.S. position is clearest. 
Although the aggressiveness of U.S. insistence on the primacy of domestic 
law and the limits of treaty body jurisdiction operates, in many ways, as a 
liability, it is also a goal: a rhetorical tactic to appease domestic opponents of 
human rights engagements by making clear that, in actively engaging with 
230 “Sovereignty,” in this sense, refers not to antiquated international law notions of a “sovereign’s 
sovereignty” – the prerogative to do as the sovereign pleases within the domestic jurisdiction, 
insulated from international law – but rather to the modern democracy-based notion of “the 
people’s sovereignty.” W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 866, 869 (1990); see also id. at 872 (“International law 
is still concerned with the protection of sovereignty, but, in its modern sense, the object of 
protection is not the power base of the tyrant who rules directly by naked power or through the 
apparatus of a totalitarian political order, but the continuing capacity of a population freely to 
express and effect choices about the identities and policies of its governors.”) (emphasis added) 
(“[T]he word ‘sovereignty’ can no longer be used to shield the actual suppression of popular 
sovereignty from external rebuke and remedy.”). 
231 That is, the United States is not exceptional in accepting treaty commitments only to the 
point of political feasibility. It is exceptional only in its forthright and aggressive defense of that 
policy in international and domestic fora, a defensiveness attributable both to the nation’s own 
hyperlegalized culture and, relatedly, to the fierceness of domestic politics on the underlying 
issues. 
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human rights treaty bodies, the United States has not surrendered any of its 
sovereignty, constitutional commitment to a federal form of government, or 
ability to engage in national defense. It demonstrates that the United States 
has staked out a firm legally based position from which it can safely and 
reliably defend democratic institutions against perceived over-reaching by 
international treaty bodies. With these assurances in place, opponents may be 
willing to relinquish their “rights cultural” arguments that human rights law 
conflicts with American constitutional democracy. It may thus open the door 
to a more sustainable human rights policy over the long term, especially at the 
domestic level. 
1. Carving Out “No-Go” Zones: The Substantive Parameters 
of Treaty Body Competence 
The first mediating strategy employed by the United States draws on 
sovereignty doctrine to assuage realist and institutionalist pressures at the for-
eign policy level. 232 As discussed, whereas institutionalists in the foreign policy 
establishment push for greater U.S. treaty body engagement, foreign policy 
realists pull away from it, seeing international human rights supervision as 
an unnecessary and unwelcome constraint on the United States’ power and 
prerogative to respond by all means necessary to foreign threats, particularly in 
times of war and armed conflict. With an eye toward appeasing both interests, 
the United States has adopted a mediating policy focused on the parame-
ters of its sovereign consent to treaty body jurisdiction. It supports a policy of 
“full” jurisdictional engagement with international human rights treaty bodies 
within their ratione materiae and ratione loci competence. The United States 
then defines these jurisdictional parameters, using positivist international law 
doctrines, as exclusive of alleged abuses arising, first, in situations of armed 
conflict, and, second, extraterritorially – both traditional areas of strong foreign 
policy sensitivities. It resorts to the full set of internationally accepted methods 
of treaty interpretation, consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, to support this jurisdictional interpretation, including ordinary 
meaning, the travaux préparatoires, state practice, the context surrounding the 
treaty at its conclusion, and the views of eminent public jurists.233 
232 Professor Murphy refers to a similar tension as the antinomy of exceptionalism versus sovereign 
equality. Murphy, op. cit. 
233 See, e.g., “Third periodic reports of States parties due in 2003: United States of America,” 
CCPR/C/USA/3 (2005), Annex 1 (“Territorial Application of the [ICCPR]”), pp. 109–11 (relying 
on ordinary meaning, travaux préparatoires, U.S. practice, context at conclusion, and views of 
eminent public jurists, identified expressly as proper means of interpretation under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties). Although the U.S. interpretation is not always persuasive, 
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Although this posture has become the focal point of scholarly and advocacy 
critique of U.S. human rights policy since 2001 – given deliberate removals 
of rights-abusive conduct to extraterritorial loci and other recent “war on ter-
ror” abuses – it is useful to take a step back and view it in larger perspective, 
outside of abusive applications, for what it represents at its core: a mediation 
tactic. Faced with powerful pressures to disengage entirely with international 
supervisory bodies should competence be exercised over U.S. military inter-
ventions or “war on terror” subjects – as the United States has done with other 
international tribunals, such as the ICC234 or ICJ235 – the U.S. decision to 
remain actively engaged in human rights treaty procedures while carving out 
limited subject matter “no-go” zones may be viewed, more positively, as a 
compromise strategy to conserve U.S. human rights engagement in all other 
areas of domestic human rights abuse. This is an enormous field, and U.S. 
willingness to engage it should not be minimized. 236 
It is important to note, moreover, that the U.S. position in this regard is 
not new. It represents a long-term policy on the part of the U.S. government, 
regularly raised in international fora wherever U.S. conduct in situations of 
war, war-related recovery, or conflict abroad has been challenged.237 Initially 
advanced in the 1950s as a pragmatic concern in the ICCPR drafting process 
it is prima facie credible. More important, it is consistently and persistently advanced across 
international supervisory jurisdictions. This is true before the Committee Against Torture, 
the Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and even 
special mandate procedures, such as UN Special Rapporteurs and Independent Experts. 
234 In May 2002, President George W. Bush renounced the United States’ prior signature of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, asserting in a letter to the UN Secretary-
General that “the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 
31, 2000.” 
235 The United States withdrew from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1986, following the 
Court’s adverse decision against it in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). On March 7, 2005, following another merits 
loss, it terminated the Court’s treaty-specific jurisdiction over it with respect to alleged breaches 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. See Journal of the United Nations: Pro-
gramme of Meetings and Agenda, No. 2005/48, at  13 (Mar. 12, 2005) (reporting UN Secretary-
General’s receipt of U.S. withdrawal notice to Convention’s Optional Protocol). 
236 It covers areas such as discrimination, political participation, due process, health, housing, 
prison conditions, education, labor rights, and access to justice. U.S. opening to international 
supervision with respect to these domestic areas represents an important advance. This, of 
course, is not to say that advocates should not continue to challenge the legitimacy of the 
“no-go” zones, particularly unjustifiable uses of them to commit human rights abuse. It is only 
to say that U.S. human rights policy should not be judged exclusively on the basis of no-go 
zones. 
237 From 1992 to 1999, for example, the United States made these arguments in litigation before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights involving its responsibility for the incom-
municado detention of 17 civilians during the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada. See Coard et al. 
v. United States, Case 10.951, Report N◦ 109/99, Sept.  29, 1999, Inter-Am.Comm.H.R (1999). 
Although the United States argued in the alternative that it had not violated the rights of the 
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with respect to the U.S.-led post–World War II recovery process in Europe and 
Japan,238 it in many ways today reflects the United States’ self-awareness as the 
world’s sole remaining military superpower in a world in which international 
law constitutes “an effective but limited structure.”239 In consequence of that 
awareness, and consistent with realist pressures, the United States has persis-
tently rejected jurisdictional recognition of treaty body authority in situations 
of extraterritorial and armed conflict. This posture enables it to maintain max-
imum flexibility to respond to threats to national security and global public 
order – including the leeway to engage in what has been termed “operational 
noncompliance”240 – without having to justify its conduct before international 
expert bodies through resort to legitimate or permissible restrictions on rights, 
such as those required to protect the rights and security of others.241 
Significantly, in rejecting treaty body supervision in these limited areas, the 
United States does not claim immunity from the binding rules of international 
human rights and humanitarian law, nor that human rights or humanitarian 
abuses do not occur within no-go zones. Rather, its argument is a narrow 
jurisdictional one: Treaty bodies, as a technical matter, lack jurisdiction over 
alleged victims under either the American Declaration or the Geneva Conventions, its prin-
cipal arguments centered on questions of admissibility – that is, that the Commission lacked 
jurisdiction over the law of armed conflict, which prevailed as lex specialis, and, secondarily, 
over the extraterritorial conduct of a State. 
238 The resulting language in art. 2 of the ICCPR (“within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
tion”) remains at the center of the U.S. policy position on the extraterritorial scope of human 
rights treaty obligations. See “Third periodic reports of States parties due in 2003: United States 
of America,” CCPR/C/USA/3 (2005), Annex 1, 109–11. 
239 W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive 
Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 3, 9–10 (2000). 
240 Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 189, 191 
(2006) (defined as “noncompliance that keeps a partially effective system, such as international 
law, operational by reconciling formal legal prescriptions with changing community policies or 
by bridging the enforcement gap created by inadequate community mechanisms of control”). 
241 Human rights law is in fact designed to allow for this sort of practical accommodation. It 
expressly allows for justified restrictions on the enjoyment of rights, both in the general interest 
and, specifically, in times of national emergency. Human rights bodies consistently, moreover – 
whether explicitly or implicitly – provide a higher margin of discretion to states in crafting 
such justified restrictions in national security situations. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 18 Jan. 1978, Eur. Ct. H.R., Series A, no. 25, para. 214; Lawless judgments of 7 
April and 1 July 1961, Eur. Ct. H.R., Series A, nos. 2 & 3. Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur 
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, has accordingly urged the United States to 
adopt this human-rights-based approach: rather than argue that human rights law does not 
apply in situations of armed conflict and thereby resist supervision, the United States might 
more usefully argue that its actions represent “justified” conduct in times of war or armed 
conflict within the frame of human rights law. Press Release, Office of the High Comm’r for 
Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. 
Doc. HR/07/51 (Mar. 28, 2007). The United States has decided that it prefers not to take this 
course, at least not at present or as an exclusive option. 
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the United States in such areas, given the United States’ historically based and 
persistently expressed position on the scope of its treaty undertakings. Under 
this view, human rights complaints in this sensitive foreign policy and rights-
balancing area are valid but best reserved to political mechanisms of control: 
media attention, political pressure, congressional oversight and investigation 
mechanisms, international censure, and diplomatic pressure. These controls 
are understood as best capable of advancing the shared community goal of 
global human rights protection – both in most effectively restoring fundamen-
tal rights protections as soon as any national or global threat diminishes242 and 
by removing a structured disincentive to responsive unilateral action in situ-
ations of humanitarian crisis or other threats to global public order to which 
the international community cannot or will not respond.243 
This is, however, the only area in which the United States should be 
expected to refuse supervision in its engagement policy. It is a bow to the 
power of foreign policy realists, enabling the United States to continue its oth-
erwise substantively plenary engagement policy and thereby attend to other 
domestic and foreign policy pressures and agendas. 
2. Preferring “Political” to “Judicial” Controls in Human Rights 
Supervision and Interpretation 
The second set of mediating tactics operates to accommodate the tension not 
between realists and institutionalists but between engagement as a foreign 
policy objective and domestic-level resistance to that engagement by those 
who view it as a threat to constitutional democracy. Such domestic resistance, 
often rooted in simple partisan political preferences, generally manifests itself 
in two classic arguments. The first involves classic federalism concerns.244 The 
second departs from the perceived “undemocratic” nature of treaty bodies, in 
the sense that their members are not elected by nor directly accountable to 
U.S. citizens and relatedly are called on to interpret treaties that reflect global 
242 For a supportive view of this approach in the United States’ domestic jurisdiction in times 
of war, see William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Rights in Wartime (Random 
House, 1998) (discussing suspension of habeas corpus and other civil rights protections in times 
of war in United States). 
243 It may, in this sense, be viewed as part of a global constitutive process that, although open to 
abuse under certain ideological postures, functions over the long term to build more enduring 
international institutions and community mechanisms of control. 
244 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390 
(1998) (asserting that treaty power is inconsistent with principle that the national government’s 
powers are limited and enumerated and that states have rights to legislate independently in 
certain spheres, concluding that government must therefore “make a choice”: human rights 
treaties or American federalism). 
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majoritarian mores, not necessarily U.S. ones.245 This counter-majoritarian 
critique, paralleling similar critiques at the domestic level with respect to 
the role of the U.S. judiciary in interpreting broadly worded constitutional 
rights, is amplified where international tribunals are concerned, particularly 
given rhetorical assertions that such courts will compel the United States to 
adopt foreign rights constructions that conflict with democratically determined 
domestic understandings. This follows not only from the fact that treaty-based 
human rights norms tend to be drafted at a high level of generality, open to 
widely diverse interpretations by different social and cultural mediators,246 but 
also from common objections that international “experts” or “judges” have 
no necessary connection to the United States and are elected principally by 
foreign sovereigns that may have interests or agendas averse, or even hostile, 
to those of the United States. 
Significantly, both of these “states’ rights” and “democratic deficit” objec-
tions are voiced most vehemently in one area of particular insulationist con-
cern: the possibility of direct judicial enforcement of human rights treaty 
law. Insulationists object to such enforcement both by U.S. federal courts247 
and by supranational human rights treaty bodies exercising adjudicatory or 
quasi-adjudicatory powers. 
The United States answers these objections through the regular use of three 
specific procedural devices drawn from the negative dimension of the principle 
of subsidiarity. Each is designed to preserve the primacy of political control 
mechanisms (the preferred decision-making environment of insulationists) by 
limiting the jurisdictional competence of judicial or quasi-adjudicatory bodies 
over raw human rights complaints. 
245 See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 57, 59 
(2004) (discussing his view of “international countermajoritarian difficulty”); Curtis A. Bradley, 
International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan. L. Rev.  
1557, 1558 (2002–03) (“By transferring legal authority from U.S. actors to international actors – 
actors that are physically and culturally more distant from, and not directly responsible to, the 
U.S. electorate – these delegations may entail a dilution of domestic political accountability.”); 
cf. John O. McGinnis and Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law? 59 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1175 (2007) (limiting critique to “raw international law,” that is, that which has not 
been endorsed by the domestic political process). 
246 See, e.g., Goldsmith, op. cit. at 338–39 (“In and among pluralistic democratic societies, there is 
a reasonable scope for disagreement about what broadly worded human rights norms require. 
When the human rights community demands that the United States make international 
human rights treaties a part of domestic law in a way that circumvents political control, it 
evinces an intolerance for a pluralism of values and conditions, and a disrespect for local 
democratic processes.”). 
247 Id. at 332 (“Domestic incorporation of the ICCPR . . . would constitute a massive, largely 
standardless delegation to federal courts to rethink the content and scope of nearly every aspect 
of domestic human rights law.”). 
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The first involves the regular attachment of non-self-execution declarations 
to human rights treaties upon ratification. Such declarations assert that treaty 
norms do not create private causes of action for direct enforcement by the 
domestic judiciary. Rather, to be judicially cognizable they must first be given 
locally relevant content in domestically enforceable implementing legislation. 
This tactic bows directly to institutionalists and indirectly to incorporationists, 
but, in a concession to insulationists, insists that any incorporation be done by 
domestic legislatures or other political processes, not courts. 
The second subsidiarity-based mediating tactic extends the same principle 
upward, from the domestic judiciary to the international treaty body system. 
It takes advantage of the fact that international treaty law generally makes 
judicial or quasi-judicial complaints mechanisms optional for States parties. In 
an effort to mediate competing institutionalist and insulationist pressures, the 
United States thus affirmatively accepts the jurisdiction of human rights treaty 
bodies for purposes of active and regular engagement, but only with respect to 
non-adjudicatory functions. Where given a choice, the United States reliably 
declines to accept the contentious jurisdiction of treaty bodies, voluntarily 
submitting only to periodic reporting and other promotional functions that 
focus on “constructive dialogue” with international supervisory bodies, not 
rights “adjudication.” U.S. compliance with treaty obligations can thereby be 
discussed and debated in general ways, without an international adjudication 
that a specific policy or practice has violated the rights of distinct individuals 
and hence requires a specific remedial response, independent of domestic 
appreciation of the matter. 
Finally, a third set of subsidiarity-based procedural devices is used in the few 
instances in which the United States is in fact mandatorily subject to interna-
tional adjudicatory or case-based claims processes as a requirement of mem-
bership in a given intergovernmental organization.248 In such circumstances, 
the United States trains heavily on the subsidiarity-based jurisdictional rules 
that limit treaty body competence over contentious cases, such as the exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies requirement, the “fourth instance formula,” and 
strict ratione materiae, personae, loci, and temporis limitations. These proce-
dural devices, recognized in all international adjudicatory fora, are designed 
to give effect to the principle that human rights treaty bodies should never 
arrogate to themselves functions that can more immediately and effectively 
be undertaken at more local levels. U.S. engagement practice is correspond-
ingly characterized by an emphasis on the extensive opportunities the litigant 
is or was afforded to address the issue through domestic legal and political 
248 The OAS and ILO have such compulsory membership requirements. 
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processes and the ultra vires nature of international jurisdiction where domes-
tic processes provide full due process of law and effective redress to the alleged 
victim. 
3. Retaining Full Remedial and Policy-Making Discretion 
The United States employs a fourth mediating technique likewise derived 
from subsidiarity’s negative dimension. This technique draws not on proce-
dural devices designed to limit the exercise of adjudicatory competence, as 
do the former three, but rather on a subsidiarity-based doctrine of substantive 
deference applicable once competence is in fact asserted. Premised on the 
understanding that local actors are in the best position to appreciate the com-
plexity of circumstances on the ground and, correspondingly, to understand 
what measures may be most effective for internalizing human rights values 
in distinct contexts, that doctrine mandates that a certain margin of discretion 
be given to competent authorities in the determination of rights abuse and in 
the crafting of appropriate responsive measures to it.249 This subsidiarity-based 
deference doctrine is given regular effect in treaty body practice: both through 
the standard of review used to assess state compliance with treaty undertakings 
and, more broadly, through the general recognition that treaty body conclu-
sions are recommendatory in nature only, providing states ample leeway to 
tailor responses appropriately to local conditions and constraints. 
This fourth subsidiarity-based mediation tactic is articulated in U.S. engage-
ment practice through regular U.S. assertions that all treaty body conclu-
sions and recommendations, although welcome and appropriately taken into 
broader political account, are nonbinding and have no independent domes-
tic legal force. Such nonbindingness is asserted with equal degrees of force 
with respect to the final recommendations issued by treaty bodies under con-
tentious individual complaints procedures and those derivative of construc-
tive dialogue and periodic reporting. By doing so, the United States seeks 
to underscore its full retention of plenary discretion to adopt its policies the 
way it chooses, notwithstanding U.S. submission to and engagement with 
international supervisory procedures. 
In making this assertion, the United States does not affirm anything that is 
new to international law: the nonbinding nature of human rights treaty body 
supervision is, as a matter of international human rights law, uncontroversial, 
as is the ability of states parties to adopt measures of their sovereign choosing 
249 For a discussion of this doctrine as it has developed in the European system, see Howard 
Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human 
Rights Jurisprudence (Utrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996). 
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in giving effect to treaty obligations.250 Rather, the United States uses this pol-
icy to speak directly to domestic constituencies, underscoring to insulationists 
that U.S. engagement will not force it to adopt policies that have not been 
fully mediated through the democratic process. This important mediating 
tactic nevertheless puts increasing strain on U.S. relationships with interna-
tional tribunals. It also invites charges of paradox and double standards from 
domestic and international quarters alike, who often read U.S. assertions of the 
nonbindingness of the views and recommendations of treaty bodies as an asser-
tion of the nonbindingness of the treaty commitments themselves. The U.S. 
government labors to clarify this distinction at the international level, consis-
tently affirming its full acceptance of all treaty obligations duly undertaken. 
Consistent with interest management, it works less hard to make the distinction 
clear at the domestic level. 
∗ ∗ ∗ 
In light of the foregoing analysis, one might expect the United States to adopt 
the following postures toward treaty body engagements over the coming years. 
Reflecting a careful management of the underlying interest-group pressures, 
each reflects the continuing application of the sovereignty and subsidiarity-
based mediation techniques just discussed. 
 The United States will continue to ratify internationally popular human 
rights treaties, accelerating the process where coordinated domestic lob-
bying campaigns converge with Democratic majorities in the Senate. 
Such treaty ratifications will likely consist of the CRPD and CEDAW, 
as first priorities; the American Convention on Human Rights and the 
CRC, as second priorities; and, finally, the ICESCR.251 
 These treaties will continue to be accompanied by non-self-execution 
clauses and other declarations and understandings designed to protect 
250 See, e.g., Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OC-13/93 (Ser. A) No. 13, ¶ 29 (1993) (authority of Commission 
to find violation does not confer “authority to rule as to how a legal norm is adopted in the 
internal order,” which “is the function of the competent organs of the State”). There are, of 
course, limits to the measures that a state can adopt and still purport to be giving effect to 
treaty obligations. These limits are generally expressed in the idea of an appropriate “margin 
of appreciation” to be granted a state, given local actors’ greater appreciation of the facts on 
the ground, or the “reasonableness” of government conduct in aiming to achieve a given end, 
taking account of conflicting duties, burdens, and resource constraints. 
251 The United States is unlikely to ratify the Migrant Workers Convention, a treaty that – unlike 
other core UN human rights conventions – has not received a high level of support from the 
international community. 
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the primacy of domestic political processes in the determination of the 
scope and contours of domestic human rights protections. 
 The United States will continue to participate actively in periodic report-
ing processes at the UN level, as well as through other promotional mech-
anisms envisioned in UN, ILO, and OAS law. In so doing, it will take a 
leading international role in identifying ways to make the process more 
efficient and less cumbersome for government actors, especially as its 
reporting obligations continue to grow with the ratification of new treaties. 
 The United States will continue to decline to accept the contentious 
jurisdiction of UN treaty bodies. 
 All individual contentious complaints of human rights abuse against the 
United States will instead be processed by the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, in which the United States will continue to 
actively and constructively engage. This follows largely from the United 
States’ greater familiarity with the system’s rules and actors and ability to 
influence its direction and growth. 
 The United States will ratify the American Convention with a view to 
seating a U.S.-nominated judge on the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. This will be undertaken to better influence the direction of inter-
American jurisprudence, increasingly important to the United States as 
more contentious U.S. cases are brought to the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights. 
 The United States will not, however, accept the Court’s jurisdiction 
over U.S. cases. This policy will continue for the foreseeable future, 
at least until the United States has a greater degree of confidence in 
the Court’s self-imposed jurisdictional limits and, most decisively, has 
established a politically based institutional setup for determining the 
content of effective remedies at the domestic level.252 
 The United States will continue to resist international supervisory juris-
diction over extraterritorial abuses and those committed in armed conflict, 
even as it takes measures to prevent such abuses or to respond to them 
once they occur. 
Notably, U.S. human rights policy should be expected to embrace these 
engagement postures irrespective of party control of the White House. Indeed, 
whether the White House occupant is a liberal Democrat or a conserva-
tive Republican, she or he will face the same powerful set of competing 
252 As a political matter, the United States is also unlikely to accept the contentious jurisdiction 
of the Court while Canada has similarly declined to do so. 
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interest-group pressures at both the foreign and domestic policy levels, and 
will need to find a principled yet flexible way to balance and accommodate 
them in a single policy posture.253 In this complex interest-management pro-
cess, the mediating techniques derived from the principles of subsidiarity and 
sovereignty should be expected to continue to play a dominant role. This is 
both because of their firm doctrinal (and hence ideologically neutral) basis 
in international law and because of their inherent flexibility in responding to 
new sets of evolving pressures and demands. 
It is not, then, stasis that should be expected in U.S. human rights engage-
ment policy, but rather continually evolving and responsive interactions 
among a wide variety of domestic and international actors, each with vastly 
different, often conflicting interests. The three predictable constants will be 
an active attention to the foreign policy benefits of engagement, a continu-
ing emphasis on the primacy of domestic-level democratic decision-making 
processes, and adherence to a core set of doctrinally anchored mediating 
techniques designed to effectively mediate the two. 
E. HONORING SUBSIDIARITY DOCTRINE IN FULL: FROM 
INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE TO DOMESTIC CHALLENGE 
This chapter has aimed thus far to disentangle some of the motivating pressures 
and interests that are constitutive of today’s U.S. human rights policy. In so 
doing, it has endeavored to demonstrate that U.S. human rights policy is 
best viewed not as a static or fixed structural given but rather as a careful 
mediation among the varied interest groups that successfully exert power 
and sustained influence on U.S. policy makers. This vantage point serves a 
number of important ends. Most significantly, it serves as a civic reminder 
that U.S. policy making is neither structurally predetermined nor undertaken 
hegemonically in a political vacuum; it is determined by domestic actors with 
agency, creativity, and constantly adapting political strategies that interact with 
each other and their environment as part of a constitutive, contested, constantly 
evolving process.254 In this respect, it is vital to underscore the deep irony that 
results in too heavy a focus by scholars and advocates on the fixedness of the 
“U.S. human rights paradox,” whether attributed to U.S. rights culture, U.S. 
253 In an interview given aboard Air Force One, President Obama responded to a question about 
the release of Guantanamo detainees by asserting that “there is still going to be some balancing 
that has to be done and some competing interests that are going to have to be addressed.” 
“Reassurance on the Economy, and Addressing Afghanistan,” New York Times, Mar.  8, 2009, 
at A1. 
254 See generally William M. Reisman, Necessary and Proper: Executive Competence to Interpret 
Treaties, 15 Yale J. Int’l L. 316, 323–30 (1990) (noting that law is never static; it changes as parties 
continually shape behavior in accordance with law, in reliance on it, and in the context of 
multiple factors that shape and limit options). 
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global hegemony, or “the deep structural reality of American political life.”255 
That irony lies in the fact that civil society, pressed with the constant assertion 
that the United States does not or will not engage domestically on human 
rights matters, may stop seeking engagement. In a political democracy, when 
any group ceases to persistently pursue constructive policy engagement, its 
interests cannot be expected to be represented in mediated political outcomes. 
This political reality is, in fact, directly reflected in today’s U.S. human 
rights engagement policy. That policy has been determined at the intersection 
of pressures from three primary interest groups: foreign policy institutional-
ists, foreign policy realists, and domestic policy insulationists. Notably absent 
in the equation are domestic policy incorporationists. Although these vital 
social protagonists have been vigorously active at the local level, working 
with grassroots communities and effecting local change through a variety of 
innovative initiatives aimed at local government, incorporationists are the first 
to underscore that they have been least effective in mobilizing their broad 
base of constituents to influence national policy makers and beltway politics, 
through, for example, coordinated lobbying and nationally directed political 
action campaigns. The unremarkable consequence is that incorporationist 
interests are not today meaningfully reflected in U.S. treaty body engagement 
policy. Rather, reflecting institutionalists’ concerns for international diplo-
macy, that policy has been pursued principally, if not wholly, as a foreign 
policy objective. It is directed to demonstrating to other nations the United 
States’ strong commitment to human rights, to international law, and to partic-
ipation in international institutions, not to effecting domestic self-reflection, 
civic discussion, and constructive change within the internal legal order. 
Indeed, the most notable aspect of U.S. treaty body engagement policy 
today is precisely its lack of any explicit goal of strengthening domestic human 
rights protection. To the contrary, the U.S. position has been that the nation 
already has strong domestic rights protections and that, beyond certain mod-
ifications determined to be necessary before ratification, it does not need to 
make additional internal changes in its laws and policies.256 Accordingly, even 
as the United States recognizes before international bodies that it is not per-
fect, has gaps to fill, and that human rights fulfillment is evolutionary, there 
is currently no institutional mechanism in place to systematically gather and 
process information from domestic actors on how the United States could 
improve its human rights protections. Likewise, although the United States 
prepares reports for submission to treaty bodies with a high degree of com-
prehension and detail, complying strictly with the technical aspects of its 
255 Moravcsik, op. cit. at 197. 
256 Core document, op. cit. 
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reporting requirements, it lacks any formal institutional mechanism to receive 
systematically the inputs of civil society into that process, to circulate outputs, 
to debrief the nation on its findings, or to encourage national reflection on 
how identified deficiencies might be remedied. 
From a democracy standpoint, it is here that the central puzzle of U.S. 
human rights policy is located: how can such overt lack of institutional atten-
tion to facilitating domestic deliberative human rights processes be reconciled 
with the United States’ formal insistence, as part of its treaty body engagement 
policy, on the secondary role of international treaty bodies and the primacy of 
domestic processes in the interpretation and protection of international human 
rights treaty norms? The disconnect lies in the United States’ selective and par-
tial use of the tools of international human rights law’s subsidiarity principle to 
mediate the conflicting pressures faced from dominant interest groups. That 
is, in its treaty body engagement policy, the United States carefully invokes 
only the negative half of subsidiarity’s project: the “non-interference” princi-
ple, the notion that discretion should be left to more local units to determine 
the content of rights without intervention or assistance from “higher” ones. 
This exclusive fragment of subsidiarity doctrine corresponds directly to the 
political coordinates at which the policy agendas of U.S. institutionalists and 
U.S. insulationists intersect – the former favoring treaty body engagement, the 
latter resisting any domestic effects thereof. 
The problem is that the structural integrity of human rights law cannot 
endure subsidiarity’s expedient fracture into constituent halves; it is constituted 
irreversibly of both the non-interference principle and that of intervention or 
assistance, each of which serves as a structural check on the other in the service 
of human dignity. Indeed, just as subsidiarity’s negative dimension guards 
against drift into centralized bureaucracy or authoritarianism, so, too, does its 
positive dimension stand as a bulwark against collapse into simple devolution 
or pure unchecked discretion. By invoking only subsidiarity’s negative side 
and, then, only vis-à-vis the U.S. relationship with international treaty bodies – 
not within the U.S. body politic itself – the United States undermines first 
principles of international human rights law, reimagining it as a simple exercise 
in local devolution. 
This partial recognition accounts for why supervisory treaty body concern 
is so often raised in relation to U.S. reliance on certain doctrinal tools ema-
nating from subsidiarity’s negative dimension (such as the non-self-execution 
doctrine), despite such tools’ solid foundation in international human rights 
law and broad parallel use by other nations.257 Indeed, that concern arises not in 
257 Australia, Canada, India, Kenya, Mexico, and the United Kingdom, among many others, for 
example, likewise recognize the non-self-execution doctrine. 
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relation to the tools themselves, which, in conjunction with subsidiarity-based 
monitoring mechanisms, are fully sanctioned by international law. Rather, 
it relates to their regular employ in the absence of effectively functioning 
domestic monitoring and supervisory mechanisms that reflect subsidiarity’s 
affirmative dimension. Thus, for instance, although both the United States 
and Canada apply the non-self-execution doctrine in implementing human 
rights treaties, international concern tends to be expressed with respect to the 
former only. This is because Canada employs the doctrine not in isolation 
but in symmetry with an integrated system of national, provincial, and local 
human rights institutions.258 These institutions are mandated to serve in a 
subsidiarity capacity – internalizing and domesticating human rights values in 
locally relevant, democratically sanctioned, and indigenized ways, as close as 
possible to the individual yet within a supportive national structure. 
A fuller recognition of the comprehensive nature of subsidiarity thus illu-
minates the central U.S. human rights challenge for the future: How to give 
substance to the affirmative aspects of subsidiarity in national human rights 
policy, while continuing to honor and respect the negative aspects. Indeed, this 
appears to be the path most capable of effectively accommodating all domestic 
interest groups. This is true both at the foreign policy level and, most directly, 
at the domestic level in mediating the vital tensions between incorporationists 
and insulationists – the former seeking greater incorporation of human rights 
methodologies and monitoring arrangements into the domestic legal and polit-
ical system, the latter wishing to protect the primacy of domestic legal process 
and the boundaries of state consent. A focus on subsidiarity principles serves 
both ends. It does so by allowing the contested struggle over the meaning of 
rights, and their application to concrete, real-world situations, to take place 
within domestic control mechanisms, yet aided by the methodological frame-
work and general subsidium of monitoring and implementation mechanisms 
at the local, state, and federal levels. 
The central challenge for the future, therefore, lies in figuring out how 
to implement creative tools and institutionalized mechanisms to advance 
such processes at the national and subnational levels – that is, to erect the 
constitutive scaffolding necessary to link the individual, family, civic soli-
darity associations, and local, state, and national governments in a common 
subsidiarity-based project that places human dignity at its center. Such tools 
should be designed to listen to local and national communities as they discuss 
258 For an excellent discussion, see Koren L. Bell, Note, From Laggard to Leader: Canadian 
Lessons on a Role for U.S. States in Making and Implementing Human Rights Treaties, 5 Yale 
Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 255 (2002). 
289 From Paradox to Subsidiarity 
and debate the contours of their own rights, to solicit their solutions for how to 
respond to deficiencies, and then to parlay those notions into concrete legisla-
tive, advocacy, and executive proposals at local, state, and federal levels. This 
project will, moreover, require a rethinking of traditional incorporationist 
objections to classic subsidiarity tools like the non-self-execution doctrine, 
shifting perspective to embrace them as democracy-enhancing and deliberation-
forcing tools – ones that do not block human rights incorporation but rather 
actively aid the process of internalizing human rights norms in locally relevant 
ways. 
By doing so, advocates may succeed – through organized pressure, active 
engagement, and a constructive shift in human rights strategy to accommodate 
the genuine democracy-based interests of all groups – in compelling the United 
States to expand its treaty body engagement policy beyond its current status 
as an exclusively international project, into a genuinely domestic one. That 
project would be one self-consciously based in the principle of subsidiarity, 
designed to support and sustain the localized decision-making capacities of 
U.S. communities to continually self-reflect on where they are, where they 
want to go, and how to get themselves there, within the methodological frame 
of international human rights law. In this way, the international treaty body 
system can serve its true subsidiary purpose. 
The question is, how do we structure this? International human rights law, 
in function of its basis in subsidiarity doctrine, tends to offer an institutional 
outline, even while recognizing the wide variety of institutional arrangements 
that states adopt to govern themselves.259 At the national level, two general 
levels of institutional supervisory arrangements are called for: one for state 
implementation, the other for state monitoring. Both should be established in 
the United States as a matter of priority.260 
The following two sections consider each of these national-level institutional 
arrangements as they might profitably be established in the United States. 
Each of these arrangements is nevertheless fully replicable at “lower” levels 
of political organization – by states, counties, cities, and towns. Indeed, such 
institutional layering of supervisory authority is core to subsidiarity’s premise, 
259 See, e.g., CRPD, op. cit., art. 33, (recognizing need of states parties to establish national 
implementation mechanisms “in accordance with their system of organization” and national 
monitoring mechanisms “in accordance with their legal and administrative systems”). 
260 Drawing expressly on the proposals in this chapter, as well as the recommendations of a 
Blueprint Advisory Group, a formal proposal to establish both national mechanisms was sub-
mitted to the Obama administration in October 2008. See Catherine Powell, Am. Constitution 
Soc’y for Law & Politics, Human Rights at Home: A Domestic Policy Blueprint for the New 
Administration (2008), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/C%20Powell%20Blueprint.pdf. 
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ensuring that decision making and monitoring occur as close as possible to 
the individual. 
1. A National Office on Human Rights Implementation 
and Inter-Agency Coordination Body 
The first national institutional arrangement required by an effective subsi-
diarity-based regime is an executive branch “focal point” on implementa-
tion.261 Ideally in the form of a National Office on Human Rights Implemen-
tation, such a focal point would be dedicated to taking care that the nation’s 
international human rights treaty undertakings are appropriately implemented 
in the domestic jurisdiction.262 As the national face for human rights imple-
mentation efforts, the focal point should be based in the Executive Office of 
the President and led by a person of recognized competence and expertise in 
the field of human rights. That individual, through the National Office, would 
be responsible for overseeing national efforts on human rights matters. 
Importantly, as an orchestrating body, its purpose would not be to take 
over the administrative functions of other agencies, nor to be responsible for 
implementing programs or policies, outside those on transparency, capacity-
building, human rights training, and small grants programs for innovative 
local human rights initiatives. Rather, consistent with subsidiarity, it would 
be dedicated to taking care that the nation’s human rights commitments were 
being appropriately implemented in the domestic jurisdiction, through each of 
the nation’s many competent departments and agencies. To this end, it would 
be assisted at the federal level by a coordination mechanism composed of a 
senior-level representative from each of the major agencies and departments of 
government.263 Each member would be personally responsible for overseeing, 
coordinating, and reporting on human rights mainstreaming efforts in her or 
his department, as well as responding to agency-related complaints of human 
rights abuse. The National Office on Human Rights would act as a back-stop 
on these efforts, providing coordination, a mechanism for the sharing of best 
261 There is an increasing emphasis in international law and development theory on ensuring 
government focal points. Such focal points generally take the shape of a dedicated office 
within government or other policy-coordinating body. See, e.g., CRPD,  op. cit., art. 33(1) 
(“States Parties . . . shall designate one or more focal points within government for matters 
relating to the implementation of the present Convention. . . . ”). 
262 The U.S. Constitution invests the President with the power and duty to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3. This undertaking includes enforcement 
of treaties, which form part of the “supreme Law of the Land.” Id. Art. VI. 
263 See CRPD, op. cit., art.  33(1) (“States Parties . . . shall give due consideration to the estab-
lishment or designation of a coordination mechanism within government to facilitate related 
action in different sectors and at different levels.”). 
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practices, encouragement, and advice. To ensure this essential orchestrating 
role, the coordination mechanism should ideally be chaired by the head of 
the National Office on Human Rights. 
While the United States lacks any executive branch focal point for domestic-
level human rights treaty implementation, it has formally established a coordi-
nation mechanism. Envisioned by President Clinton’s 1998 Executive Order 
13107 and reorganized under President Bush’s 2001 National Security Presiden-
tial Directive, that mechanism must be revitalized and given life through new 
infusions of personnel, resources, and specific human rights mainstreaming 
mandates, with appropriate corresponding tools of transparency and sanction 
where deficiencies are identified in agency or department conduct. 
It is essential, however, that such a revitalized coordination mechanism 
be accompanied by a National Office on Human Rights Implementation. 
Without a centralized, permanent, and dedicated focal point to orchestrate 
the human rights mainstreaming work of agency and department heads, the 
coordination mechanism alone will not be maximally effective. This has been 
the experience of the current Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on 
Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations, which has not 
functioned other than in an ad hoc fashion. This experience owes in large part 
to the absence of a dedicated executive focal point that has human rights treaty 
implementation as its exclusive mandate and area of expertise. Rather, the 
PCC has been headed by the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, for whom domestic-level human rights treaty implementation may be 
neither a priority nor interest. 
A National Office on Human Rights Implementation would thus work 
with a coordination mechanism to ensure that each of the critical functions 
expressed in Executive Order No. 13107 are carried out by the appropriate 
authority or authorities, including the following: 
 responding to inquiries, requests for information, and complaints about 
violations of human rights obligations that fall within each authority’s 
areas of responsibility; 
 coordinating the preparation of treaty compliance reports to the UN, 
OAS, and other international organizations; 
 coordinating responses to contentious complaints lodged with the same 
organizations; 
 overseeing a review of all proposed legislation to ensure its conformity 
with international human rights obligations; 
 ensuring that plans for public outreach and education on human rights 
provisions in treaty-based and domestic law are broadly undertaken; 
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 ensuring an annual review of U.S. reservations, declarations, and under-
standings to human rights treaties; and 
 ensuring that all nontrivial complaints or allegations of inconsistency 
with or breach of international human rights obligations are reviewed 
to determine whether any modifications to U.S. practice or laws are in 
order.264 
In addition to these competences, the National Office on Human Rights 
Implementation would likewise have the important mandate to report to 
Congress and to the nation annually on national human rights progress and 
to make recommendations on new legislation or policies that might periodi-
cally be required on the basis of information received. In this way, Congress 
would be regularly informed of human rights implementation measures taken 
throughout the nation and could supplement efforts where gaps in coverage 
were identified or new forms of spending were required. 
The National Office would also, however, play an important facilitation 
role with respect to the human rights implementation initiatives undertaken 
by state and local authorities. It could collect information, share best practices, 
provide publicity, shine a national spotlight on abusive situations, and promote 
the scaling up of the nation’s most successful local experiments with human 
rights implementation. The Office would act as a centralizing repository for 
information generated from a variety of programs, agencies, and private sector 
sources on national human rights achievement, problem areas, and setbacks 
and could be held to political account for failures to supervise or intervene 
where systemic or gross abuses were uncovered. 
In short, the National Office on Human Rights Implementation would 
serve as the nation’s focal point for ensuring that federal, state, local, and pri-
vate entities were adequately supported and incentivized to implement effec-
tive and appropriate human rights policies for themselves, as close as possible 
to affected individuals. In this way, its mandate would be to help obviate 
the need for individuals to seek human rights protections and enforcement 
at international or even national levels. Rather, consistent with the positive 
dimensions of subsidiarity, it would function to ensure those protections were 
provided effectively at the immediate site of abuse. 
2. United States Commission on Human Rights 
Yet, an implementation mechanism alone is not enough to ensure an effective 
national system of subsidiarity-based protection for human rights. An executive 
264 Executive Order 13107, op. cit. §§2–4. 
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focal point must be accompanied by a fully institutionalized national-level 
monitoring framework to ensure that all individuals have the ability to par-
ticipate in national-level scrutiny and public oversight of U.S. human rights 
implementation commitments.265 Such a body, ideally in the form of a U.S. 
Commission on Human Rights, would serve as an independent check on 
implementation failures, providing a forum through which individuals could 
report abuses and seek political or quasi-judicial address at the domestic level, 
before needing to recur to international treaty bodies. 
To be maximally effective it should be instituted and financed by gov-
ernment, but functionally independent of the political branches, consistent 
with the Paris Principles.266 Most countries honor this function by creating 
a national human rights commission or ombudsperson’s office, bodies that 
can be further replicated within subnational political units, as close to the 
individual as necessary.267 
Many U.S. states and cities in fact have bodies called “human rights com-
missions” or “human relations commissions.”268 Few, however, interpret their 
mandate as extending beyond investigating complaints of discrimination.269 
A U.S. Commission on Human Rights would serve to encourage states and 
localities to broaden their own mandates to encompass the full field of rights 
recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the treaties 
ratified by the United States. A subsidiarity-based relationship would then be 
engaged in which the national body would serve to support the human rights 
protection and promotion activities of more local commissions, ensuring that 
protection efforts are provided throughout the nation’s diverse communities 
at the level closest to the affected individual. 
265 See, e.g., CRPD,  op. cit., art.  33.2 (“States Parties shall . . . maintain, strengthen, designate or 
establish within the State Party, a framework, including one or more independent mechanisms, 
as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the present Convention. 
When designating or establishing such a mechanism, States Parties shall take into account 
the principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and 
promotion of human rights.”). 
266 National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (“The Paris 
Principles”), G.A. Res. 48/134, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/134 (Mar. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Paris 
Principles]. 
267 The International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions counts 
more than 100 national human rights institutions worldwide. U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2006/CRP.5 
(2006), n. 4. 
268 There reportedly are only three states – Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi – that do not 
have any form of a state or local human rights or human relations commission. See Kenneth 
L. Saunders & Hyo Eun (April) Bang, “A Historical Perspective on U.S. Human Rights 
Commissions,” Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Executive Session on Human 
Rights Commissions & Criminal Justice, No.  3 (June 2007), at 11. 
269 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has a similarly limited mandate. 
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Within this subsidiarity orientation, the U.S. Human Rights Commission 
would have a broad promotional and protective mandate.270 It would be able 
to issue relevant reports and guidelines on rights-respecting behavior by dis-
tinct social actors. These would include nonbinding guidelines or guiding 
principles on appropriate conduct in prisons, police stations, administrative 
agencies, and other fora in which human rights abuses frequently occur, as 
well as the power and responsibility to make regular (nonbinding) recommen-
dations to all relevant stakeholders, including particularly Congress, executive 
agencies and departments, and the legislatures of the many states. Such recom-
mendations would be offered in a constructive spirit of cooperation, indicating 
areas of concern and offering assistance in identifying the most effective mea-
sures of response in consultation with affected citizens and local or national 
authorities. 
A national human rights commission would also engage in regular human 
rights education and training programs,271 as well as receive complaints from 
individuals about alleged human rights violations, initiate investigations, offer 
mediation services, arrive at findings, and issue recommendations to the par-
ties and/or to relevant local authorities.272 It would be competent to hold 
nationwide thematic hearings on distinct human rights issues, especially where 
common themes emerged from state and local hearings, and engage in inde-
pendent monitoring of national human rights conditions through a variety 
of means, including investigations, inquiries, and surveys. In this respect, it 
could gather statistics from local and state human rights commissions on the 
numbers and types of issues and complaints they were addressing, and ensure 
the broad availability of human rights documents and materials. It would 
thereby serve as an important conduit for receiving and processing the results 
of localized discussions, policies, and experiments around the nation, with a 
view to discussing and sharing them among a national audience. 
A U.S. Commission on Human Rights would thus self-consciously be based 
in the principle of subsidiarity, ensuring that its interventions were aimed at 
supporting local decision making, participatory engagement, and community-
centered implementation processes. Its work would be directed to supporting 
270 Paris Principles, op. cit., Part A,  ¶ 2 (“A national institution shall be given as broad a mandate 
as possible, which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its 
composition and its sphere of competence.”). 
271 The Paris Principles explicitly affirm that national human rights institutions “shall, inter  
alia, have the following responsibilities. . . . To assist in the formulation of programs for the 
teaching of, and research into, human rights and to take part in their execution in schools, 
universities and professional circles; [and] [t]o publicize human rights and efforts to combat 
all forms of discrimination . . . by increasing public awareness, especially through information 
and education and by making use of all press organs.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 3(f)-3(g) (emphasis added). 
272 Cf. id. Part D. 
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localism, states’ rights, and the vital experimentation they foster, while serving 
in a capacity to illuminate problematic areas where national policy interven-
tion may be necessary in function of subsidiarity’s positive assistive aspect. 
In this way, a U.S. Human Rights Commission would serve as an inde-
pendent check to ensure that individuals throughout the United States had 
effective local mechanisms through which their rights could effectively be 
protected in meaningful and appropriate ways at the immediate site of abuse, 
without needing to resort to international human rights treaty bodies for addi-
tional assistance and support. 
F. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONALIZING SUBSIDIARITY 
In his statement before the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, U.S. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher affirmed that “[i]n the battle for democ-
racy and human rights, words matter, but what we do matters much more.”273 
This continues to be the slogan of the U.S. State Department in its engage-
ment policy with international human rights treaty bodies. That is, the United 
States engages such bodies in a procedurally exacting, substantively respon-
sive, and high-level way, with the aim of setting an example for other states in 
deepening their own sovereign engagements with human rights treaty body 
supervision. 
Yet what the United States in fact does in its engagement policy constitutes 
only half of what it seeks to encourage other states to do. The United States does 
not wish to encourage other states to use treaty ratification primarily as a foreign 
policy tool, formally preparing and presenting reports, answering questions, 
and then leaving the process in Geneva, away from the critical reflection of 
domestic constituencies. Such a process would serve no useful domestic-level 
purpose, either in terms of strengthening democratic institutions or enhancing 
human dignity. To the contrary, the United States aims to use its influence 
to encourage the world’s governments to bring those international processes 
and commitments home, to discuss them with civil society, to monitor their 
own internal human rights progress, and to work to correct areas of deficiency 
through local innovation, transparency, and corrective experimentation. That 
is, the United States aims to ensure that international supervision truly serves its 
intended subsidiary purpose: to accompany and impel forward domestic pro-
cesses of human rights monitoring, supervision, and remediation at national, 
municipal/state, and local levels. 
In this respect, if the United States genuinely wishes to set a positive, 
constructive example for other states, it must – as Secretary Christopher 
273 Christopher, op. cit. 
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underscored – not only talk the talk, but walk the walk, demonstrating through 
self-directed action its commitment to domestic human rights processes. This 
cannot include engagement with the mere formalisms of international treaty 
obligations, using them to shield domestic processes from the influence of 
treaty body engagement. Rather, it must include engagement with the sub-
stance and spirit of them. This means institutionalizing domestic processes for 
using treaty body engagement as the impetus for a regular conversation and 
self-analysis of how well we are in fact standing up to human rights commit-
ments, as we understand them in our complex and diverse communities and 
in the concrete contexts in which we live. It means monitoring national-level 
statistics and collecting regular information from the states with respect to 
each recognized right, regularly listening to citizens about the ways in which 
they feel their rights are or are not being addressed, actively considering their 
proposals for effective solutions, and systematically analyzing complaints of 
abuse and what remedies are in place to address them. Within this process, 
the inputs of international actors and comparative national experience can be 
highly instructive, even as they are never determinative for the precise con-
tours of U.S. policy. That is, human rights engagement is not only or even 
principally about having a conversation at the international level; it is about 
starting and sustaining a domestic conversation, one that begins at the small-
est and most local of places and works its way up to town, state, and federal 
authorities, within a national facilitative structure. 
A U.S. treaty body engagement policy structured in this way – with the 
focus on domestic processes and responsive accountability to local needs – 
would go a long way toward transforming U.S. human rights policy from a 
noted example of paradox for the rest of the world to a genuine model of how 
human rights law and international treaty body engagement can be used, in 
function of subsidiarity principles, to deepen democratic processes, strengthen 
civil society participation, and internalize human rights protections in locally 
relevant, factually responsive, and genuinely meaningful ways. 
